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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
GERMAN VERGANGENHEITSBEWÄLTIGUNG, 1961 - 1999:  
SELECTED HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONTROVERSIES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Christine Richert Nugent, M.A. 
Western Carolina University (April 2010) 
Director:  Dr. David Dorondo 
 
 
 
Focusing on Germany, this study addresses the question how a national community can 
go about incorporating its crimes against others into its ‘national memorial landscape,’ a 
term coined by James E. Young.  After the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany at 
the end of WWII, Germany had to redefine its national identity, in light of its National 
Socialist past, in order to rejoin the community of democratic nations. This study focuses 
on that process, which in the Federal Republic of Germany has taken place largely by 
working through competing interpretations of the National Socialist legacy; a process 
also known as ‘reckoning with the Nazi past’ or Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  The 
process involves complex relationships between public and private representations and 
interpretations of the past, scholarly and lay perspectives, academic and popular
approaches, political and personal motivations, and individual and collective memories.  
The resulting ‘memory contests’ are by definition pluralistic and generally contentious.  
They deal with competing interpretations of the past, interpretations that are of critical 
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importance to the self understanding of individuals, groups, and nations.  This study 
focuses on five controversies that not only served as catalysts for reckoning with the 
recent past, but also significantly shaped German national self-consciousness. Th y are 
the Fischer Controversy (1961-64), the Historikerstreit (1986/87), the Goldhagen Affair 
(1995), the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung (1995-99), and the Walser-
Bubis-Debate (1998/99).  Together, these debates about the legacy of National Socialism 
shaped what has become known as the ‘history culture’ of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, with implications for the political culture of the country as well. This study 
argues that the first and the last contests were bracketing events.  They signified a 
beginning and an end to a particular way of reckoning with the Nazi past.  The major 
themes, namely the role of the past in the present, the role of professional historians in 
constructing the past, the interplay between public and private memory, and the impact of 
(competing) conceptions of the past on national identity, were present in all five, but the 
study demonstrates that they played out differently in each one. The study further argues 
that while the historicization of National Socialism has probably become inevitable by 
the end of the twentieth century, it took the process of working through the five catalyti  
events in order to get to that point.  Yet the process traced here does not demonstrate 
progress nor was it inevitable in the way that it played out; rather, it was complex and 
‘messy’ and is unlikely to be over any time soon, even though the generation that has 
witnessed WWII first-hand is about to leave the scene.  The study concludes that the p st, 
regardless of how riddled with traumatic or criminal events, will remain important as 
individuals, groups, and nations discover and rediscover their historical roots and 
negotiate who they are in the world.  The focus here is on post-war Germany, yet the
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issues connected with forging memorial landscapes that incorporate proud as well as 
burdening aspects of a national past are applicable beyond the German context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The master or grand national narrative has largely fallen out of favor with 
historians.  While the profession once embraced as noble task the uncovering of a 
nation’s inexorable path towards democracy, skepticism or outright rejection of this role 
prevail today.  These statements are admittedly generalizing and simplifying a situation 
that may vary widely from nation to nation, but they nevertheless point to broad trends 
within western historiography. 
The grand national narrative seems to live on in popular culture, nevertheless, 
from where its impact on historical consciousness and national identity formati n may be 
quite significant, but professional historians are no longer dominating its construction and 
communication.1  Rather, the guild has long since abandoned the notion that such a 
master narrative can or should exist or that it is possible to agree on what it might be.2  
Fragmentation has replaced consensus within the historical profession.  Yet the p rceived 
need for a ‘usable’ past has not disappeared from the public sphere, as one might infer 
from popular interest in all things ‘historical,’ be they documentaries, personal memoirs, 
historical fiction, movies and television series based on historical themes, museu s, or 
                                                
1For Germany, one indication of this trend is an opinion survey conducted in 1999, according to 
which 66% of the respondents gained their information about history from television; 40% each from 
movies and historical places; only 12% responded that their information about history came from ‘lectures.’ 
16% did not occupy themselves with history.  Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, eds., 
Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-2002, Band 11(München: K.G. Saur, 2002), 541. 
 
2See also Stafan Berger, The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical 
Consciousness in Germany since 1800 (Providence, RI:  Berghahn Books, 1997), 81.  
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memorials.3  Public commemorations of historical events also convey the message that 
‘the past,’ however defined, remains to hold an important place in the present. 
The unabated interest in and need for national identity rooted in history is not all 
that surprising at the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite or perhaps because of 
increasing tendencies towards globalization and cultural convergence.  Just having 
emerged from a century of total war, genocide and industrial mass murder, of forced 
mass expulsion and migration, and of volatile national boundaries and state alliances, a 
national community’s understanding of its own past seems to be as important as ever, 
even while that very past is contested at the same time.4  Who participates in the 
construction of such a past, what role, if any, professional historians and other 
intellectuals play in the process, what is being included and excluded, and how the 
resulting narratives are being used in the public sphere is neither self-evident nor 
inconsequential.  Furthermore, in the presence of a generation of eye-witnesses and 
participants, national historical consciousness becomes entangled with personal and 
collective memory.  Moreover, as Konrad Jarausch pointed out, many of the historians 
engaged in the sub-discipline of Zeitgeschichte [the very recent past] find themselves in 
the crucible between subjective memory and the professional ethic of scholarly rigor and 
                                                
3Hans Günter Hockerts provided as evidence for this interest, especially via the medium of 
television, the example of the public television series, Hitlers Helfer [Hitler’s Helpers] that attracted up to 
eight million viewers per episode in 1998.  As for museums, the House of History of the Federal Republic 
of Germany in Bonn counted one million guests within fifteen months of opening.  He also mentioned the 
motion pictures Schindler’s List and Saving Private Ryan as examples of history-based media events 
attracting enormous public interest.  Hans Günter Hockerts, “Zugänge zur Zeitgeschichte:  
Primärerfahrung, Erinnerungskultur, Geschichtswissen chaft,” in Verletztes Gedächtnis:  
Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt, eds. Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow (Frankfurt:  
Campus Verlag, 2002), 66, 58.   
 
4In an opinion survey in Germany in 1997, respondents pu  ‘history—the past’ in fourth place in 
terms of holding a nation together, after ‘language,’ ‘a common state,’ and ‘threat from without,’ in that 
order.  Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, eds., Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1998-
2002, Band 10 ( München: K.G. Saur, 1997), 494. 
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appropriate emotional distance. 5  These various tensions have attracted considerable 
scholarly attention in recent decades, leading to debates about the complex relationships 
between national history, historical consciousness, private and public memory, scholarly 
history and popular memory, and national identity.6 
While communities striving to construct or strengthen their collective ident ties 
with the help of a ‘usable past’ must confront the complexities just mentioned, the 
processes involved are especially complicated for nations whose recent history is all but 
heroic and contains elements that are uncomfortable or traumatic to rememb r.7  
Germany, on which this study will focus, provides an excellent albeit not the only 
                                                
5Konrad Jarausch, “Zeitgeschichte und Erinnerung:  Deutungskonkurrenz oder Interdependenz?” 
in Verletztes Gedächtnis:  Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt eds. Konrad Jarausch and 
Martin Sabrow (Frankfurt:  Campus Verlag, 2002), 24-25, 28, 34-35.   
 
6A few examples from the vast literature on the topic concerning Germany are Aleida Assmann, 
Geschichte im Gedächtnis: Von der individuellen Erfah ung zur öffentlichen Inszenierung  (München:  
C.H. Beck, 2007);  Saul Friedländer, “History, Memory, and the Historian:  Dilemmas and 
Responsibilities,” New German Critique 80, Special issue on the Holocaust (Spring-Summer 2000):  3-15, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/488629 (accessed March 27, 2010); Michael Geyer and Michael Latham, “The 
Place of the Second World War in German Memory and History,” New German Critique 71, Memories of 
Germany (Spring-Summer 1997):  5-40, http://www.jstor.org/stable/488557 (accessed March 27, 2010); 
Patrick Hutton, “Recent Scholarship on Memory and History,” The History Teacher 33, no. 4 (August 
2000): 533-584, http://www.jstor.org/stable/494950 (accessed March 27, 2010); Bill Niven, “On the Use of 
‘Collective Memory,” German History 26, no. 3 (July 2008):  427-436;  Mary Nolan, “The Politics of 
Memory in the Berlin Republic,” Radical History Review 81 (Fall 2001):  113-132, http://0- 
search.ebscohost.com.library.acaweb.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=7527718&site=ehost-live 
(accessed March 27, 2010); Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History:  Les Lieux de Mémoire,” 
Representations 26, Special issue:  Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989): 7-24. 
 
7Robert G. Moeller may have coined the term, ‘usable past,’ in his article, “War Stories:  The 
Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany” The American Historical Review 101 no. 4 
(October 1996): 1008-1048, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2169632 (accessed March 27, 2010).  As for the 
place within society of reckoning with a difficult past, see Christian Meier, Das Verschwinden der 
Gegenwart: Über Geschichte und Politik (München:  Carl Hanser Verlag, 2001), 88-89.  Meier made the 
point that a lack of openness vis-à-vis the criminal elements in one’s national past is widespread.  He cited 
examples such as Turkey’s genocide of the Armenians during WWI, Dutch colonial conduct in Indonesia, 
the role of Vichy-France during WWII, and Japanese conduct in WWII, all of which were still more or less 
taboo in official national discourse at the time of his writing.  One could add examples for other countries, 
including the United States (Enola Gay controversy).  According to Meier, Germany’s efforts to reckon 
with its difficult recent past were the exception rather than the norm.  R. J. B. Bosworth offered a rare
example of comparative historiography of WWII that focused on the divergent approaches in England, 
West Germany, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan and demonstrated the linkages between 
historiography, politics, and ideology.  R. J. B. Bosworth,  Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima:  History 
Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990 (New York:  Routledge, 1994). 
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example where this is the case.  On the one hand, the country’s past century included 
major responsibility for two world wars, the perpetration of unprecedented crimes against 
humanity, the almost complete destruction of its own territory, and forced migration on a 
large scale.  Yet on the other hand economic recovery characterized the second half of the 
same century, resulting in Germany currently being one of the most robust and 
prosperous economies in the world.  National reunification, following a peaceful popular 
revolution in East Germany, as well as a growing leadership role on the world stage 
round out the image of a  nation that has risen from the ashes of its past. Looking back on 
Germany’s development from the perspective of 1994, British historian and writer, 
Timothy Garton Ash noted “the fantastic distance that Germany has travelled [sic] over 
the last-half century:  the distance to civility, legality, modernity, democracy.” 8  
One cannot take for granted the development from utter ruin to thriving nation, 
within a time span of little more than half a century.  What was needed to effect this 
change was not only economic, political, and social reconstruction, but also moral 
reconstitution.  The focus here will be on the latter, a process that in the Federal Repub ic 
of Germany has taken place largely by working through competing interpretations of the 
National Socialist legacy.   
Germans use the heady term, Vergangenheitsbewältigung for this process, a term 
that generally translates as reckoning or coming to terms with the past, but that some 
have interpreted as overcoming or mastering the past.  The first meaning implies an 
ongoing process, while the second understanding refers to the expectation of a successful 
endpoint.  Those who adhere to the latter notion imply that a conclusion is indeed 
                                                
8Timothy Garton Ash, “Kohl’s Germany:  The Beginning of the End?” The New York Review of 
Books,  December 1, 1994, 20, quoted in Berger, The Search for Normality, 236. 
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possible.  Once it has been reached, one can draw a final line, or Schlussstrich, under the 
past and Germany can once again be a ‘normal nation,’ however one might want to 
define such concept.  In any case, central to the effort is the need to construct a ‘usable’ 
past out of the Third Reich and its aftermath.  The fact that this has been an elusive goal 
so far does not seem to make it less of a national obsession.  Indeed, as of 2010, there is 
yet no sign of a Schlussstrich; on the contrary, since German reunification there seems to 
be a renewed sense of urgency about dealing with the National Socialist past.9 
The literature uses a variety of terms for this phenomenon.  Memory politics, 
memory debates, public memory discourse, politics of remembrance, modes of 
commemoration, and history politics are a few examples. The German term, 
Vergangenheitspolitik, loosely translated as politics with or about the past, seems to be 
prevalent.  Those who use it attribute it to German historian Norbert Frei.  Whatever one 
may choose to call the process, it involves complex relationships between public and 
private representations and interpretations of the past, scholarly and lay perspectives, 
academic and popular approaches, political and personal motivations, and individual and 
collective memories.  The usage of p litics and debate in connection with memory 
alludes to the fact that there are multiple memories and multiple historical perspectives 
                                                
9Michael Th. Greven and Oliver von Wrochem, “Wehrmacht und Vernichtungskrieg zwischen 
Gesellschaftspolitik, Wssenschaft und individueller V arbeitung der Geschichte,” in Der Krieg in der 
Nachkriegszeit:   Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik,eds. Greven and von 
Wrochem  (Opladen:  Leske + Budrich, 2000), 9.  Greven and von Wrochem attributed some of the 
renewed conversation to the fact that after reunification West and East Germans, who had been socialized 
in very different memory-political systems, had to negotiate a new, now common national identity.  See 
also Siobhan Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity (Westport:  
Praeger, 2001), 9. Others attributed the development primarily to the disappearance of the aging generation 
of witnesses who were victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. Norbert Frei, 1945 und Wir:  Das Dritte Reich 
im Bewuβtsein der Deutschen (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2005), Chapter 3.  According to Stefan 
Berger, there have been signs since 1989 that dealing with the more recent communist past in the eastern 
part of the country is eclipsing that of dealing with the National Socialist past.  For example, just in 1994, 
one historian counted eight hundred ongoing research projects on the German Democratic Republic.  
Berger, The Search for Normality, 157.  
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and discourses that their various adherents must negotiate with one another.  The 
postmodern notion of individuals, groups, and nations constructing their memories as 
well as their pasts is fundamental to an understanding of the political nature of dealing
with one’s past.  In this sense, the past functions as providing meaning for the present.  In 
other words, individuals, groups, and nations instrumentalize the past in response to 
issues and concerns of the present.  It is not surprising that the proc ss itself, the question 
of how Vergangenheitsbewältigung has played out at various stages in the life of post-
war German society has been as much the subject of debate as the historical events of th  
National Socialist past themselves.  The process has been historicized to th  point of  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung  having matured into a sub-field of historical inquiry in its 
own right within the broader field of Zeitgeschichte, which, in turn is part of modern 
German history.10     
Germany did not willingly embark on reckoning with its National Socialist pa
immediately following its unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945.  Rather, the 
occupying forces ‘jumpstarted’ the process informally by making local populations tour 
close-by concentration camps and formally with the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals.11  
                                                
10The Allied Forces gave the first impetus for the institutionalization of Zeitgeschichte by 
proposing the founding of the Institut für Zeitgeschichtsforschung in Munich in 1949, with the mandate to 
research the history of National Socialism.  German historians Hans Rothfels and Martin Broszart were its 
first directors.  Half a century later, not only the vast literature on the subject attests to the maturation of the 
field and its sub-field, but also the encyclopedia, Lexikon der “Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” edited by 
Torben Fischer and Matthias Lorenz and published in 2007. 
 
11German historian Sybille Steinbacher described how the American occupation forces made the 
population of Dachau view the corpses in the Dachau concentration camp, clear the dead from trains, and 
bury them.  According to Steinbacher, popular reaction to these measures was a mix of disbelief, horror, 
resentment, and anger (at the Jews), but not much contrition. Sybille Steinbacher,  “ ‘…dass ich mit der 
Totenklage auch die Klage um unsere Stadt verbinde’:  Die Verbrechen von Dachau in der Wahrnehmung 
der frühen Nachkriegszeit,” in Beschweigen und Bekennen:  Die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der 
Holocaust, eds. Norbert Frei and Sybille Steinbacher,  Dachauer Symposium zur Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 1, 11-
33  (Göttingen:  Wallstein Verlag, 2001).  For similar findings, see Frei and Steinbacher,  Beschweigen und 
Bekennen:  Die Deutsche Nachriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen:  Wallstein, 2001), 147-148 
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Also important in this respect were the wholesale de-Nazification and re-education 
programs targeted at the entire German population. 
While basic survival was foremost on Germans’ minds during the immediate 
post-war years, it soon became obvious that Germany had to redefine its national identity,
in light of its National Socialist past, in order to rejoin the community of democratic 
nations. If for no other reasons, raison d’état dictated embarking upon the process.  West 
Germany’s immediate goal after 1945 was integration into the West.  Twenty-five years 
later, reconciliation and rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union also 
became hallmarks of West German foreign policy, with the ultimate goal of making 
German reunification possible.  This dual effort—West integration first and then 
reconciliation with the East—would have been unthinkable without reckoning with 
National Socialism, under the eyes of an international community whose wounds 
inflicted by Nazi Germany were still fresh.12  Thus, political necessity and international 
weariness made the process not only one that Germany drove herself, but also one that 
largely occurred under the watchful eyes of the international community.13 
Reckoning in West Germany took many forms. At first, it primarily manifested 
itself in official government declarations and commemorations.  It became mor  intense 
                                                
12In East Germany, the process followed a different path.  The national socialist past also played a 
decisive role since the state legitimized its existence as the socialist alternative to fascist Germany.  A sense 
of responsibility for Nazi crimes and an obligation t  make amends was not part of the GDR’s national 
identity.  For further detail on the dual or double G rman past, which is not addressed in this study, see 
Kattago, Ambiguous Memory, Chapter 4, and Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past:  United Germany and the 
Legacy of the Third Reich (London:  Routledge, 2002), chapters 2 and 3.  
 
13None of the controversies discussed in this paper were German affairs alone, as the wide foreign 
coverage indicates.  There seems to be a keen interest, specially in Europe, the United States, and Israel,  
in German Zeitgeschichte. A considerable number of non-German historians have dedicated their 
professional lives to it and some count among the most prominent and prolific experts on the topic (Konrad 
Jarausch, Charles Maier, Ian Kershaw, Geoff Eley, Richard Evans, Saul Friedländer, Raul Hilberg, Omer 
Bartov, Mary Fulbrook, just to name a few of those who had much to say about the controversies at issue 
here).  Michael Geyer also made the point that the history of WWII will never be the history of the 
Germans alone.  Geyer, “The Place of WWII in German Memory,” 38-39. 
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in the late 1960s as the first post-war generation insisted on answers from their elders. 
With the aging of the witness or perpetrator generation on the one hand and an increasing 
interest in everyday history on the other, private memories and family discourse about the 
war gained importance within an emerging memory culture of the Federal R public by 
the late 1980s.  Finally, reunification shifted the focus once again, from moral 
reconstitution to forging a new national identity. 14 
There were catalysts for this work of reckoning, some coming from abroad and 
others from within society.  Some of the strongest impulses came from within polit cal 
circles, usually in connection with anniversaries, and from the popular media.  Most 
notable among the latter was the American television series, Holocaust, that has captured 
German audiences since its first screening in 1979 and prompted widespread 
preoccupation with National Socialist crimes against the Jews.15  A  a result, the term 
Holocaust became practically synonymous with the murder of the Jews and began to 
stand for the National Socialist past as a whole, replacing Auschwitz as the central 
metaphor for the historical period. 
American historian Atina Grossman referred to these catalytic events as 
‘Holocaust moments.’ 16  She correctly observed that the history of the Federal Republic 
                                                
14There seems to be a historiographic consensus aboutthis standard narrative of the broad phases 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  The assessment of this process is highly contested, on the other hand.  Two 
similar perspectives are provided in Norbert Frei, 1945 und wir and Mary Fulbrook, German National 
Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge, UK:  Polity Press, 1999).  
 
15Twenty million viewers, or about half of the adult population of West Germany, watched the 
series on television that year.  Kattago, Ambiguous Memory, 45.  See also, Klaus Groβe Kracht, Die 
zankende Zunft:  Historische Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2005), 12. 
 
16Atina Grossman, “The ‘Goldhagen Effect’:  Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New 
Germany,” in The Goldhagen Effect:  History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German Past, ed. Geoff Eley   
(Ann Arbor:  The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 89-90.  For a good overview of such events since 
1945, see Jeffrey K. Olick, “What Does It Mean to Nrmalize the Past?  Official Memory in German 
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was literally ‘strewn’ with them; however, as we will see, the events were much more 
than ‘moments.’ Christian Meier’s image of Wellen [waves] seems more appropriate as it 
implies a succession of controversies that literally wash over society and upset the status 
quo left by the previous one in their wake.17  The wave image also corresponds with 
Anne Fuchs’s and Mary Cosgrove’s assertion that these catalysts initiated “memory 
contests,” which they defined as “highly dynamic public engagements with the past that 
are triggered by an event that is perceived as a massive disturbance of a community’s 
self-understanding.” 18  Memory contests are by definition pluralistic and generally 
contentious.  They deal with competing interpretations of the past, interpretations hat are 
of critical importance to the self understanding of individuals, groups, and nations.  This 
study will focus on five such contests or ‘waves,’ all of which have significantly shaped 
German national self-consciousness from the early nineteen-sixties into the firs  decade 
of the twenty-first century.  They are the Fischer Controversy (1961-64), the 
Historikerstreit (1986/87), the Goldhagen Affair (1995), the controversy over the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung (1995-99), and the Walser-Bubis-Debate (1998/99). 19 
This study will show that the first and the last contests were bracketing events.  
They signified a beginning and an end to a particular way of reckoning with the Nazi 
________________________ 
Politics,” Social Science History 22, no. 4, Special issue:  Memory and the Nation (Winter 1998):  547-571, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1171575 (accessed March 27, 2010). 
 
17Meier, Das Verschwinden der Gegenwart, 46. 
 
18Anne Fuchs and Mary Cosgrove. “Introduction: Germany’s Memory Contests and the 
Management of the Past,” in German Memory Contests:  The Quest for Identity in Literature, Film, and 
Discourse Since 1990, eds. Anne Fuchs, Mary Cosgrove, and Georg Grote (Rochester, NY:  Camden 
House, 2006), 2.    
 
19Historikerstreit= quarrel/debate/controversy among historians; Wehrmachtsausstellung = exhibit 
about Hitler’s war of annihilation against the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia from 1941-1944. The exhibit’s 
official name was: Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht.1941-1944. 
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past.  The major themes, namely the role of the past in the present, the role of 
professional historians in constructing the past, the interplay between public and private 
memory, and the impact of (competing) conceptions of the past on national identity, were 
present in all five, but played out differently in each one.  This study will argue that the 
historicization of National Socialism has become inevitable, perhaps even desirable, by 
the end of the twentieth century, but that it took the process of working through the five 
catalytic events in order to get to this point.  This does not mean that the elusive 
Schlussstrich under the National Socialist past has finally arrived; it just means that 
dealing with National Socialism enters a new phase in which approaches may be 
appropriate that would have been unthinkable in the early nineteen-sixties or premature in 
the mid-nineteen-eighties.  
 All five events happened at critical junctures in the history of the Federal 
Republic. In a nutshell, the Fischer Controversy surrounding historian Fritz Fischer’s 
1961 ground-breaking study of Germany’s war aims in WWI did not directly deal with 
Nazism or WWII, but nevertheless opened the door for the questioning of historiographic 
assumptions that had thus far impeded a reckoning with the Nazi past.20  In other words, 
Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht was the opening salvo for a process that is still 
ongoing today, namely the attempt to forge a new national identity in light of a tr ubled 
recent past.  The last event erupted thirty-seven years later over the speech that 
playwright Martin Walser delivered in the Frankfurt Paulskirche in October 1998, on 
occasion of accepting the peace price of the German book trade. The speech took issue 
with the public use of Auschwitz as ‘moral cudgel’ and with the alleged 
                                                
20Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmach:  Die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914/18 (Düsseldorf:  Droste Verlag, 1961). 
. 
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instrumentalization of shame over the Holocaust for contemporary political purposes. 
Walser called for reckoning with the Nazi past to become a private affair between the 
individual and his or her conscience.  The speech earned Walser overwhelming public 
support, but unleashed a six-months controversy in which the German news media played 
a primary role.21  Although the process of reckoning with its National Socialist past has 
not come to a conclusion yet in Germany, the Walser-Bubis-Debate was the most recent 
event of its kind gripping the entire nation. 
If Germans were not ready to reckon with their Nazi past in 1961, and if their 
general approval of Walser’s speech indicated their weariness of doing so in 1999, one 
wonders what happened in the thirty-seven years between the two controversies.  The 
three events that bridged the gap between the Fischer Controversy and the Walser-Bubis- 
Debate, the Historikerstreit, the Goldhagen Affair, and the controversy surrounding the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung, may provide some clues. 
The Historikerstreit erupted just a year after the fortieth anniversary celebrations 
of the end of the war and three years before the unexpected reunification with East 
Germany.  The core issues in this complex debate included the question whether it was 
appropriate to historicize the Holocaust and study it like any other historical event.  Also, 
would comparing the Holocaust to other modern genocides ‘normalize’ it (i.e. make it 
relative or even excuse it), or would one have to continue to treat it as a uniquely 
horrendous event in history?  Underlying these points of contention was the question 
whether the time had come to draw a closing line under the past and become a self-
                                                
21Matthias Lorenz, “Walser-Bubis-Debatte,” in Torben Fischer and Matthias Lorenz, eds., Lexikon 
der “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”:  Debatten-und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945 
(Bielefeld:  transcript Verlag, 2007), 297. 
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assured, ‘normal’ nation like any other?  The Goldhagen Affair and the controversy over 
the original Wehrmachtsausstellung happened a decade later, five years after 
reunification, and coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi 
Germany.  The Goldhagen Affair broke out over American historian Daniel Goldhagen’s 
book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, in which he asserted that ordinary Germans took part 
in the Holocaust willingly and often enthusiastically, driven by an ‘eliminatio ist anti-
Semitism’ that was unique to Germany and deeply rooted in its history.22  The 
Wehrmachtsausstellung was a traveling exhibit depicting German army soldiers 
committing war crimes and genocide as part of Hitler’s war of annihilation gainst the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (1941-1944).  It was controversial because it destroyed the 
popular myth of the ‘clean’ army and allegedly condemned as murderers all who had 
served as soldiers (as opposed to members of the Waffen SS) during WWII. 
These three bridging events had in common that they fell into the time span 
between 1983 and 1995, the long decade replete with fiftieth anniversaries, 
commemorating events from Hitler’s coming to power to the various assassination 
attempts on his life, and culminating in the final defeat/liberation.23  All three were 
significant in that they prompted discussions among historians and other intellectuals, but 
also drew in politicians, various opinion makers, and the public. Each one broke taboos, 
some within historical scholarship, and others in political self-understanding or within the 
popular memory of the past.  They asked new questions or old questions in new ways, 
                                                
22Torben Fischer, “Goldhagen Debatte,” in Torben Fischer and Matthias Lorenz, eds., Lexikon der 
“Vergangenheitsbewältigung”:  Debatten-und Diskursge chichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945 
(Bielefeld:  transcript Verlag, 2007), 295.  Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners:  Ordinary 
Germans and the Holocaust (New York:  Knopf, 1996). 
 
23Whether to refer to May 8, 1845 as a day of defeat or liberation was a memory contest in its own 
right.   
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and to varying degrees they prompted new scholarship.24  They were not confined to 
Germany, since the history of National Socialism is not Germany’s alone, but the focus 
of this study will be on German perspectives.  All three were public debates that deeply 
affected German memory, both its collective memory and the personal memories of 
individuals.  Lastly, each of these ‘waves’ that triggered intense ‘memory contests’ were 
as much about the present—and even about the future—as about the past.  They had as 
much to do with current events in the life of the nation as with its recent past.  As such, 
each debate offers a window into German national identity, before and after the 
watershed events of 1989-1991.  They also make clear that at issue are not only the past 
events themselves, but just as much the manner in which politics, society, and the 
historical profession research, discuss, remember, and instrumentalize such events from a 
variety of perspectives and for a variety of purposes.  Together, these debates about the 
legacy of National Socialism shaped what has become known as the ‘history culture’ of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, with implications for the country’s political culture as 
well.25   
Even though the academic literature about German history contests and memory 
culture is vast, few scholars have offered conceptual frameworks providing me tal 
roadmaps for negotiating the successive ‘waves’ of controversies.  Estonian p litical 
                                                
24For more detail on the kinds of scholarship they opened up, see “Forum:  The Historikerstreit 
Twenty Years On,” German History 24, no. 4 (2006):  586-607.  
 
25Jörn Rüsen, “Was ist Geschichtskultur? Überlegungen zu einer neuen Art, über Geschichte 
nachzudenken,” in Historische Faszination:  Geschichtskultur Heute, eds. Klaus Füssmann, Heinrich 
Grütter, and Jörn Rüsen (Köln:  Böhlau Verlag, 1994), 5. Rüsen, Professor for General History at the 
University of Bielefeld, defined history culture as the “practically operative articulation of historical 
consciousness in the life of a society” [my translation], ibid. According to Rüsen, artistic expression, public 
history, and monuments and commemorations are all part of history culture.  Academic history can and 
does influence it, but has no exclusive hold on it.  The term seems to be roughly synonymous with 
‘memory culture,’used to describe the same phenomenn. 
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philosopher Siobhan Kattago and German historian Norbert Frei are notable exceptions.    
According to Kattago, the process has moved through five stages:  (1) Occupation and 
shock, 1945-1949; (2) repression and reparations, 1949-1959; (3) therapeutic mourning, 
1960s and 1970s; (4) preoccupation with antifascism and totalitarian theories, 1970s, and 
(5) normalization and national identity, 1980s to present.  In Kattago’s analytical 
framework, these phases coincided with three models of national self-consciousess. 
According to her, West Germans moved from a “guilty pariah” model of identity i the 
1950s to a therapeutic phase of mourning in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the 1980s 
arrived at the normalization model of national consciousness that still persists.26  
According to this scheme, except for the Fischer Controversy, the debates at issue here 
would all fall into the last model of national self-consciousness. 
Frei offered an alternative periodization, which, upon closer scrutiny, is not that 
different from Kattago’s.  For him, reckoning with the past happened in four phases.  Th  
phase of politische Säuberungen [political purges] lasted from 1945-1949 and was 
followed by the phase of Vergangenheitspolitik [politics about the past] in the 1950s.  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung [reckoning with the past] followed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The last phase was that of Vergangenheitsbewahrung [commemoration of the past], 
which commenced in the 1980s and was still ongoing in 2005, the year of publication of 
Frei’s periodization scheme. 27  It remains to be seen which one, if any, of the attempts to 
establish phases of Vergangenheitsbewältigung corresponds with this work’s proposal of 
a more thematic, rather than a chronological classification of the ‘waves’ that wept over 
                                                
26Kattago, Ambiguous Memory:  The Nazi Past, 38-48.  
  
27Frei, 1945 und Wir, 41. 
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Germany between what this study will call theOpening Salvo (Fischer Controversy) and 
an End of an Era (Walser-Bubis-Debate).  
22 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
OPENING SALVO AND END OF AN ERA: 
THE FISCHER CONTROVERSY AND THE WALSER-BUBIS-DEBATE 
 
 
 
The reaction to his book surprised no one more than Fritz Fischer, its author.28  In 
1964, three years after the publication of Griff nach der Weltmacht:  Die Kriegszielpolitik 
des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918 and during the climax of the ensuing 
controversy, a journalist asked Fischer whether he had expected his work to be a huge 
success.  “No, I had to offer it like sour beer,” responded Fischer, continuing that most 
publishers were not interested because he had to admit that the book did not deal with 
Hitler.29  
Nevertheless, the book must have “hit a nerve of German self understanding” 
since otherwise the reaction to the book would have been inconceivable.30 More 
publications followed and the controversy broadened.  In retrospect, Australian historian 
and Fischer expert John A. Moses claimed that the dispute over Fischer’s work had had 
the impact of a revolution.31  “Once in a decade or generation,” Moses declared, 
                                                
28Born in 1908 in Bavaria, Germany, Fischer studied Protestant theology, philosophy, pedagogy, 
constitutional history and national history at the Universities of Erlangen and Berlin, culminating in two 
PhDs., one in theology and the other in history.  Having served in the German Air Force in WWII and after 
a period as prisoner of war in U.S. custody, Fischer assumed the chair of medieval and modern history at 
the University of Hamburg in 1947, where he stayed until his retirement in 1973.  He remained active in 
scholarly research and debate until the early 1990s and died in 1999.   
 
29Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Fritz Fischer Papers, N 1422/5, quoted in Groβe Kracht, Die zankende 
Zunft, 47 [translation mine]. 
 
30Ibid., [translation mine].  The term, self-understanding, does not ideally capture the German 
Selbstverständnis.   In this context the German also means national self-consciousness or national identity. 
 
31John A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography  
(New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975), 1. 
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the world of historians may be startled by the publication of some truly striking 
piece of research which not only shatters accepted images by revealing new 
material but also raises new questions abut the total validity of earlier 
methodologies.  Such a piece of research is Professor Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach 
der Weltmacht …. 32 
 
What was this bombshell of a book all about and why did it strike such a nerve?  
Is it justified to claim that it fired the opening salvo for a German-initiated process of 
reckoning with the Nazi legacy, even though the book was not about Hitler?  Or, to return 
to Meier’s image, was this the event that opened the floodgates to 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a process by which successive waves of controversy would 
wash over the land, upsetting the status quo in their wake?  A brief overview of the 
sociopolitical climate in West Germany during the decade preceding this watershed event 
is useful in order to appreciate the impact of the book at the time and to understand its 
heuristic value for the argument of this paper. 
The ‘long’ 1950s brought rapid economic growth and prosperity to West 
Germany.  The integration into the Western political and military alliances and limited 
rearmament went hand in hand with social conservatism.33 The decade also became 
known as the ‘years of silence’ about the Nazi past, a stance Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich attributed to repressed mourning and guilt.34  The formulation that 
                                                
32John A. Moses, The War Aims of Imperial Germany: Professor Fritz Fischer and his Critics  (St. 
Lucia [Brisbane]: University of Queensland Press, 1968), 213. 
 
33Konrad Jarausch,  After Hitler:  Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995,  Brandon Hunziker, trans., 
translation of Die Umkehr:  Deutsche Wandlungen 1945-1995  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
2006), 120-124.   
 
34Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn:  Principles of Collective 
Behavior, Beverley Placzek, trans., (New York:  Grove Press Inc., 1975), translation of Die Unfähigkeit zu 
trauern:  Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens (München:  R. Piper & Co Verlag, 1967).  Others have rgued 
that Germans were not silent about the Third Reich and about the war during the 1950s and early 1960s at 
all; rather, they conceptualized the era from a Germans-as-victims-perspective within the private sphere.  
See Peter Fritzsche, “Volkstümliche Erinnerung und deutsche Identität nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in 
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Chancellor Konrad Adenauer chose for his call for German restitution to Israel, 
“suffering was brought over the Jewish people in the name of the German people,” may 
have been symptomatic of the country’s general state of mind vis-à-vis the crimes of its 
National Socialist past. 35  While Germans were willing to acknowledge collective 
responsibility for making financial amends, personal culpability was not yet a topic.  
Granted, the publication in German of Anne Frank’s diary in 1950 had helped people 
identify with an individual Jewish victim for the first time since the war, but it was to 
take years before individual implication in Jewish suffering became a widely recognized 
component of German discourse about National Socialism.36 Instead, the Adenauer 
administration and the public were more concerned with rebuilding the economy and 
with the repatriation of POWs still in Soviet hands.37  Incidentatlly, the myth of the ‘clean 
Wehrmacht,’ which was to persist in the popular imagination until the controversy over 
the Wehrmachtsausstellung was to dismantle it in the 1990s, arose as part of the effort to 
repatriate the German prisoners of war.38  The breakthrough to a new way of thinking 
________________________ 
Verletztes Gedächtnis:  Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt, eds. Konrad Jarausch and Martin 
Sabrow (Frankfurt:  Campus Verlag, 2002), 82-89. 
 
35Moeller, “Deutsche Opfer, Opfer der Deutschen:  Kriegsgefangene, Vertriebene, NS-Verfolgte:  
Opferausgleich als Identitätspolitik,” in Nachkrieg in Deutschland, ed. Klaus Naumann  (Hamburg:  
Hamburger Edition, 2001), 36; Moeller used a similar quote in “War Stories:  The Search for a Usable 
Past,” 1015-1016.  
 
36Anne-Kathrin Herrmann, “Frühe Zeugnisse Überlebender,” in Lexikon der 
‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland, e s. Fischer and Lorenz, 41. As Robert Moeller pointed out 
in “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past,” Germans in the 1950s did not have ‘amnesia’ about the 
war; rather, their selective memory cast themselves rather than the Jews into the role of victim (1011-
1013). 
 
37Jörg Echternkamp,  Nach dem Krieg:  Alltagsnot, Neuorientierung und die Last der 
Vergangenheit 1945-1949 (Zürich:  Pendo Verlag, 2003), 126. 
 
38Konrad Jarausch, “Critical Memory and Civil Society:  The Impact of the 1960s on German 
Debates about the Past,” in Coping with the Nazi Past:  West German Debates on Nazism and Generational 
Conflict, 1955-1975, eds. Philipp Gassert and Alan Steinweis (New York:  Berghahn Books, 2006), 18. 
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about the recent past and to new questions directed at that past did indeed not come until 
Griff nach der Weltmacht burst on the scene in 1961, and then only against considerable 
resistance.39     
Fischer’s book was not about WWII.  Instead, it posed a number of theses about 
Imperial Germany’s policies before and during WWI that challenged contemporary 
German historiography.  For example, Fischer claimed to have uncovered newly 
available documentary evidence for Imperial Germany’s willingness to pursue European 
hegemony, even by means of war.40 More provocatively yet, Fischer alleged that large 
parts of the German elites, including members of the worlds of commerce, industry, 
banking, and the Lutheran Church, had actively supported Imperial Germany’s effort to 
establish itself as a world power.  According to Fischer, German unification in 1871 had 
opened the door to a new nationalism that was conservative-dynastic as well as military 
and völkisch [ethnic]. Economic growth and anti-Semitism fueled this nationalism during 
the pre-war years.  Eventually, it culminated in the dangerous mix of chauvinism a d 
self-aggrandizement that led Germany to risk, even actively pursue, war in order to force 
its way into a “place in the sun” among the world powers.41  
These well-documented findings struck like a historiographic thunderbolt at a 
time when a number of conservative German historians were doing their best to help 
Germans regain a semblance of ‘normal’ national identity following the physical and 
                                                
39Christine Nugent, “The Fischer Controversy:  Historiog aphic Revolution or Just Another 
Historians’ Quarrel?”  The Journal of the North Carolina Association of Historians 16 (2008):  77-114. 
 
40For his research, Fischer utilized archives that had become available to German historians for the 
first time since the Allies had confiscated them after WWII.  The Soviets had returned them to East 
Germany in 1956 and Fischer had been granted access.  Prior to the documents’ release, German historians 
had had to rely on memoirs and personal papers. 
 
41Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 17. 
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moral collapse of the country after WWII.42  This role vis-à-vis the state had deep roots 
within German historiography, reaching back to Leopold von Ranke who had been 
instrumental in founding the profession in the late nineteenth century.  As civil servants, 
holding highly respected and powerful positions at German universities, German 
historians had played the leading role not only in defining German national identity 
following the founding of Imperial Germany in 1871, but also in disputing Germany’s 
alleged principal war guilt, as expressed in Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty.43  By 
WWII, the question of Germany’s leading role in unleashing WWI had become a 
historiographic taboo.  Indeed, the “myth of German innocence” prevailed well into the 
1960s, meaning that it was firmly in place when Fischer introduced his evidence to the 
contrary.44  Gerhard Ritter was the most prominent German historian upholding the Neo-
Rankean or ‘historist’ tradition in German historiography following WWII.  Not 
surprisingly, he became Fischer’s most vehement antagonist.45 
Fischer’s research upset a long-held historiographic consensus between the guild 
and the state, putting the reputations if not life-long achievements of prominent historian  
at stake in the process.  It should therefore not be surprising that some of his antagonists 
                                                
42Berger, The Search for Normality.  Chapter 2 provides a useful overview of the roleof the 
profession in Germany until 1960. 
 
43Moses, The Politics of Illusion, Chapter 1; Wolfgang J. Mommsen,  “Zur Kriegsschuldfrage 
1914,” Historische Zeitschrift 212, no.3  (1971): 608 - 609.   
 
44Frederick Hale, “Fritz Fischer and the Historiography of World War One,” The History Teacher 
9, no. 2 (February 1976): 262, http://www.jstor.org/stable/492292 (accessed March 27, 2010). 
 
45The fact that Ritter had a leading role on the editorial boards of German school textbooks well 
into the 1960s is just one indicator of his influenc  on national historical conscious formation in post-war 
Germany.  Ritter’s historiographic perspectives are evident throughout a textbook for High Schools from 
1963. Gerhard E. Bonwetsch, E. Dittrich-Gallmeister, J. Dittrich, H. Gundel, H. Herzfeld, K. Leonhardt, G. 
Ritter, F. Schnabel, and E. Wilmanns,  Grundriss der Geschichte főr die Oberstufe der Hıheren Schulen,  
Ausgabe B, Band 3 ( Stuttgart:  Ernst Klett Verlag: 1963).  
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did not shy away from labeling him as Nestbeschmutzer [one who fouls one’s own nest], 
as Fischer recalled with some bitterness in a retrospective defense of his work.46  Against 
that invective, he shot back that the insights he had offered had  
contributed to a painful process of disillusionment about the character of the 
Wilhelminian Empire and even of the Weimar Republic, a process of distancing 
oneself from one’s own immediate past, which has contributed to self-criticism in 
the Federal Republic of Germany.  This change of thinking has helped move the 
Germans to achieve a normal and relaxed relationship with their neighbors to the 
west and to the east (in the latter case against strong traditional hostility!).47  
   
Notably, Fischer did not explicitly claim that he had changed the way Germans 
dealt with their National Socialist past.  From the above passage it seems that he did not 
fully realize in 1988 to what extent his work had served as catalyst for subsequent 
‘memory contests’ over the Nazi legacy.  Fischer had done nothing less than change the 
way German historians looked at historical continuities.  He had demonstrated that a 
critical perspective of one’s national past was possible and had argued that it was 
preferable to the apologetic stance that professional historians had traditionally assumed.  
His work ultimately called into question the whole notion of the grand national narrative 
constructed around historical progress and advanced by the nation-state.  Eventually, this 
                                                
46Fritz Fischer, “Twenty-Five Years Later:  Looking Back at the ‘Fischer Controversy’ and its 
Consequences,” Central European History 21, no. 3 (1988): 209, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4546121 
(accessed March 27, 2010). Gerhard Ritter’s following publications attested to his side of the controve sy 
and gave a glimpse into the deep rift between the two historians.  Gerhard Ritter, “Eine neue 
Kriegsschuldthese?  Zu Fritz Fischers Buch ‘Griff nach der Weltmacht’.”  Historische Zeitschrift  194, no. 
3 (1962): 646-668;  Ritter, “Zur Fischer-Kontrovers.”  Historische Zeitschrift 200, no. 3 (1965):  783-787.  
Ritter’s opus magnum provided an appreciation for what was at stake, since Fischer’s research questioned 
much of it:  Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter:  the Problem of Militarism in Germany, translated from the 
second, revised edition in German by Heinz Norden.  Translation of Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk:  Das 
Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland, 1954-1967 (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami Press, 
1969-1972).   
 
47Fischer, “Twenty-five Years Later,” 223.  The last sentence alluded to the West integration of 
the 1950s and 1960s and the Ostpolitik of the 1970s and 1980s.   
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new way of conceptualizing history opened the door for examining how the National 
Socialist era fit into German history.48 
Although Fischer’s work was not about historical method and the role of the 
historian vis-à-vis the state per se, his work raised these issues to the point where in 
retrospect analysts called it a “historiographic break-through” or a watershed event that 
completely changed the landscape of post-WWII German historical scholarship.49  
Fischer himself made sweeping claims about the revolutionary nature of his approach, 
beyond the content of his subject.  For example, he asserted that his books and his 
teaching “ha[d] not only helped to advance scholarly methodology and historical 
research, but ha[d] altered the Germans’ view of their own past.”50  In his own 
perception, he was one of the first German historians to use a social-historical approach, 
meaning that he did not only look at the state and diplomacy, but also at all the social and 
economic forces that pressed upon the political leadership prior and during WWI.  
Fischer further claimed that his books “advanced historical methodology away from 
[nineteenth-century] ‘historicism’ [historism] to a social-economic and structuralist view 
of history,” which in turn helped spawn an entirely new school of research [the so-called 
                                                
48This argument is informed by Konrad Jarausch’s retrospective of the Fischer Controversy in his 
“Der Nationale Tabubruch.  Wissenschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Politik in der Fischer-Kontroverse,” in 
Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte: Grosse Kontroversen nach 1945, eds. Martin Sabrow, Ralph Jessen, 
and Klaus Groβe Kracht, 20-40 (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2003), especially 33-36. 
 
49
Jarausch, “World Power or Tragic Fate: The Kriegsschuldfrage as Historical Neurosis,”  Central European History 5, no. 
1 (1972): 76.  In hindsight, though, some historians have observed that Fischer’s approach was still quite traditional in his emphasis on 
the state and on state documents.  For example, Arnold Sywottek argued this in   “Die Fischer Kontroverse.  Ein Beitrag zur 
Entwicklung Historisch-Politischen Bewusstseins in der Bundesrepublik,” in  Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. 
Jahrhunderts: Fritz Fischer zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. Fritz Fischer, Imanuel Geiss,  Bernd Jürgen Wendt, and Peter-Christian Witt 
(Düsseldorf:  Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1973), 38.  Emanuel Geiss made a similar argument in S udien über Geschichte und 
Geschichtswissenschaft (Frankfurt am Main:  SuhrkampVerlag, 1972), 170. 
50Fischer, “Twenty-Five Years Later,” 221-223. 
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Fischer School.]51  Thus Fischer’s work challenged a tradition of strong alliances 
between leading professional historians and the state that had existed for over one 
hundred years. It would eventually shatter the paradigm or Geschichtsbild that the guild 
had so carefully constructed, before WWI, between the wars, and once again after WWII.  
This not only invited his colleagues’ wrath upon him, but also led to significant political 
controversy.   
 Fischer’s continuity thesis must have posed the greatest challenge to German 
national self-consciousness.  It questioned the quarantine that post-1945 historiography, 
with the blessing of the state, had imposed on National Socialism.  If there were, as 
Fischer argued, continuities from Bismarck all the way to Hitler, then it would be 
impossible to maintain that Hitler, the ‘demonic individual,’ and his minions had 
unleashed the catastrophe of WWII upon the German people who, in this scenario, 
assumed the victim role in the process. 52  The argument that some of Hitler’s policies had 
deep roots in Imperial Germany and had already played a role before and during WWI 
was generally not acceptable in the Federal Republic of the 1950s and early 1960s.  After 
all, from a political perspective, it was “a central task of historians [in the Fed ral 
Republic of Germany] … to present an image of German history that would mesh as well
as possible with efforts to integrate the Federal Republic into a western European 
community of nations.”53  The order of the day was the rehabilitation of West Germany.  
                                                
51Ibid., 221-222.  Some have translated the German Historismus as ‘historism’ instead of 
‘historicism’ to distinguish it from the Anglo-American concept of historicism, which is not at all Whig 
history.  See Berger, The Search for Normality, 3. 
 
52For more detail on the political implications of Fischer’s theses, see Hale, “Fritz Fischer and the 
Historiography of World War One.”  
 
53Frederick Hale, “Fritz Fischer and the Historiography of World War One,” 264. 
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The newly constructed national narrative was to reach back to Bismarck or even 
Frederick the Great, via Weimar, conveniently leaving Hitler out as ‘aberr tion’ or 
historical accident.  Fischer’s claim that there was indeed a continuity between 
Bismarck’s power politics, the war aims of Imperial Germany in WWI, and, by 
implication, the policies of Nazi Germany in WWII therefore struck a sensitive chord at a 
time when West Germany strove to construct a new, less war-like image for itself that 
would make it a more attractive partner of the Western alliance.  Professional, p litical, 
and public circles did not fully appreciate the explosiveness of this aspect of Fischer’s 
work until later, when he explicated and radicalized it in subsequent publications.54  
Apparently, though, political circles understood it well enough by the summer of 
1964 when the government tried to foil Fischer’s university lecture series in the United 
States by withdrawing previously granted travel funds.  Eventually, the American 
Council for Learned Societies financed the trip and Fischer was able to present his work 
to American academic audiences despite official German resistance.55 It would be 
difficult to find a clearer political rejection of Fischer’s work than the one Franz Joseph 
Strauβ, controversial political figure and chairman of the conservative Christian-Social 
Union (CSU), offered.  “A people which has performed an economic miracle,” he argued, 
                                                
54This happened primarily in Fischer’s  From Kaiserreich to Third Reich:  Elements of Continuity 
in German History 1871-1945,  trans. Roger Fletcher, translation of Bündnis der Eliten: Zur Kontinuität 
der Machtstrukturen in Deutschland 1871-1945, 1979 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
 
55Jarausch, “Der nationale Tabubruch,” 20 and 31-32; Imanuel Geiss, “Zur Fischer Controverse—
40 Jahre danach,” in Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte: Grosse Kontroversen nach 1945, eds. Martin 
Sabrow, Ralph Jessen, and Klaus Groβe Kracht (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2003), 46.  American 
historians were much more receptive to Fischer’s the es than his German colleagues, as Fischer’s work as 
more in line with the international than with the Grman historiography of WWI.  As an interesting side 
note, Jarausch, then a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, experienced one of 
Fischer’s lectures, which prompted him to write his doctoral dissertation on Imperial Chancellor Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, one of the pivotal German politicians connected with the outbreak of WWI (ibid., 
20). 
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“has the right not to want to be bothered with Auschwitz anymore.”56  For Strauβ, Fischer 
was nothing but a “Communist fellow traveler.” 57  
Political and cultural impacts of Fischer’s theses were closely linked. During the 
‘silent decade’ of the 1950s, society had not confronted the moral issues of personal 
responsibility.  Yet it was not difficult to connect Fischer’s questions about the role of 
elites on the eve of WWI with those of elites during the Third Reich and, by extension, 
about the role that some of those same elites were playing in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.58  Indeed, there had never been a ‘Zero Hour’ or new beginning within the 
professions, including the historical one; on the contrary, many intellectuals, including 
history professors, had been able to remain in their positions of power.59  Questioning the 
authority of their parents, their professors, and the state, the emerging student mov ment  
found the alleged continuities between the Nazi power structure and the young Federal
                                                
56Franz Joseph Strauβ, quoted in Berger, The Search for Normality, 83.  Berger quoted Strauβ 
from Matthias von Hellfeld, Die Nation erwacht.  Zur Trendwende der deutschen politischen Kultur (Köln:  
PapyRossa, 1993), 75. 
 
57Ibid. 
 
58If such connections occurred to anyone at the time, they were not openly discussed, or at least I 
have not been able to find evidence in the literature.  Given the political and social climate at the time, 
however, the thought about possible connections must have added fuel to the attacks against Fischer. 
 
59These historians, occupying powerful positions in the German university system, referred to 
themselves as “Die Zunft” or the guild, which implied a monopoly on influence and high barriers for 
newcomers to join.  See also Moses, The Politics of Illusion, 111-114.  As for the continuity within the 
guild between the Third Reich and West Germany, see Axel Schildt, “Überlegungen zur Historisierung der 
Bundesrepublik,” in Verletztes Gedächtnis:  Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Konflikt, eds. Konrad 
Jarausch and Martin Sabrow (Frankfurt:  Campus Verlag, 2002), 266-268 and Berger, The Search for 
Normality, 40-41.  This situation became the subject of a historiographic controversy in its own right in the 
so-called ‘Historians in National Socialism Controversy’ from 1998 onwards.  See Torben Fischer, 
“Historiker im Nationalsozialismus,” in Fischer and Lorenz, eds. Lexikon der Vergangenheitsbewätigung, 
299-303.  
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Republic unbearable.60  Twenty years later, the German journalist Ralph Giordano, 
himself a victim of Nazi persecution, labeled this particular continuity as die zweite 
Schuld [the second guilt/culpability], popularizing the notion with a large readership.61 
In the late 1960s, students were indeed the first group in German society willing 
to look at the immediate past more critically than their parents had done thus far.  They  
began demanding a ‘reckoning with the past’ that did not shy away from questions of 
personal guilt.62  This generational dynamic demonstrated for the first time what should 
become apparent during subsequent ‘waves’ of controversies about the Nazi past, 
namely, that intergenerational issues would inevitably play a role.  Intergeerational 
tension was also at work within the historical guild itself, during this first controversy as 
well as subsequent ones, pitting those historians who had experienced National Socialism 
directly against those who had not.63  
Although Fischer’s work had far-reaching political and cultural consequences, its 
most profound legacy might have been having questioned, for the first time, the 
traditional role of the historian in society.  No longer would the historian provide 
legitimacy to state policies, at least not out of a nationalist loyalty to the stat , as had 
been the tradition of German historism.  Rather, the historian would not shy away from 
uncovering unpalatable aspects of national history and thereby challenging society and its 
                                                
60Fischer must have had a strong following among students, as he had attracted over one hundred 
doctoral candidates during his tenure at the Univers ty of Hamburg.  Jarausch, “Der nationale Tabubruch,” 
28. 
 
61Ralph Giordano, Die zweite Schuld oder von der Last Deutscher zu sein (Hamburg:  Rasch und 
Röhring Verlag, 1987). 
 
62For a similar argument along these lines, see Jarausch,  “World Power or Tragic Fate?” 76. 
 
63As for the Fischer Controversy, Gerhard Ritter and the other critics from within the guild had 
fought for Germany in WWI, while Fischer was too young to have done so.  This difference might have yet 
been another reason why the older historians still identified with Imperial Germany.   
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various elites.  Thus, the historian’s role would still be profoundly political, but he or she 
would no longer be the handmaiden of the state. On the contrary, historiography could 
have an emancipatory effect, as Imanuel Geiss, Fischer’s most prominent student, 
claimed it should.64  This independence from the state would lead to less uniformity 
within historiography and to greater plurality of interpretative frameworks of the past.  
Such plurality or fragmentation became evident once social history in all its iterations 
came on the scene. 65  Although Fischer did not single-handedly replace historism with  
critical history, the new vision of the role of history in society and of the corresponding 
responsibility of the historian was the most significant historiographic contribution of 
Fischer’s work.66 
Looking at the Fischer Controversy from a distance of almost fifty years, its 
timing is not surprising, even against the backdrop of the 1950s and early 1960s.  Its 
emotional climax in 1964 played out at the Berlin Historikertag [historians’ meeting], a 
conference that coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of WWI and the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of WWII.67  These anniversaries would bring 
with them a heightened sensitivity for questions of wars’ origins and war guilt, b t also of 
historical continuities, national identity, and victimhood.  Yet it would take another 
                                                
64Geiss, Studien über Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft, 194-195.  Geiss asserted this new 
reality in his portrayal of the Fischer Controversy as a generation conflict between the “orthodoxy” of the 
guild and a new generation of historians who finally wanted to assert their right to write their own history, 
building on the bitter lessons of the past.  According to him, the older generation had had its turn, “with 
results that we all know,” ibid., 195.  
 
65Stefan Berger posited that the pluralization within istoriography that Fischer brought about has 
remained intact ever since, despite repeated conservative attempts of revisionism during the Historikerstreit 
and after reunification. Berger, The Search for Normality, 220, 233. 
 
66This argument is informed by Konrad Jarausch’s retrospective of the Fischer Controversy in his 
“Der Nationale Tabubruch.” 
 
67For a detailed account of that meeting, see Geiss, “Zur Fischer-Kontroverse—40 Jahre danach,” 
46-49. 
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twenty-two years for the Historikerstreit to break out, the first major controversy about 
the legacy of National Socialism proper.  As we will see, this controversy and the others
that followed were quite unthinkable without the preceding debate about Germany’s role 
in WWI.  Even though Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht may not have been ‘about 
Hitler,’ his entire body of work and the debate it precipitated turned out to be very much 
so.  
Fast-forward from 1964 to October 11, 1998.  The stage from where our second 
bracket event emanated was none other than the Frankfurt Paulskirche, a plac of great  
symbolism for German national history.  It was here that the first publicly elected 
political body in Germany convened in 1848/49, thirty-one years before the founding of 
the first modern German nation-state.  The Paulskirche has served as national memorial 
rather than as church and has been used since its reconstruction after WWII for events of 
national political and cultural significance.  The particular event at issue here was the 
ceremony awarding German playwright Martin Walser the prestigious Peace Prize of the 
German Book Trade, an international prize that has been given in conjunction with the 
Frankfurt Book Fair since 1950.68  Walser used this exposed platform, in the presence of 
representatives from various German and international leadership circles, to make a 
statement, couched as an acceptance speech, that would unleash the most recent major 
controversy about the role of the National Socialist legacy in German society. 69   
                                                
68Americans have been among the international recipients: George F. Kennan, Yehudi Menuhin, 
Paul Tillich, Thornton Wilder, Fritz Stern and Susan Sontag.  
 
69Walser was born in 1927 in Wasserburg, Germany.  Among his most controversial literary 
productions in terms of Vergangenheitsbewätigung are, the essay, “Unser Auschwitz,” (1965), the novel, 
Tod eines Kritikers (2002), and his autobiographical novel, Ein springender Brunnen (1998), for which he 
received the award at issue here. 
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In his speech, titled “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” Walser 
took issue with the alleged public use of Auschwitz as “moral cudgel” and with what he 
coined the “instrumentalization of shame” over the Holocaust for contemporary political 
purposes.70  Bemoaning the relentless and ritualized memory culture surrounding the 
Holocaust in Germany and the politically correct mea culpa associated with it in 
contemporary German discourse, Walser laced his speech with controversial statements, 
such as “I have had to learn to avert my eyes,” “I don’t have to be able to stand the 
unbearable,” “I could not live in a world in which amends had to be made for 
everything,” and “…, I realize that something in me rebels against the relentless 
representation of our shame.” 71 Instead of the ‘moral cudgel’ that the Holocaust 
allegedly had become in the political and cultural life of the reunified nation of the1990s, 
Walser demanded that reckoning with the Nazi past would once again become a private 
affair between the individual and his or her conscience.72 “Conscience cannot be 
delegated,” he argued.73 Also stressing that no reasonable person would deny the horror 
of Auschwitz, Walser further stated that the constant affirmation of shame had political 
motives, insinuating that such motives revolved around the leftist arguments against 
German reunification. One could not afford to speak of Germany as a normal nation 
                                                
70Martin Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” in Die Walser-Bubis-
Debatte:  Eine Dokumentation, edited by Frank Schirrmacher (Frankfurt am Main:  Suhrkamp, 1999), 13, 
12.  Loosely translated, the title of the speech reads, Experiences While Composing a Sunday [thought-
provoking]Address. 
 
71Ibid., 8 [first three quotes] and 12 [last quote].  Translations mine. 
 
72Lorenz, “Walser-Bubis-Debatte,” in Fischer and Lorenz, eds., Lexikon der 
‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 297.  
 
73Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” 9. 
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without inviting suspicion.74 With escalating sharpness, Walser further accused unnamed 
German Dichter und Denker of acting as the official “defenders of national conscience” 
and as “opinion soldiers,” brandishing “moral pistols” to demand political correctness 
from the poet.75 
His ‘Sunday speech’ earned Walser overwhelming public support, not only from 
the roughly twelve-hundred people filling the Paulskirche on that Sunday morning, but 
also from the broad public that subsequently weighed in.76 The controversy that followed 
lasted six months and was aired in public via the entire spectrum of the national Germ n 
news media.  Already in 1999, Frank Schirrmacher, co-editor of the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and author of the Laudatio on Walser, published a 682-page 
collection of documents that had appeared in the press between October 1998 and March 
1999.77  
The public support was not the decisive factor in turning the speech into a 
veritable ‘wave’ of disputes about the legacy of the Nazi past; rather, the initial reaction 
by Ignatz Bubis, then chair of the Central Committee of Jews in Germany [Zentralrat der 
                                                
74Ibid., 9, 11, 12-13.  Some leftist intellectuals had argued in the 1980s that Auschwitz forbade 
German dreams of eventual reunification with the German Democratic Republic, forming once again a full-
fledged German nation. 
 
75Ibid., 14-15. With Dichter und Denker, literally translated as poets and thinkers, Walser referred 
to German intellectuals.  Germany had traditionally prided itself on being a nation of Dichter und Denker, 
referring to Goethe, Schiller, and even Marx, but also one in which modern intellectuals had much to 
contribute to the public sphere.  The slogan made resurgence after reunification, coinciding with the 
growing self-confidence of the nation (or with the attempt to project a new, positive image of Germany that 
draws on a less encumbered past than the one associted with the Third Reich).  Here Walser probably 
referred to the criticism he received for not having i cluded anything about the Holocaust in his 
autobiographical novel, Ein springender Brunnen/Roman (Frankfurt am Main:  Suhrkamp, 1998). 
 
76Lorenz, “Walser-Bubis-Debate,” in Fischer and Lorenz, eds., Lexikon der 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 297. 
 
77Frank Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte:  Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt am Main:  
Suhrkamp, 1999). 
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Juden in Deutschland], kicked off what was to become one of the most acerbic and 
polemic controversies about the legacy of National Socialism to date.  Bubis and his wife 
attended the event in the Paulskirche.  They were the only ones not joining in the 
standing ovation Walser received; rather, they remained seated in protest.  A month later, 
on November 9, 1998, Bubis took the opportunity to offer a public rebuttal in his speech 
commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the night of Nazi pogroms against the Jewish
community, also know as the Reichskristallnacht.  In his speech, again in front of an 
audience of political and intellectual dignitaries and reprinted in full in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Bubis placed Walser in a long tradition of those who had tried “to 
suppress history [and] extinguish memory.” 78 Carefully mentioning that only he was 
responsible for what he would say and only Walser was responsible for his earlier speech 
(as opposed to ‘all Jews’ and ‘all Germans’), Bubis’s main points of criticism focused on 
Walser mentioning shame repeatedly, but never any of the crimes that had called for 
shame in the first place. In fact, considering public display of shame as 
instrumentalization of Auschwitz for contemporary purposes amounted to “intellectual 
arson.”79 Bubis also leveled an accusation of anti-Semitism at Walser, parts of whose 
speech were “unworthy” of a recipient of a peace prize, but perhaps symptomatic f a 
                                                
78Ignatz Bubis, “Rede des Präsidenten des Zentralrates der Juden in Deutschland am 9. November 
1998 in der Synagoge Rykerstraβe in Berlin,” in Frank Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte:  Eine 
Dokumentation (Frankfurt am Main:  Suhrkamp, 1999), 108-109. 
 
79Ibid., 111.  The original German is geistige Brandstiftung, a provocative label in a country that 
prides itself on the role of intellectualism and intellectuals in society.  The fire imagery has ugly 
connotations with Auschwitz, but also with arson assaults on asylum hostels that occurred around the time 
of the controversy.  The political purposes for which Auschwitz was allegedly being used that Walser had 
alluded to may have been the hotly contested  Holocaust Memorial that was planned for the center of 
Berlin.  Bubis believed Walser had alluded to the discussions about financial restitution for forced laborers 
that was raging at the time, which Walser denied. Ignatz Bubis, Salomon Korn, Frank Schirrmacher, and 
Martin Walser, “Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für die Erinnerung:  Ein Gespräch,” in  Schirrmacher, ed.
Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte,, 438-439, 444. 
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mood of “intellectual nationalism” that had lately arisen in Germany and that esired for 
Germany finally to become a ‘normal nation.’80  Bubis’s concluding statement was most 
pointed, perhaps to serve as a moral cudgel in its own right, as, according to him, “some 
would not be able to learn morals any other way.”  “We owe it to the victims of the 
Shoah not to forget about them!” he exclaimed, “He who forgets these victims, kills them 
once more!” 81  Bubis passed away less than a year later, in August 1999. 
It would lead too far to reiterate here the controversy as it unfolded in all its 
details, but it is nevertheless of interest that the majority of the letters to the editor that 
Schirrmacher reprinted in his documentation sympathized with Walser, regardless in 
which newspaper the letters had originally appeared.  Many writers found that Walser 
had been courageous to express what they themselves believed but were afraid to say for 
fear of appearing politically incorrect.  A few examples must suffice to convey a common 
thread among these letters:  “You speak my heart!” wrote Astrid Koch in a personal letter 
to Walser on December 12, 1998.  Two days later, Joachim Baron wrote to Walser, “You 
are completely right: ‘Having to remember!’ has once more to become an individual 
[affair], an affair of the heart!” On January 23, 1999, Eva Krüger wrote in a letter to he 
editor of the Neue Züricher Zeitung, “This is about us older generation, …, finally 
want[ing] protection from [someone] constantly digging in our wounds and demanding 
from us to profess guilt publicly.  There is no collective guilt.”82  These few excerpts 
represent some of the key concerns Walser’s supporters from the general public voiced. 
                                                
80Bubis, “Rede des Präsidenten des Zentralrates der Ju n,” in Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-
Bubis-Debatte, 112. 
 
81 Ibid., 112 and 113. 
 
82Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 407, 465, and 589, respectively  [translations 
mine]. 
 
39 
  
A look at opinion polls from 1989 and 2002 allows the conjecture that they might not 
have been entirely out of synch with the general public.83  These same issues also became 
major themes of the controversy:  A saturation point had allegedly been reached for 
public and official commemorations that represented Germany as a nation of 
perpetrators; mourning and remorse must once again become private affairs; the older 
generation had done enough to atone for National Socialism and had a right to have its 
own victim status recognized. 
Those who supported Walser, and there were many, expressed directly or 
indirectly that it was time, almost ten years after the post-WWII epoch had come to an 
end, finally to put the elusive Schlussstrich under the National Socialist past.  ‘Enough is 
enough,’ and ‘it’s time to be a normal nation again,’ many seemed to have heard Walser 
say in his speech—and they agreed.  For our purposes it may not be as important what 
Walser actually did say and what he may have meant with his numerous insinuations as 
what his audience heard him say.  He had purportedly spoken only for himself, but had 
constructed his speech in such a way that it was open to multiple interpretations.  This, of
course, also made it vulnerable to being misunderstood, as, according to Walser, Bubis 
and some others obviously had.84  Walser had indeed touched a nerve, not unlike Fischer 
                                                
83The pollsters asked whether the statement was correct that Germans occupied themselves too 
much with the past, especially with the Third Reich, w ile not looking towards the future enough.  In 1989, 
40% of the respondents agreed with this statement while 42% did not.  In 2000, by contrast, 47% agreed 
and 43% did not.  This might signal a growing ‘fatigue,’ with reckoning with the past, being stronger in 
2000 than eleven years earlier.  Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, eds., Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 
1998-2002, 548.  
 
84Walser made additional statements throughout the unfoldi g controversy.  On 28 November, 
1998, for example, he stated that his criticism had been directed towards the media not towards 
professional historians and their work.  Furthermore, he had never asked for a Schlussstrich; instead, he had 
argued that memory and remembrance were affairs for the individual conscience. Martin Walser, “Wovon 
zeugt die Schande, wenn nicht von Verbrechen.  Das Gewissen ist die innere Einsamkeit mit sich:  Ein 
Zwischenruf,” in Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 252-260.  In a conversation with Bubis 
from 14 December 1998, Walser reiterated that he had never meant to demand a Schlussstrich.  He had 
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before him, but in a very different way.  As a result, the next wave of reckoning with the 
Nazi past swept over the land, involving members of the general public, publicists and 
politicians, and, to a small degree, professional historians in yet another heated d bate 
about the past that still had not ‘passed away,’ to use Ernst Nolte’s formulation from the 
Historikerstreit.  This debate proved so important that it eventually found its way into a 
German history textbook, as was the case with the other four controversies discusse  
here.85  
If at the eve to the twenty-first century not even a reunified German nation was 
able to relegate the National Socialist past to the annals of history, can one still argue that 
the Walser-Bubis-Debate marked the end of an era?  Was this controversy indeed the 
closing bracket, just like the Fischer Controversy had been the opening bracket?  More   
‘waves’ were already on the horizon; the Walser-Bubis-Debate was not the last one.  The 
planned Jewish Museum in Berlin was hotly debated, for example, before it was opened 
in 2001; Walser’s own novel, Death of a Critic, rekindled the Walser-Bubis-Debate in 
2002, and, most recently in 2009/10, the political quarrel over the appointment of Erika 
Steinbach, controversial president of the Federation of Expellees [Verbund der 
Vertriebenen], to the board of the government foundation, Flight, Expulsion, 
________________________ 
never disputed that the entire nation was responsible.  He also maintained that the majority of listeners had 
understood his message correctly, implying that Bubis and a minority had not been able to do the same. 
Bubis, Korn, Schirrmacher, Walser, “Wir brauchen eie neue Sprache,” in Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-
Bubis-Debatte,  438-464, especially 445-447 
 
85Bender, Daniela, Michael Epkenhans, Karl-Heinz Gräfe, Rődiger Fleiter, Andreas Grießinger, 
Wolfram Lippert, Joachim Rohlfes, Reinhard Sturm, and Martin Thunich, Geschichte und Geschehen:  
Neuzeit.  Sekundarstufe II (Leipzig:  Ernst Klett Schulbuchverlag, 2005), 246-247.  The text presents the 
students with excerpts from Walser’s speech and Bubis’s response.  The assignment asks for students to 
discuss the two perspectives, based on their own experiences (!) and reflections.  
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Reconciliation, makes regular appearances in the national press.86 There is indeed no 
indication that such controversies will cease to develop any time soon.  Even the recent 
historicization of East Germany and the fledgling historicization of West G rmany, both 
of which are attracting much professional and general interest, have not rendered the 
continuing reckoning with National Socialism superfluous.87  
Comparing the Walser-Bubis-Debate with the Fischer Controversy may help in 
shedding light on their respective roles within the broader context of German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  Such comparison must include the political frameworks 
within which the controversies played out and the repercussions on national 
consciousness as well as the respective roles of the historical profession, the media, and 
the public. 
At the outbreak of the Fischer Controversy, there was no German nation, at least 
not in the conventional form of a nation-state.  Germany as a territorial nation-state had 
ceased to exist with capitulation in 1945.  Two separate successor states had rplaced 
Germany in 1949, their common border marking the geographic and ideological divide 
between East and West that was to persist for forty years.  During the first decades 
following the war, both states were engaged in forming new ‘national’ identities that 
required historical legitimization via newly constructed grand ‘national’ narratives.  
                                                
86For more information about the first two controversi s, see Sabine Offe, “Jüdisches Museum 
Berlin, “ in Fischer and Lorenz, eds., Lexikon der “Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” 306-308 and Matthias 
Lorenz, “Martin Walser: Tod eines Kritikers,” in ibid., 310-313. The Steinbach Affair is still ongoing and 
can be followed in the online German national press (http://www.welt.de , http://www.zeit.de, or 
http://faznet.de). 
 
87See also Dietrich Mühlberg, “Vom langsamen Wandel der Erinnerung an die DDR,” in 
Verletztes Gedächtnis:  Erinnerungskultur und Zeitgeschichte im Kondlikt, eds. Konrad Jarausch und 
Martin Sabrow (Frankfurt:  Campus Verlag, 2002), 217- 51 and Axel Schildt, “Überlegungen zur 
Historisierung der Bundesrepublik,” in ibid., 253-272. 
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Although in West Germany the narrative was not uncontested, a broad consensus 
nevertheless existed, including a view of the Third Reich as aberration from the path of
German history, the desirability of belonging to the West, and the search for a ‘usable’ 
past.  Many a historian from the older generation saw it as his responsibility to facili ate 
West Germany’s search for such a past.88  As a consequence, Fischer’s challenge to 
redefine the role of the historian vis-à-vis the state met with cool or outright hostile 
reactions.  Nevertheless, he had opened the door to a new way of looking at the state, 
and, by extension, at the past, which would prove immensely fruitful to the 
historiography of the following decades.  
The Walser-Bubis-Debate took place in a completely different geo-political 
environment.  The German nation-state existed again since 1990, although occupying a 
substantially smaller territory than the Bismarckian nation-state of 1871.  With it came a 
renewed need for some kind of national identity, however that might be defined. After 
all, neither identity of the two post-war German successor states would do under the n w 
circumstances.  By 1998/99, Germany had developed a degree of self-confidence vis-à-
vis the great powers that would have been entirely unthinkable before reunification, not 
to mention in the 1950s.89  A new coalition government of the leftist Social Democrats 
and the Greens had just taken the helm, bringing a generation of politicians without 
                                                
88Stefan Berger provided an excellent overview of West German historiography between 1945 and 
1961 in Chapter 3 of his book, The Search for Normality. 
 
89According to conservative historian, Gregor Schöllgen, this confidence had been painfully slow 
in coming initially, partially due to Germany’s relative lack of experience with having a nation-state.  
Notably, Schöllgen insinuated in his book, Angst vor der Macht:  Die Deutschen und ihre Aussenpolitik 
(Frankfurt/Main:  Ullstein, 1993), especially Chapter One, that Allied post-war policies vis-à-vis Germany 
were partially responsible for Germans having forgotten how to pursue the foreign policy of a fully-fledged 
nation-state.  Stefan Berger, by contrast, argued that re-nationalization was apparent right after re-
unification, not only in politics, but also in historiography (Berger, The Search for Normality).  
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personal experience of National Socialism to power.  Under Gerhard Schröder’s 
chancellorship, the raison d’état was different from what had driven Chancellor 
Adenauer:  West integration had become a long-established status quo, while the 
economic reconstruction of the former East Germany now took priority. Economic 
considerations but perhaps also a more distanced moral perspective on the Nazi legacy 
may have been among the reasons why Schröder clearly sided with industry in the 
wrangle about reparation payments to surviving forced laborers of the Third Reich.  He 
did not weigh in on the Walser-Bubis-Debate xcept for the comment that playwrights 
should be permitted to talk about Auschwitz as moral cudgel while the Federal 
Chancellor should not.  As Gerd Wiegel pointed out, Schröder’s statement left unclear 
whether he regretted this or not. 90 Another comment, on occasion of an interview with 
the national newspaper, Die Zeit, from June, 1999 conveys Schröder’s position quite 
clearly.  “People who do not have their own memories—that pertains to my generatio  
and to those that follow— should be able to run around without guilt complexes.”91 The 
Federal President, Roman Herzog, by contrast, did address the controversy.  On occasio
of the day of remembrance of the liberation of Auschwitz, January 28, 1999, Herzog 
delivered an address that seemed to attempt finding a middle-ground between Walser’s 
complaints about German ‘memory culture’ and Bubis’s accusations of antisemitism.  
                                                
90Gerhard Schröder, cited in Gerd Wiegel, “Eine Rede und ihre Folgen:  Die Debatte zur Walser-
Rede,” in Geistige Brandstiftung:  Die Walser-Bubis Debatte, eds. Gerd Wiegel and Johannes Klotz (Köln:  
Papy/Rossa Verlag, 1999), 51.  Also telling of Chancellor Schröder’s rather unencumbered attitude towards 
the German past was his call for a Holocaust memorial “to which one would enjoy going” (ibid.).  Wiegel 
cited the Chancellor not directly, but from an article by Werner A. Perger in the national newspaper, Die 
Zeit, from 11 December, 1998. 
 
91Gerhard Schröder, “Eine offene Republik.  Ein Intervi w mit Gerhard Schröder,”  Die Zeit (June 
1999), quoted in Amir Eshel, “Vom Eigenen Gewissen:  Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte und der Ort des 
Nationalsozialismus im Selbstbild der Bundesrepublik,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 74, no. 2 (2000), 358 [translation mine]. 
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Bemoaning the conspicuous absence of the young generation from the public discussion, 
Herzog concentrated his remarks on “the future of remembering.”92 We will encounter 
the theme underlying this remark, namely the historicization of the Holocaust, throughout 
the remainder of this study. 
This cursory comparison has demonstrated that the geo-political situation in 
which a community undertakes Vergangenheitsbewältigung influences how the process 
plays out.  The political motivation is always central to the process.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, both the old as well as the new, such motivation has ranged from 
striving to earn back the moral respect of desired alliance partners (1950s and 1960s) to 
demonstrating that the new nation was well on its way to becoming ‘normal’ once more 
and assuming a more self-assured role on the world stage (1990s onward).  A full 
assessment of Kattago’s and Frei’s periodization schemes in light of our own findings 
will have to wait until the end of this study, but one certainly can find aspects of 
Kattago’s ‘guilty pariah’ stage and Frei’s ‘politics with the past’ in the Fischer 
Controversy, as well as the normalization theme in the Walser-Bubis-Debate. 93 
As for the role of the historical profession, the media, and the public, our two 
controversies could not be farther apart as well.  The Fischer Controversy, as we have 
seen, was all about historiography and the role of the historian vis-à-vis the state.  As 
such, it was indeed highly political.  This should not be surprising because the members 
of the guild, with few exceptions, had seen the legitimization of the nation-state a  th ir 
                                                
92Roman Herzog, “Sich der Geschichte nicht in Schande, sondern in Würde stellen:  Rede zum 
Gedenktag der Befreiung des Konzentrations-und Vernichtungslagers Auschwitz,” in Schirrmacher, ed., 
Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 600.   
 
93Kattago, Ambiguous Memory:  The Nazi Past, 38-48; Frei, 1945 und Wir, 41. 
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primary reason for being ever since Leopold von Ranke and the historism of the Prussian 
School had founded the profession in the late nineteenth century.  Questioning that 
political role, as Fischer did, was political.  A historian’s scholarly work was the impetus 
for this controversy which subsequently played out primarily among professional 
historians, even though the national press gave it some publicity.  The controversy 
profoundly altered the framework within which historians would work for decades to 
come, although some have argued that historism never died out completely, but rather 
raised its head occasionally, only to gain new ascendancy after reunification.94 Walser 
never referenced a particular historiographic school in his speech, but his remarks place 
him well into the neo-conservative branch of Zeitgeschichte that had become more 
prominent since reunification.  We will see later how the tension between the two broad 
historiographic paradigms surfaced again and again, perhaps even causing the subsequent 
controversies.  The Fischer Controversy was, in essence, a historiographic controversy, 
albeit one that kicked off an entirely new way of reckoning with the Nazi past in society 
at large.  The Walser-Bubis-Debate was not, but it is nevertheless unthinkable without the 
historiographic controversies that bridged the gap between our bracket events.
By comparison, historians remained very much in the background during the 
Walser-Bubis-Debate.  German historian Christian Meier and Israeli historian Saul 
Friedländer—whom we will encounter again in connection with the Historikerstreit— 
were the only ones featured in Schirrmacher’s initial documentary.95 If they took sides at 
                                                
94Berger, The Search for Normality, Chapter 4, especially 78-79. 
 
95Christian Meier, “Vielleicht gar ein Beitrag zur Erinnerung.  Jedes Gedenken an Auschwitz ist 
unzulänglich:  Walser und Bubis leisten Arbeit an der Vergangenheit,” in Schirrmacher, ed., Die Walser-
Bubis-Debatte, 203-206; Saul Friedländer, “Die Metapher des Bösen:  Über Martin Walser’s Friedenspreis-
Rede und die Aufgabe der Erinnerung,” in ibid., 233-240.   
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all, which is not easy to determine, it was in an even-handed manner, introducing the 
historian’s scholarly and perhaps rather disengaged perspective into a highly emotional 
debate.  After all, Walser had not criticized the guild as much as he had leveled 
accusations at ‘politics,’ the media, and at alleged ‘Jewish interests.’  As much as the 
Fischer Controversy was a controversy over the role of the historian, this was about 
society in general, about the present, and about the ‘future of dealing with the past,’ to 
take up Herzog’s theme once more.  One could argue that this most recent ‘wave’ 
demonstrated what Martin Sabrow has coined the “creeping disempowerment of the 
German historical guild” since the days of the Historikerstreit, despite, or perhaps 
because of the cultural “historicization jolt” [Historisierungsschub] that happened during 
the same time span.96  Publicists, by contrast, seemed to have taken the helm during this 
debate, influencing significantly its course in the process, a development that a tested to 
the towering function of the media in society. 97 Members of the general public were also 
not afraid to chime in in large numbers.  Since Walser had talked about himself, 
individuals seemed to have felt invited to share their own perspectives and experiences as 
well.  Although this controversy was very much about politics, not unlike the Fischer 
Controversy had been, it was also about individual Germans.  As we will see, it had 
become clear during the various bridging controversies that reckoning with the past 
pertained to individuals not just to politicians and historians and that the debate would 
happen in the public sphere and not exclusively within political and academic circles.   
                                                
96Sabrow, Martin, “Der Historiker als Zeitzeuge.  Autobiographische Umbruchsreflexionen 
deutscher Fachgelehrter nach 1945 und 1989,” in Verletztes Gedächtnis, eds. Jarausch and Sabrow, 126.  
  
97For example, former politician Klaus von Dohnanyi, Spiegel editor in chief, Rudolf Augstein, 
and Frank Schirrmacher from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung played pivotal roles. 
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Finally, our comparison of the two controversies compels us to look at the 
respective topics that were at stake.  While the Fischer Controversy was about political 
history, political structures, the agency of political leaders, and the role of social elites in 
foreign policy, at issue in the Walser-Bubis-Debate was a very different kind of history.  
The focus here was on the individual and his or her relationship with the past.  It was 
about memory, both personal and collective.  It was about individual conscience, guilt 
and shame.  Just as the Fischer Controversy was not really about WWI but rather about a 
critical stance towards the past in general, the Walser-Bubis-Debate was about how, if at 
all, the past should play a role in forging national identity at a time when there would no 
longer be those who had witnessed National Socialism first-hand to weigh in.  The theme 
of historicization, first raised during the Historikerstreit, had reappeared in full force, but 
now under very different geo-political and social conditions.  One could say that the 
Walser-Bubis-Debate was the last hurrah of a generation of Zeitzeugen trying to define 
the terms under which following generations would view the past.98  In this sense one can 
clearly argue that the era the Fischer Controversy had inaugurated what was now coming 
to an end.  Any attempt to deal with the National Socialist legacy after 1999 would take 
place within completely new parameters.   
It would not be fruitful, and it certainly is not within the purview of the historian, 
to speculate what types of controversies might come next or how Germany might deal 
with them, given the soon-to-arrive complete absence of a generation of Zeitzeugen.  
Rather, in order to understand the significant differences between our two bracketing 
events more clearly, we will take a closer look at those major controversies that bridged 
                                                
98Zeitzeugen, literally ‘witnesses of the times,’ are those who have lived during the Third Reich, 
either as witnesses, bystanders, perpetrators, victims, or fellow-travelers.  There are several generations of 
Zeitzeugen and it has made a difference in the controversies to which of them the contenders belonged. 
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the two.  We will see that the changes happened gradually rather than overnight, although 
reunification was a watershed event with profound impact on 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  Each bridging event or ‘wave’ lends itself to demonstrating 
a different aspect of the themes already mentioned.  The Historikerstreit continued the 
historiographic debate begun in the Fischer Controversy.  One cannot fully grasp its 
significance without taking into account the fault lines running through the historical 
profession that had developed much earlier and had manifested themselves during the 
Fischer Controversy. The Goldhagen Affair demonstrated better than any other the 
impact of the media, as well as the generational aspect of such controversies, while the 
controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung dealt most directly with public vs. private 
memory.  Together, these five debates shed a light not only on how Germany’s reckoning 
with the Nazi legacy has unfolded so far, but also on the corresponding evolution of 
historical and national consciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany.  Furthermo e, 
they reflect quite well the vagaries of modern German historiography over the past 
century. Lastly, the controversies should be of broader interest as they dealt with subjects 
of concern for modern history in general.  The role of the historian in society is one of
those, as is the interplay between historical scholarship and the popular media in shaping
historical, if not national consciousness in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORIKERSTREIT:  A PERFECT STORM 
 
 
 
At the time, the Historikerstreit may have seemed like a mudslinging contest 
among cantankerous old men that got out of hand. Before anyone knew what had 
happened, the controversy had escalated to international proportions.  Bruised egos, 
poisoned collegial relationships, and a burgeoning literature, impenetrable in its sheer 
quantity and complexity, was all that was left in its wake, or so it seemed.99  A closer 
look, and the benefit of twenty-four years of hindsight, reveal that the dispute that has 
become known as, somewhat misleadingly, the controversy among historians 
[Historikerstreit], may arguably have been the ‘perfect storm’ among controversies about 
the place of the National Socialist past in contemporary German society.100  
Such a claim requires explanation, since this controversy neither produced 
seminal works on the level of Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht, nor launched new, 
                                                
99For example, Ernst Nolte, who had been an internatio lly reputable historian of fascism before 
the Historikerstreit, apparently became increasingly isolated during the affair and seemed to have lost most 
of his colleagues’ respect by the end of it.  Also, during the Historians’ Meeting in October 1986, a 
discussion of the issues between the main contestans was impossible because Michael Stürmer and Hans-
Ulrich Wehler would not be in the same room together.  Groβe Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 111, 109. 
 
100This debate has been the most thoroughly historicized controversy about Germany’s reckoning 
with the Nazi past.  Several retrospectives exist.  A selection includes Dan Diner, ed. Ist der 
Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?:  Zu Historisierung des Historikerstreit (Frankfurt am Main:  Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987);  Jürgen Elvert, “Nationalsozialismus, Nationalbewusstsein und Deutsche 
Identität:  Eine Erinnerung an den Historikerstreit von 1986,”  Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 45, 
no. 1 (1997):  47-62;  Richard Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow:  West German Historians and the Attempt to 
Escape from the Nazi Past  (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1989);  “Forum:  The Historikerstreit Twenty 
Years on,”  German History 24 no. 4 (2006):  586-607; Eckhard Jesse,  “Ist der ‘Historikerstreit’ ein 
‘Historischer Streit’?  Zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur,”  Zeitschrift für Politik 35 no. 2 
(1988):  163-197;  Dominick LaCapra, “Revisiting the Historians’ Debate:  Mourning and Genocide,”  
History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (Fall, 1997):  80-112, http://0-www.proquest.com.library.acaweb.org/; 
Document ID: 593640281(accessed  March 27, 2010); Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past:  History, 
Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1997);  Jörn Rüsen, 
“The Logic of Historicization:  Metahistorical Reflctions on the Debate between Friedländer and Broszat,”  
History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (Fall 1997): 113 [no ending page number provided]. 
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innovative approaches to Zeitgeschichte.  It did not even produce new insights about 
National Socialism, although analyses of the controversy itself exist in abundance.101  Yet 
this controversy was about nothing less than how to talk and write about the National 
Socialist past forty years after the war’s end.  It was about discourse and semantics just as 
much as it was about the role of history and of the historian in society.  Also at issue was 
the interplay between history and politics.  It was arguably more about the present than 
about the past.  In contrast to the Fischer Controversy, this was not a professionally 
conducted debate among subject specialists about competing interpretations of he recent 
German past; rather, the rancor of its discourse made the Historikerstreit appear more 
like a ‘Hysterikerstreit [fight among hysterics],’ to use Imanuel Geiss’s clever play on 
words. 102 Having been minimally involved in the Fischer Controversy, the media in 
1986/87 was quick to capitalize on public interest in the controversial and emotional 
issues at stake. In subsequent controversies, the media would assume an even more 
prominent role, but this was the first large-scale controversy that played out almost 
exclusively in the public arena. 
It is indeed appropriate to claim that the Historikerstreit was more than a ‘wave.’   
For it to break out when it did, upheavals in political culture had to converge with 
lingering tensions within the historiographic landscape; tensions that the Fischer 
Controversy had brought to the fore and that had not resolved themselves since.  
Complex international relations embedded in cold war politics and perfect timing with 
war-related anniversaries further contributed to perfect conditions for a major cl sh.  
                                                
101Elvert, “Nationalsozialismus, Nationalbewuβtsein und deutsche Identität,” 56.  For Elvert, this 
controversy was a continuation of the Sonderweg debate that, in his assessment, had dominated West 
German historiography since the end of WWII.  
 
102Imanuel Geiss, Der Hysterikerstreit:  Ein unpolemischer Essay (Bonn:  Bouvoir, 1992). 
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Before examining each of these factors more closely, a brief introduction of the main 
points of contention is in order. 
In a nutshell, the debate concerned the singularity of Auschwitz and the proper 
role of history in society.  A side debate concerned the appropriateness of historiciz ng 
the Holocaust.  The first two issues were mainly associated with neo-conservative 
historians Ernst Nolte, Michael Stürmer, Andreas Hillgruber, and Klaus Hildebrand on 
one side and on the other the political philosopher from the leftist Frankfurt School, 
Jürgen Habermas, accompanied by similarly-minded historians. The protagonists of the 
historicizationdebate were German historian Martin Broszat and Israeli historian Saul 
Friedländer.  The revisionist argument of the controversy proper, in very broad stkes, 
went along these lines:  if the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union and the murder
of the Jews were preemptive actions against a Bolshevist threat and represented a 
‘reenactment’ of Soviet atrocities against the Kulaks, and if the Holocaust only differed 
from earlier genocides in the techniques employed, but was neither new nor unique in 
recent history, then the Third Reich did not warrant wholesale vilification. Likewise, 
Germans did not deserve much of the blame heaped upon them.  If Germans were not to 
blame, there was no reason to shun national pride in the Federal Republic.  Rather, it was 
high time to reestablish a healthy national self-consciousness.103  
                                                
103For a more nuanced overview consult Groβe Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 91-115; Ulrich 
Herbert, “Der Historikerstreit.  Politische, wissenchaftliche, biographische Aspekte,” in Zeitgeschichte als 
Streitgeschichte:  Grosse Kontroversen nach 1945, eds.  Martin Sabrow, Ralph Jessen, and Klaus Groβe 
Kracht, 94-113 (München:  Verlag C.H.Beck, 2003) and A tje Langer, “Historikerstreit,” in Lexikon der 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, eds. Fischer and Lorenz, 238-240.  Several compilations of original 
contributions to the debate provide insight into the various players, as well as into the chronology of the 
controversy:  Rudolf Augstein,  Historikerstreit:  Die Dokumentation der Kontrovers um die 
Einzigartigkeit der Nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung (München:  R. Piper, 1987);  Forever in the 
Shadow of Hitler?:  Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the 
Singularity of the Holocaust, rans.  James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:  
Humanities Press, 1993); Reinhard Kühnl, Streit ums Geschichtsbild:  Die Historiker-Debatte:  
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At issue in the historicization debate was Broszat’s carefully argued call for 
subjecting the Holocaust to historical study in order to gain more knowledge about the 
associated events.  Friedländer warned that such an approach was in danger of being 
appropriated for revisionist purposes, culminating in relativizing the Holocaust and 
exonerating the perpetrators.  Looking at both sub-controversies together, one notices a 
commonality despite the considerable differences of civility and academic sophistication 
with which the antagonists conducted them.  Both dealt with periodization and 
contextualization of the Nazi era and of the Holocaust.  The perspective from which one 
examined the period and its central event would have profound implications on the kinds 
of questions one would ask and on how one would write and talk about the period.  
Whether one looked at the Holocaust as embedded in a larger historical context or as a 
unique event made a huge difference.  Likewise, examining the Holocaust from the 
perspective of the present or from within its own time would lead to different 
assessments.  Before returning to this crucial point, a brief examination of the various 
tensions that created the conditions in which this ‘perfect storm’ developed might be 
helpful. 
Politically, the early-to-mid 1980s saw a conservative turn, precipitated by the 
change from the Social Democratic Schmidt government to the Christian Democratic 
Kohl era, an era that was to last well beyond German reunification.104  Two events 
characterized the political culture of Kohl’s early years in office better than any other and 
________________________ 
Darstellung, Dokumentation, Kritik (Köln:  Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987).  The correspondence between Martin 
Broszat and Saul Friedländer about historicization has been published in the New German Critique: Martin  
Broszat and Saul Friedländer, “A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism,”  New 
German Critique 44, Special issue on the Historikerstreit (Spring-Summer 1988):  85-126, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/488148 (accessed March 27, 2010). 
 
104Chancellor Helmut Kohl headed the German government from 1982 to 1998. 
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helped prepare the conditions in which the Historikerstreit broke out.  One has entered 
the annals of history as the ‘Bitburg fiasco’ and the other revolved around the planning of 
two German history museums. 
‘Bitburg’ has become shorthand for political clumsiness or for a grave mistake of 
judgment on the parts of Chancellor Kohl and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, depending 
on one’s position on the political spectrum.  The statesmen had chosen May 5, 1989, a 
few days before the fortieth anniversary of the capitulation of the Third Reich, to stage a 
grand gesture of reconciliation between the enemies-turned alliance partn rs, Germany 
and the United States of America. The military cemetery in the German town of Bitburg 
was to be the place for the occasion.  Unfortunately, members of the notorious Waffen SS 
were buried there alongside German and American soldiers.  Despite vehement protests 
from both sides of the Atlantic, the two heads of state went ahead with the ceremonies, 
adding, as a gesture of compromise, a short visit to the nearby Bergen Bels
concentration camp.  Reagan’s address at Bitburg included the remark, “You know, I 
don’t think we ought to focus on the past.  I want to focus on the future, I want to put that 
history behind us.”105  Meant as a conciliatory gesture, perhaps with a subtext of anti-
Soviet Western solidarity, the remark nevertheless seemed naive and politically clumsy.  
It certainly betrayed obliviousness towards its effect on (American)-Jewish audiences, 
who had tried in vain to prevent the occasion altogether.106  Honoring the dead from both 
sides together and making no distinctions between members of the SS and other soldiers, 
                                                
105Ronald Reagan, quoted in Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima, 76.   
 
106Elie Wiesel, himself a Holocaust survivor and generally considered a moral authority, had been 
the spokesperson for the American-Jewish opposition against the visit and the location.  Herbert, “Der 
Historikerstreit,” in eds. Sabrow, Jessen, and Groβe Kracht, Zeiteschichte als Streitgeschichte, 97. 
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appeared to bestow equal victim status upon all. To make matters worse, the sharp 
criticism ‘Bitburg ‘ provoked from within and outside of Germany in turn led to a 
backlash from within conservative German circles demanding an end to anti-German 
feelings. 107 In the eyes of his critics, Chancellor Kohl added insult to injury by 
addressing the Silesian Expellees at their annual meeting just five weeksafter ‘Bitburg,’ 
emphasizing that the Polish border issue (with East Germany) was still an open question.  
These actions, as well as the Kohl administration’s push for two new German history
museums, fit perfectly well with the government’s attempt to effect the so-called 
Tendenzwende.108 
On the surface, this ‘turn-about of political culture’ was to lead Germans to a 
more positive national identity, but at the same time it might have been intended to 
counteract the growing peace movement’s staunch opposition against the current U.S. 
nuclear policy in Western Europe.109  Under the Kohl government, the elusive 
Schlussstrich had entered national discourse once again, as were calls for finally 
                                                
107Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen:  Zweiter Band, Deutsche Geschichte 
vom ‘Dritten Reich’ bis zur Wiedervereinigung (München:  Verlag C.H. Beck, 2002), 432- 443; Geoff 
Eley,  “Nazism, Politics and the Image of the Past:  Thoughts on the West German Historikerstreit 1986-
1987,”  Past and Present 121 (November 1988):  175-176, 186-192, http://www.jstor.org/stable/650915 
(accessed March 27, 2010). 
 
108These were the years following the controversial stationing of new American nuclear arms on 
German soil (Pershing II missiles) in response to Soviet nuclear missiles (SS-20) stationed in East 
Germany.  The Kohl government faced fierce oppositin against the weapons from a growing peace 
movement within the Federal Republic. 
 
109For a brief overview of the conflict between anti-nuclear protesters and the government, see 
Hagen Schulze, Germany: A New History, translated by Deborah Schneider (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 326-328.  Jeffrey Herf provided a book-length treatment about the Tendenzwende, 
the political controversies over the Two-Track Decision to station new nuclear missiles in Germany, and 
the peace movement in the early 1980s.  Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means:  Soviet Power, West German 
Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles, (New York:  The Free Press, 1991), especially 98-112.  
Michael Geyer provided additional historical background for understanding the various positions.  Michael 
Geyer, “Der Kalte Krieg, die Deutschen und die Angst:  Die westdeutsche Opposition gegen 
Wiederbewaffnung und Kernwaffen,” in Nachkrieg in Deutschland, ed. Klaus Naumann (Hamburg:  
Hamburger Edition, 2001), 267-318. 
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becoming a ‘normal nation.’ West Germans were to develop a nationalism that went 
beyond the constitutional patriotism or Verfassungspatriotismus for which the liberal left 
advocated. 110  The new museums, one planned for Bonn and the other for West Berlin, 
were to help them find positive continuities with their national past and turn away from 
the shame and guilt that had dominated the official historical consciousness of the post-
WWII West Germany state.111  Martin Walser did not refer to the Tendenzwende in his 
speech in 1998, but what he demanded seems right out of the mindset Kohl wanted to 
allow West Germans to develop in the mid-1980s.  Echoes of ‘Bitburg’ were still audible 
in the Paulskirche thirteen years later and across the watershed event of reunification.  It 
was within the sociopolitical climate of the T ndenzwende, which Charles Maier aptly 
characterized as “Bitburg history,” that the Historikerstreit erupted. 112   
Within the guild of professional historians, the ideological and methodological 
fault lines that became apparent in the wake of the Fischer Controversy had not 
disappeared during the 1970s, even though critical history had gained hegemony vis-à-vis 
neo-historism during that time.  
                                                
110According to Jeffrey Olick, Kohl aimed at portraying West Germany “as a ‘Normal Nation,’ 
with the same problems as other Western states and a history that included ‘highs as well as lows.’” Olick, 
“What Does it Mean to Normalize the Past?” 552-553. ‘Normal’ in this context means that the Holocaust, 
while acknowledged and commemorated, would not overshadow every aspect of the present.  Germany, in 
other words, would no longer be associated exclusively with its National Socialist past, whose central event 
would not necessarily be the Holocaust.  Kohl did not use this particular comparison (neither did Olick), 
but Germany would be more like the United States which is not generally associated exclusively with 
slavery or with the first use of the atomic bomb on an enemy nation. 
 
111The planned museums were the German Historical Museum, to be completed in time for the 
750-year anniversary of Berlin in 1987, and the House of History, planned for Bonn, which was still the 
capital of West Germany at the time. Kohl appointed Michael Stürmer, who was also one of his political 
advisers, to the planning committee for the museum, a ove that earned him criticism from the left.  The 
House of History was to portray the history of West Germany as success story of democracy.  Rita Martens 
and Matthias Lorenz, “Museumsdebatte,” in Lexikon der Vergangenheitsbewältigung, eds. Fischer and 
Lorenz, 263. 
 
112Maier, The Unmasterable Past,  9-16. 
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 As mentioned earlier, for Jürgen Elvert, the Historikerstreit was just “another 
variant of the Sonderweg discussion” that had dominated German historiography since 
WWII.113  The Sonderweg paradigm was not new in German historiography.  Heinrich 
von Treitschke, Friedrich Meinecke, and other historists had originally used it to enote 
Prussia’s special role for Germany and the world.  A different variant of this positive 
interpretation has reappeared among neo-conservative historians after reunification; 
however, during the 1970s and into the 1980s, the theory had received a negative 
connotation and was associated with critical history. 114  The general consensus had been 
that the special path on which Germany had embarked prior to forming its first nation-
state had set it off from the rest of western European ‘normal’ national development.  
Germany had instead pursued a unique and troubled path towards nationhood and 
modernity, a path that inevitably and tragically led to National Socialism.  In other words, 
Germany’s alleged uniqueness had been a negative one.  According to this notion, the 
country had never achieved a ‘healthy’ nation-state as England and France had and 
should therefore shy away from pursuing reunification.115  Instead, Habermas and some 
leftist social historians had argued, the best path for Germany to pursue was to allow a 
new type of nationalism that was not based on the nation-state but rather on the West 
                                                
113Elvert, “Nationalsozialismus, Nationalbewuβtsein und deutsche Identität,” 56; the same idea 
appeared in Stephen Brockmann, “The Politics of German History,” History and Theory 29 no. 2 (May 
1990): 184, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505224 (accessed March 27, 2010).   
 
114Berger, The Search for Normality, Chapter 5.  See also Hagen Schulze, “Die ‘Deutsche 
Katastrophe’ erklären:  Vom Nutzen und Nachteil histori cher Erklärungsmodelle,” in Ist der 
Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung ud Historikerstreit, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt am 
Main:  Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), 92-93.  
 
115For a thorough discussion of the history of the Sonderweg debate, see Brockmann, “The Politics 
of German History”; Richard Evans, “The New Nationalism and the Old History:  Perspectives on the West 
German Historikerstreit,” The Journal of Modern History 59 no. 4 (December 1987):  762-764; Hagen 
Schulze, “Die ‘Deutsche Katastrophe’ erklären,” in Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?, d. Dan 
Diner, 90-93. 
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German constitution and that was coupled with ‘constitutional patriotism.’ Such a pat 
would also assuage European fears of a resurrected German nation. 116   It should not 
come as a great surprise that neo-conservative historians disagreed.117  For many of them, 
the world wars and Germany’s post-war division resulted primarily from the nation’s 
‘unfortunate’ geographical position, wedged between east and west and ‘encircled’ by 
enemy nations.118  Yet, most historians (and many politicians), regardless of ideological 
persuasion, did not  consider a peaceful reunification of the two German states a feasible 
solution to the Cold War during the 1980s and certainly did not foresee this very 
development a decade later. 119  
Another point of near-consensus among historians was the notion that the 
extermination of the European Jews had been unique, even though, as Ulrich Herbert 
pointed out, German historiography had not yet subjected it to a thorough analysis, as 
some foreign historians had.120  Nevertheless, there was a broad consensus that this event 
was without precedent in modern history.  Consequently, comparing it to other genocides 
in the twentieth century, as Ernst Nolte proposed, was breaking a historiographic taboo, 
                                                
116Jürgen Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages,” in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?:  
Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust, 
trans.  James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:  Humanities Press, 1993), 43-44.  
  
117Stefan Berger, in Chapter 4 of his book, The Search for Normality, titled “Decades of Post-
Nationalism:  German Historiography from the 1960s to the 1980s,” provided an excellent overview and 
analysis of the fault lines among West German historians during this time. Ibid., 77-108. 
 
118The geo-deterministic line of argumentation that had long characterized neo-conservative 
German historiography, made a reappearance after reunification.  Arnulf Bahring’s conversation about 
Germany’s future with Dirk Rumberg and Wolf Jobst Siedler is just one example.  Arnulf Baring, 
Deutschland, was nun?  Ein Gespräch mit Dirk Rumberg und Wolf Jobst Siedler (Berlin:  Siedler Verlag, 
1991).  
119Groβe Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 115-116. 
 
120Herbert, “Der Historikerstreit,” in Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte, eds. Sabrow, Jessen, and 
Groβe Kracht, 99, 105. 
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even though comparative analysis of historical events is a widely used historical method.  
Concerning the Holocaust, however, most German historians considered this approach  
inappropriate because it might lead to a relativization of the crime, associated with the 
exoneration of the perpetrators. Critical historians as well as Jürgen Haberm s and other 
leftist participants in the debate suspected that exactly this political and ideological 
motivation was behind Nolte’s call for embedding the Holocaust in a new historical 
context that would allow comparability.121  No doubt, such a motivation also appeared to 
provide the ideological foundation of Helmut Kohl’s Tendenzwende.  
After having argued that a particular alignment along political/ideological and 
historiographic fault lines made the Historikerstreit possible and helped explain its 
ferocity, it is now time to take a closer look at the documents at the center of this ‘perfect 
storm.’ 
Two passages in Nolte’s essay, originally published in the conservative national 
newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, on June 6, 1986, precipitated the 
controversy, although Nolte had advanced similar arguments before.  It took Kohl’s
Tendenzwende, Nolte’s provocative style, and the public forum of a national newspaper 
to make his future critics take note. According to Nolte,  
Is it a notable shortcoming that the literature about National Socialism does not know 
or does not want to admit to what degree all the deeds—with the sole exception of the 
technical process of gassing—that the National Socialists later committed had already 
been described in the voluminous literature of the 1920s: mass deportations and 
executions, torture, death camps… and public demands for the annihilation of 
millions of guiltless people who were thought to be “enemies.”  
 
                                                
121Ernst Nolte, “The Past That Will Not Pass:  A Speech That Could Be Written But Not 
Delivered,” in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? trans. Knowlton and Cates, 18-23. 
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He also posed a number of rhetorical questions that raised the ire of his critics, 
asking,  
 
Did the National Socialists or Hitler perhaps commit an “Asiatic” deed merely 
because they and their ilk considered themselves to be potential victims of an 
“Asiatic” deed? Was the Gulag Archipelago not primary to Auschwitz?  Wasthe 
Bolshevik murder of an entire class not the logical and factual prius of the “racial
murder” of National Socialism? … No one murder, and especially not a mass 
murder, can ‘justify’ another, and we will be led astray by an attitude that points 
only to the one murder and to the one mass murder and ignores the other, even 
though a causal nexus is probable.” 122 
 
In the first excerpt, Nolte referred to the deportation of the Armenians in Turkey 
and the Kulaks (small landowners deemed class enemies) in Bolshevik Russia, inferring 
that Hitler’s final solution may have been an imitation of those historical precedents 
rather than a unique and unprecedented event.  The second excerpt was no less 
controversial because Nolte alleged the existence of a causal relationship between 
Auschwitz and other genocides of the twentieth century.  Nolte suggested that the 
Holocaust might have been a preemptive strike against the Jews in order to prevent them 
from forcing communist revolution upon Germany and using ‘Asiatic’ torture methods in 
the process.  If this were the case then Germans could absolve themselves from the 
collective responsibility and guilt that had prevented the development of a positive 
national identity in post-war West Germany.  The burdens of the past would then no 
longer obscure the path to a new national self-consciousness and to the more self-assured 
stance among the nations of the world that Kohl so desired. 
                                                
122Ibid., 21-22.  ‘Asiatic deed’ referred to a torture method that allegedly originated in China. 
Revolutionary Russia had also supposedly applied this method and it was said that Hitler was terrified of 
Russia using it against Germans in the attack he feared was imminent.    
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Habermas’s rebuttal came quickly, on July 11, but in the leftist-leaning national 
newspaper, Die Zeit.  Perhaps he wanted to nip the suspected alliance between 
historiographic and political revisionism in the bud. In his essay, titled “A Kind of 
Settlement of Damages:  The Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing,”  
Habermas targeted not only Nolte, but also the other historians mentioned earlier,
Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, and Michael Stürmer.  Habermas accused them of 
neo-conservative, apologetic, and ultimately dangerous revisionism.  He castigated 
Hillgruber primarily for his publication, Zweierlei Untergang [Twofold Fall], a booklet 
that dealt with the destruction of Imperial Germany and the demise of German Jewry. 123  
The mere fact of having published these two originally freestanding lectures together 
insinuated a comparison between two very different catastrophes and neglected to 
distinguish between victims and perpetrators.  Hillgruber’s subtitle further inflamed 
criticism.  “The Forceful Destruction of Imperial Germany and the End of German 
Jewry” cast the Allies into the role of aggressor, while the Jews seemed to have 
disappeared on their own. What Habermas deemed especially objectionable was 
Hillgruber’s call for the historian to identify with the German soldiers and with the 
German population in the East in order to tell their stories accurately.  Furthermore, 
according to Habermas, Hillgruber had presented the destruction of the Jews almost as an 
afterthought.  Also, Hildebrand attracted Habermas’s critique for having supported 
Nolte’s attempt to compare the Holocaust to other twentieth century genocides.  
Habermas also found Hildebrand’s defense of revisionism objectionable.  Hildebrand 
justified this stance with the argument that historians primarily from the victorious 
                                                
123Anreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen R iches und das 
Ende des Deutschen Judenturms  (Berlin: W.J. Siedler, 1986). 
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nations had so far written the history of the Third Reich and had in the process 
constructed a “negative myth” of German history.124  Finally, Habermas criticized 
Stürmer for admonishing historians to write ‘usable history’ in order to support 
patriotism. According to Stürmer, he objected, history should provide a higher meaning 
to life, not unlike religion had done in earlier times. Stürmer had justified this stance with 
his by now famous adage that “In a land without history, the future is controlled by those 
who determine the content of memory, who coin concepts and interpret the past.” Thus, 
historians should once again dare to play this role.125  Summing up his criticism of the 
conservative historians, Habermas concluded,    
No one desires to oppose seriously meant attempts to strengthen the historical 
consciousness of the population of the Federal Republic. … But this kind of 
historicization would not be guided by impulses such as the ones that provided 
impulses to the revision recommended by Hildebrand and Stürmer and conducted 
by Hillgruber or Nolte, who set out to shake off the mortgages of the past now 
happily made morally neutral. … the one side assumes that working on a more 
objectified understanding releases energy for self-reflective remembering and thus 
expands the space available for autonomously dealing with ambivalent traditions.  
The other side would like to place revisionist history in the service of a nationalist 
renovation of conventional identity.126 
 
In this passage, Habermas advocated historicization of the Holocaust, but not the 
kind that Kohl and the neo-conservative historians were calling for.  Instead, he seem d 
to have sided on this issue with Martin Broszat.  This leads us to a discussion that was 
somewhat overshadowed by the Historikerstreit proper, but nevertheless proved to be 
                                                
124Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages,” in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?, 38-39. 
 
125Michael Stürmer, quoted in Habermas, ibid., 34. 
 
126Ibid., 41-42. 
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more significant, not only for the future of German Zeitgeschichte, but also for the 
argument of this study.127 
Broszat first advanced his call for the historicization of National Socialism in an 
essay, originally published in the prestigious journal Merkur in 1985.128  His article did 
not attract any attention from non-historians until other arguments, allegedly similar in 
intent, became points of contention in the Historikerstreit.  Broszat and the Israeli 
historian, Saul Friedländer, who had criticized Broszat’s standpoint, discussed the 
concept of historicization once again in 1988, via an exchange of six open letters to one 
another, summarizing their main arguments from previous publications on the topic. This 
dialogue is especially poignant because both discussants belonged to the Zeitzeugen 
generation of Nazi Germany. While Broszat had served in the mandatory Hitler Youth, 
Friedländer had survived the Holocaust hidden under false identity in a French Catholic 
school. 129  The exchange would prove to have an enormous impact on the historiographic 
discussions far beyond the Historikerstreit. 130  The exchange is of interest here since it 
                                                
127Andrei S. Markovits,  “Introduction to the Broszat-Friedländer Exchange,” New German 
Critique 44, Special issue on the Historikerstreit (Spring-Summer 1988):  81, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/488147 (accessed March 27, 2010).  
 
128Martin Broszat, “Plädoyer für eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus,” reprinted in Nach 
Hitler.  Der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte:  Beiträge von Martin Broszat, 159-172, eds. 
Hermann Graml and Klaus-Dietmar Henke (München:  Oldenburg Verlag, 1986). 
 
129Martin Broszat, 1926 - 1989, was in 1988 the director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute 
for Contemporary History) in Munich and an honorary p ofessor at the University of Munich.  Saul 
Friedländer, born 1932 in Czechoslovakia, taught in 1988 in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel and held the 
endowed Holocaust Studies Chair at the University of California at Los Angeles.  His parents were 
murdered in Auschwitz. 
 
130For example, Nicolas Berg, looking back from 2001, surmised that the document might be 
regarded in the future as the “secret key document of the scholarly historical discussion of the 1990s”  
[translation mine].  Nicolaus Berg, “Der Holocaust in der Geschichtswissenschaft:  Kontroversen und 
Fragestellungen seit dem ‘Historikerstreit’,” in Beschweigen und Bekennen:  Die deutsche 
Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust, eds.  Norbert Frei and Sybille Steinbacher,  Dachauer 
Symposium zur Zeitgeschichte, Bd. 1 (Göttingen:  Wallstein Verlag, 2001), 117. 
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addresses various issues of historicization that were present, explicitly or as undercurrent, 
in every one of our historiographic controversies.  
In their letters, both scholars invoked the difficulty of having a fruitful, non-
polemic dialogue but also repeatedly welcomed the opportunity for enhanced mutual 
understanding.  Yet their tone occasionally betrayed that this was much more than an 
academic debate between two historians; rather, the participants dealt with issues cutting 
to the core of their respective identities.  The exchange was as much about questions of 
historical approach as about personal guilt and loss.  Given this reality, one can feel 
nothing but respect for the level of civility and collegiality that both men were able to 
maintain; in this alone, their exchange differed markedly from those between th  
antagonists of the Historikerstreit proper.  
Broszat conceded that the term, historicization, was ambiguous.  For him, it rested 
on two premises, namely, that one should not exclude the Nazi period from historical 
understanding and that critical historical understanding, Verstehen, “should be clearly 
distinguished from the concept of ‘Verstehen’ in the frame of German historicism 
[historism] of the 19th century, with its Romantic-idealistic basis and the one-sided 
pattern of identification bound up with this notion.“ 131  Rather, the historical 
understanding that resulted from proper historicization included “ ‘insight’ [Einsicht]” as 
well as “empathetic reliving [Nachvollzug] of past achievements” and was “charged with 
the task of preventing historical consciousness from degenerating once more into a 
deification and idealization of brute facts of power, as exemplified by the Prussian-
                                                
131Broszat and Friedländer.  “A Controversy about the Historicization of National Socialism,” 87.  
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German historical thought of a Heinrich von Treitschke.” 132  Such historicization would 
not relativize the Holocaust but would rather provide the necessary balance between “the 
desire to understand” and “critical distancing.”  Still, the “mythical memory” for the 
victims of Nazi crimes must “be granted a place.” 133  In response, Friedländer expressed 
doubt about the existence of the blockade around National Socialism that Broszat now 
tried to lift.  He also took issue with Broszat’s “mythical memory” of the victims, 
insinuating that his opponent implied that the victims or their descendants still clung to a 
non-scholarly, black-and-white, “mythical memory” after all this time.  Friedländer 
further wondered whether Broszat negatively compared Jewish historians who preserved 
the “mythical memory” of the victims with their German colleagues who advanced a 
rational discourse about the Holocaust in their work. 134 
Next, the correspondents proceeded to further analyze historicization as a method 
of historical inquiry.  According to Broszat, it should not be a revision of historical 
insight that questioned the criminal aspects of the Nazi regime, but rather a continuation 
of research on a new level that overcame the past moral-didactic character of historical 
inquiry into National Socialism.  This also meant lifting the quarantine around the time 
period from 1933 to 1945.  Social history and Alltagsgeschichte offered promising 
methods for doing so.  The “mythical memory” with which Friedländer took offence was 
“precisely a form of remembrance located outside the framework of (German and Jewish) 
historical science.” 135  Responding to this, Friedländer took up the theme of social 
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history and Alltagsgeschichte, insisting that he did not have anything against those 
methods per se but that they did present a shift of focus on both everyday life and on 
long-range social trends.  This carried the danger of relativizing the objects of such 
historical study.  Therefore, the traditional periodization of 1933 to 1945 as a distinct 
historical entity remained essential.136   
The third and last exchange brought out more clearly the opponents’ personal 
experiences and their impact on the scholars’ work as historians.  Broszat allowed, “If I 
myself had not been a member of the generation of Hitler Youth … then I probably 
would not have felt such a need after 1945 to confront the Nazi past so critically…. 
Affected, yet hardly burdened, the generation of Hitler Youth was both freer than those 
who were older, and more motivated than those who were younger, to devote itself totally 
to the learning process of these years.” 137  Friedländer retorted that there was a 
significant counterpart among the victims to Broszat’s German age group, reminding his 
counterpart and the audience that the Holocaust did not belong to Germany alone.  Both 
cohorts were the last groups still publicly active in their respective countries whose 
members possessed a personal memory of the Nazi period.  Furthermore, he noted, “the 
dissonance between personal memory and socially constructed memories…is…one of the 
reasons which give the present debates their peculiar intensity….This also hold  true 
when it comes to the Historikerstreit, as the great majority of those involved are part of 
the age group just mentioned.” 138  One can hear echoes of this argument in the 
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controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung, that exemplified most clearly this very 
dissonance.  Both historians were well aware of the fact that future generatio s would 
construct history and memory of National Socialism in new and different ways.  A proper 
understanding of what historicization meant was therefore of critical importance to 
Broszat.  As we have seen, such proper understanding was still elusive during the Walser-
Bubis-Debate. 
Whether the Historikerstreit was indeed the perfect storm, as this chapter has 
argued, or whether it served primarily as a war of proxy between the political left nd 
right, or whether Geiss’s ‘Hysterikerstreit’ best captured its essence, it did serve a 
bridging function between the Fischer Controversy and the Walser-Bubis-Debate. 139  It 
was the first grand dispute about the National Socialist past entirely perform d in the 
public sphere; from then on, these types of controversies were never within professional 
historians’ purview alone.  Instead, they became media events.  One could say that, at 
least in this respect, the Historikerstreit was the dress rehearsal for the Goldhagen Affair.  
It also was a dress rehearsal for the struggles over national identity in post-
reunification Germany, even though no one realized this at the time.  Sooner rather than 
later, historians had to figure out what public role they were willing to play.  The Fischer 
Controversy had upset the long-standing consensus among the German guild about this 
question; in the mid-to-late 1980s, it had raised its head again.  Yet the His orikerstreit 
was not to bring lasting resolution, even though the left ‘won.’  Reunification was to 
show how fragile that victory was.  As to their role in society, it seems that this dispute 
helped historians involved in Zeitgeschichte realize that their craft was not politically 
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neutral.  On the contrary, Zeitgeschichte, arguably more than any other historical 
specialty, is enmeshed in the mentalities of the times in which it is produced.  It was 
therefore almost inevitable that historians either associated themselves with one side or 
the other.  If they did not, then others would do this for them.140  
The concept of historicization of the Holocaust was also discussed for the first 
time during the Historikerstreit, albeit on the sidelines. As we have seen, it struck a 
sensitive nerve forty years after the end of the war, even though historicization or 
contextualization is what historians do.  The issue was in the open from then on and 
would remain an undercurrent of every subsequent controversy.  Whether one studied  
National Socialism from the perspective of its final demise or from within the time period 
itself made an enormous difference.  Likewise, how one embedded the period into 
broader periodization schemes would affect the questions one asked, the sources one 
selected, and the results of one’s inquiry.  In this respect, National Socialism as a time 
period is no different from any other epoch. 
The issue of private vs. public memory that would dominate the controversy over 
the Wehrmachtsausstellung and would come to a head in the Walser-Bubis-Debate 
remained on the sidelines during the Historikerstreit, but it was nevertheless there.  
Broszat and Friedländer touched on the theme by acknowledging the impact of their
respective biographies on their work as historians. The participants in the Historikerstreit 
proper, mostly older men, also must have found themselves in the crucible between their 
personal memory and their craft. In this they were no different from those historians 
                                                
140It was Habermas who put Hillgruber, Stürmer, and Hil ebrand in the same camp with Nolte, 
even though the perspectives of these historians were quite diverse.  A look at the table of contents of the 
collection of original documents of the Historikerstreit, Forever in the Shadow of Hitler, indicates that a 
large number of German (male) historians weighed in and took a stand. 
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involved in the Fischer Controversy.  The Walser-Bubis-Debate was most likely the last 
German controversy over the Nazi past in which first-hand personal memory would play 
a major role.  
In conclusion, the Historikerstreit demonstrated that West Germany had not at all 
‘come to terms’ with the National Socialist past.  The fault lines that competing 
interpretations caused ran deeply throughout society.  The Historikerstreit brought them 
out and did nothing to smooth them; on the contrary.  This is how Germany approached 
reunification.  That unexpected event would not make it easier to deal with the recent 
past, as the big controversies of the 1990s, the Goldhagen Affair and the controversy over 
the Wehrmachtsausstellung were soon to demonstrate. 
69 
  
CHAPTER THREE 
LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTION!  THE GOLDHAGEN AFFAIR 
 
 
 
That what is correct about the theses of the book, is not new, and what is new is 
not correct.141   
 
Before people judge, they should read the book: “Then the public will be able to 
form its own ideas about the quality of the research and the arguments of the 
critics.” 142 
 
 
Less than ten years after the Historikerstreit and thirty-five years after the Fischer 
Controversy a book once again was at the center of a national debate about the legacy of 
the Third Reich.  Both authors were academicians. Whereas Fritz Fischer had been a 
German historian, Daniel Goldhagen was an American political scientist.  Fischer’s work 
had only been indirectly about National Socialism; Goldhagen’s dealt with the Holocaust 
as the defining event within National Socialism.143    Both authors had expected their 
theses to upset the status-quo of historical scholarship.  Fischer had had a sense that his 
book might raise some eyebrows; Goldhagen, by contrast, was convinced that he had 
accomplished nothing less than set the record straight on virtually all previous Holocaust 
                                                
141Reinhard Rürup, “Viel Lärm um nichts?  D.J. Goldhagens ‘radikale Revision’ der Holocaust-
Forschung,” quoted in Groβe Kracht, Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte, 151 [translation mine]. 
 
142Daniel Goldhagen, “The Failure of the Critics,” in U willing Germans: The Goldhagen Debate, 
ed. Robert Shandley, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 150 
[originally published in Die Zeit, 2 August, 1996]. 
 
143Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners:  Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New 
York:  Knopf, 1996).  The Siedler Verlag published the German translation under the title, Hitlers Willige 
Vollstrecker:  Ganz gewöhnliche Deutsche und der Holocaust.  Incidentally, Siedler also published 
Andreas Hillgruber’s Zweierlei Untergang, one of the contested publications in theHistorikerstreit. 
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research. In fact, he claimed to have been the first to ‘explain’ the Holocaust. 144 Both 
authors had initially had some difficulties finding publishers for their manuscript , both 
found themselves at odds with the historical establishment, and Fischer as well a 
Goldhagen attracted a strong following among the young generation.  This is where the 
commonalities end.  As we will see, factors other than the different geo-political, social, 
and historiographic environments in which the authors wrote their tomes explain the 
differences.  In the final analysis, Fischer accomplished nothing less than a paradigm 
shift within German historiography and thus opened the door for a flood of historical 
research on National Socialism.  In the wake of his work, historians and then the public 
began to ask new questions of the German past as well as ask old questions differently.  
Even though Goldhagen raised lingering questions in a new way, he did not effect 
anything comparable within historiography.  His methods and conclusions did not hold 
up to professional scrutiny and his subsequent publications proved disappointing.145 
Why then, did his first book precipitate a controversy that gripped Germany at  
time when historical questions about the second German dictatorship should have been of 
more immediate interest?146  What made the Goldhagen Affair the ‘phenomenon’ or 
                                                
144Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners.  In the introduction, Goldhagen maintained that in 
order to explain the Holocaust fully, one had to lok at it in an entirely new way.  He was going to do just 
that, even though no single previous book had claimed to be able to explain the Holocaust adequately. 
 
145Daniel Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning:  The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and 
its Unfilled Duty of Repair (New York:  Alfred Knopf, 2002); Goldhagen, Worse than War:  Genocide, 
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity (New York:  Public Affairs, 2009).  Reviewers of 
these works took Goldhagen to task for assuming the role of moral judge rather than historian.  They also 
criticized him for not adding anything new to historical research, just as had been the case with his first 
publication, Hitler’s Willing Executioners. 
 
146Second dictatorship refers to one-party rule as practiced in East Germany before reunification. 
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‘effect’ that some observers claimed it was? 147  What made his theses important enough 
to warrant inclusion in a German history text for high school students, alongside the other 
controversies at issue here?148  
When Goldhagen’s book came on the scene in 1996, in early spring in the United 
States and in late summer in Germany, some expected another Historikerstreit, 149 while 
others argued that this was just another controversy of which the Federal Republic had 
seen so many already.  For Atina Grossmann, it was just one more ‘Holocaust moment.’  
“As soon as ‘Goldhagen’ fades,” she surmised, “another debate, another controversy, 
another scandal, moves in to occupy the political economy of Holocaust memory.” 150  
We now know that it was indeed not another Historikerstreit; yet the controversy was 
important because it contributed in significant ways to the public discourse about the 
National Socialist past in post-reunification Germany.151  
The momentous geo-political changes that had catapulted Germany into full-
fledged nationhood in 1989/90 did not seem to have played as important a role in the 
Goldhagen Affair as they did in the controversy over the W hrmachtsausstellung which 
                                                
147Geoff Eley titled the book he edited, The “Goldhagen Effect”: History, Memory, Nazism—
Facing the German Past; Klaus Groβe Kracht used the term ‘Goldhagen Phänomen’ to describe the 
controversy.  Groβe Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 145. 
148The text for high schools, published in 2005, juxtaposed an excerpt from Goldhagen’s book 
with one from Hans-Ulrich Wehler and asked student to evaluate critically the authors’ theses about anti-
Semitism.  Geschichte und Geschehen—Neuzeit, eds. Bender et al., 197. 
 
149Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Like a Thorn in the Flesh,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 104; 
Volker Ullrich, “A Provocation to a new Historikerstreit,” in ibid., 31. 
 
150Atina Grossmann, “The ‘Goldhagen Effect’:  Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the 
New Germany,” in Eley, 89.   
 
151Before the Goldhagen Affair ever came to Germany, it had already raged in the United States 
for several months.  Goldhagen’s book also made waves in England, while its publication in France and 
Israel did not cause much of a controversy.  For a comparative analysis of the book’s reception in these 
countries,  see Omer Bartov, “Reception and Perception:  Goldhagen’s Holocaust and the World,” in The 
“Goldhagen Effect,” ed. Geoff Eley, 33-87. The Holocaust had truly been internationalized by the 1990s.  
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was gaining momentum as the Goldhagen Affair eached its climax.  Quickly it had 
become clear that this most profound caesura in post-war German history had not brought 
with it the elusive Schlussstrich for the process of reckoning with the National Socialist 
past.  On the contrary, it seems that the legacy of National Socialism had become even 
more contested after reunification. Germans faced the dual challenges of forging a new 
national community from quite disparate societies, while at the same time reconciling 
two sets of divergent national memories and reckoning not with one, but with two recent 
dictatorships.  Despite being occupied with the challenges of reunification, the Nazi past 
must have loomed quite large on Germans’ minds in the 1990s, considering that the year 
1995 concluded a twelve-year commemorative cycle culminating in the fiftieth 
anniversary of the end of WWII.152 
Yet the Goldhagen Affair was an almost entirely west German controversy.  Since 
the former East Germany had never accepted responsibility for the Holocaust, the i sues 
Goldhagen raised may not have been of deep concern to east Germans at a time when 
they were fully absorbed in the momentous life changes that reunification required.  An 
opinion survey from 1996 shows a striking difference in historical consciousness between 
east and west Germans.  Of those who had indicated that Germany’s history differed 
from that of other countries, for forty-four percent of west Germans it was the Third 
Reich/National Socialism/Hitler that made it different, while only thirteen percent of east 
Germans thought so.  Twenty percent of west Germans vs. four percent of east Germans 
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“deeply touched” fifty-four percent and forty-six percent found them “impressive.”  Allensbacher Jahrbuch 
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believed the Holocaust was special about German history.153  The apparently different 
perception of the role of National Socialism and the Holocaust in Germany’s history in 
east and west may explain the lower interest in the controversy in the east of the c untry.  
It probably did not help that Goldhagen’s lecture tour bypassed east German cities 
altogether.154  The general absence of former East German historians from the debate, 
with the notable exception of the well-respected scholar of National Socialism, Kurt 
Pätzold, was probably the result of the former East German guild having either been 
absorbed into west German historiography, or, more likely, of former East German 
historians having lost their academic posts in the wake of reunification.155   
Goldhagen’s book, although based on his dissertation for Harvard University, 
differed from standard scholarly fare about the Holocaust in several important ways.  
First, it concentrated on the perpetrators of the Holocaust instead of on the victims.  It 
gave faces to the thousands of ‘ordinary’ Germans who, according to Goldhagen, had 
willingly and enthusiastically carried out the killings of Jewish men, women, and 
children. Goldhagen claimed to have found an explanation for their actions in their 
mentality, ideological conviction, and motivation while eschewing other explanatory 
approaches.  In his work, mentality and will replaced structural circumstance d 
pressures.  With this, he positioned himself in the intentionalist camp, opposing 
structuralist perspectives that had been dominant within social history for decades.  This 
                                                
153Ibid., 504. 
 
154I am referring to ‘east German’ cities in connection with post-reunification Germany, i.e. cities 
located in the new federal states,  while ‘East Germans’ refers to those who lived in the German 
Democratic Republic.   
 
155Kurt Pätzold taught at the University in Leipzig in 1996.  As one of the few voices from the 
former East Germany and as a subject specialist, he should have been invited to some of the public events 
associated with Goldhagen’s book tour through German cities, but was not. 
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might explain, at least in part, why Goldhagen attracted the ire of almost an entire 
generation of German structuralist historians; the same ones whose methodological 
approaches had emerged from the Fischer Controversy and who had ‘won’ the battles 
with neo-conservative, intentionalist historians during the Historikerstreit. 156 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners also differed sharply from standard scholarly works 
in imagery and language that did not shy away from graphic detail.  The shock effect this 
produced had become acceptable in the movie genre and perhaps in fiction, but it had not 
been part of scholarly discourse about the Holocaust.  “No German historian speaks and 
writes as graphically as Goldhagen!,” exclaimed Wolfgang Wipperman in article 
generally sympathetic to Goldhagen’s book, “…the problem is that when Goldhagen 
delivers his thick and empathetic account of the horrible acts of murder, he does not 
recoil from describing fictitious scenes in addition to real ones in order to arouse the 
desired emotional effect in the reader.” 157 Wippermann referred to sentences such as one 
describing shootings in the woods, “At such close range, the Germans often became 
spattered with human gore.” While this description was based on an eyewitness account, 
the account of the murder of patients in a hospital was not. “In all probability, a killer 
either shot a baby in its mother’s arms, and perhaps the mother for good measure, or, as 
was sometimes the habit during these years, held it at arm’s length by the leg, shooting it 
                                                
156Notably, Nolte, Stürmer, Schulze, Hildebrand, and Hillgruber, who had shared the neo-
conservative camp during the Historikerstreit, did not weigh in on the Goldhagen Affair.  Wolfgang 
Wippermann, Wessen Schuld? Vom Historikerstreit zur Goldhagen Ko troverse  (Berlin:  Elefanten Press, 
1997), 104. 
 
157Wolfgang Wippermann, “The Jewish Hanging Judge?  Goldhagen and the ‘Self-Confident 
Nation’,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 229. 
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with a pistol.  Perhaps the mother looked on in horror.”158  This approach shifted the 
emphasis of the book from the scholarly arguments to the discourse itself. 
How one might talk about the Holocaust had been at issue during the 
Historikerstreit, but Goldhagen’s choice of representation apparently stretched the 
comfort zone of most German historians beyond the limit. Goldhagen’s style did not 
seem to bother the general public, on the other hand, a public that had flocked to 
Schindler’s List just two years earlier.  On the contrary, those who read his book or 
packed the halls during his book promotion tour, reacted with the greatest interest and 
overwhelming support, while the guild, virtually unanimously, rejected the methods and 
conclusions of their young colleague from the United States.159  
Academic historians had indeed not been this united since the Fischer 
Controversy.  A consensus had emerged since the Historikerstreit that made historical 
comparisons acceptable even for the Holocaust.  Also, as Wippermann pointed out in his 
survey of revisionist historiographic trends in the 1990s, putting National Socialism into 
the broader context of totalitarianism was generally no longer taboo.160  Still, 
Goldhagen’s book seemed to unite the guild more than post-reunification revisionism 
had.  This time, the fault lines ran along different paths than during the Historikerstreit.  
Now the guild was in the defensive, wedged between a young, eloquent newcomer from 
abroad and a public that flocked to him in droves. 
                                                
158Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 218, 216, quoted in Wippermann, “The Jewish 
Hanging Judge?,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 229, 243. 
 
159The first printing of the German edition of Goldhagen’s book sold out in five days.  All in all, 
the edition sold 360,000 copies.  All venues hosting he author’s book tour were filled to capacity.  Groβe 
Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 171. 
 
160Wipperman, Wessen Schuld?, 10, 21, 27 n. 3.  
 
76 
  
The media were quick to capitalize on the situation, providing Goldhagen with 
ample opportunities to disseminate his message.  Goldhagen’s book promotion tour not 
only attracted record crowds, but also demonstrated that members of the guild no longer 
had hegemony over the interpretation of the past.  In some historians’ eyes, this 
‘emasculation of an entire profession’ rather than Goldhagen’s book itself constituted he 
scandalon that became known as the ‘Goldhagen phenomenon.’ 161  Issues that 
professionals had formerly discussed primarily among peers, in their academic journals 
or at their conferences, had moved directly on to the pages of the news media and, more 
significantly, into public meeting halls.  In order to be part of the conversations, 
historians had to enter the public sphere, via essays or letters to the editor in the news 
media or in front of television cameras.  The academic ivory tower that had been 
crumbling since the student revolts of the late 1960s had become a thing of the past by 
the mid-1990s, at least for those involved in the contested field of Zeitgeschichte.  
Whereas historians had seen themselves obliged to take a stand in the Historikerstreit in 
order to avoid professional marginalization, now they needed to step into the limelight of 
television cameras and compete with Goldhagen, who was apparently much more adept 
at drawing the audience to his side than were his academic opponents.162 Goldhagen had 
irrevocably introduced the show element into public discourse about Germany’s troubled 
past.  Taken to its extreme, the ‘Goldhagen phenomenon’ advanced a development that 
                                                
161Ruth Bettina Birn and Volker Rieβ, “Das Goldhagen-Phänomen oder:  fünfzig Jahre danach,” in 
Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 49 (1998): 81, quoted in Groβe Kracht, Die zankende Zunft, 170 
[paraphrase loosely translated by me]. 
 
162Volker Ullrich described the humiliating encounter between high-caliber German historians and 
Goldhagen in several venues during his book tour as ‘t iumphal procession’ for Goldhagen.  Volker 
Ullrich, “A Triumphal Procession:  Goldhagen and the Germans,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley,  
197-201.  The climax of the confrontation with Hans Mommsen, “the doyen of German Holocaust 
research” that left the historian “beet-red in the face,” is especially poignant (ibid., 198, 199). 
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would eventually lead to clever marketing strategies that lured audiences into 
‘histotainment.’ 163 Applied to the Holocaust, such approach is in danger of appearing 
tasteless and lacking the reverence due to the victims and their descendents.164 
Choreographed approaches can indeed give the appearance of “instrumentalization” of 
the past for “present [political/economic] purposes,” as Walser would soon complain.165   
‘Bitburg’ did some of that before the Historikerstreit, but with Goldhagen, ‘history in the 
limelight’ seemed to have reached new heights. The backlash came quickly, like with the 
Walser-Bubis-Debate. 166  
Although the emphasis so far has been on the novel elements that the Gold agen 
Affair introduced to the broader process of Vergangenheitsbewätigung, a closer look at 
Goldhagen’s arguments, his critics’ objections, and his supporters’ praise is in order to 
understand why his book invited professional historians’ ire while earning the publics’ 
praise.  
Hitler’s Willing Executioners opened with a historical overview of anti-Semitism 
in Germany and then focused on three case studies:  the Hamburg Reserve Police 
Battalion 101, two forced-labor death camps, and a death march.  At issue was the reason 
                                                
163The author saw this term used in advertising of historical venues and events during a recent visit  
in Germany.   
   
164Norman Finkelstein, outspoken Jewish-American critic of what he calls the Holocaust industry, 
portrayed the Simon Wiesenthal Center as using  “Dachau-meets-Disneyland” museum exhibits.  
According to Finkelstein, Goldhagen was both a product and a proponent of the Jewish American 
dominated Holocaust industry.   Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry:  Reflections on the 
Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (New York:  Verso, 2000), 92. 
 
165Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” in Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, d.   
Schirrmacher, 12. 
 
166Walser protested more against the instrumentalization of the Holocaust for political (and 
economic) reasons than against ‘histotainment,’ but those two can have much in common and one can 
easily use the latter to further the former’s cause. 
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for the smooth implementation of the Holocaust.  In contrast to Christopher Browning, 
who had also studied Reserve Police Battalion 101 and who had concluded that the 
majority of the perpetrators had acted under peer pressure, a threat of severe punishment, 
and out of a strong sense of obedience to authority, Goldhagen claimed that Germans had 
perpetrated unspeakable crimes against Jews during the Third Reich willingly and 
eagerly. 167  According to his findings, their motivation was not fear of reprisal for 
refusing to kill Jews, but rather an ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ whose r ots reached 
back long before Hitler came to power.  Thus a murderous ideology was the primary 
driving factor in the implementation of the Holocaust.  With this conclusion Goldhagen 
established that individual and ordinary Germans were responsible for the Holocaust.  In 
Goldhagen’s perspective, the documentary evidence to this effect thus no longer 
warranted victim status for ‘ordinary Germans.’ The crimes of the Third Reich were not 
committed ‘in Germany’s name,’ as had become a platitude in German parlance since 
Adenauer’s formulation so many years ago, but rather ‘ordinary Germans’ had committed 
those crimes. In future discourse about the National Socialist past, the active voice would 
have to replace passive constructions with respect to the perpetrators.   
German historians filled the national press with critical reviews, some of them
scathing in tone and substance, for weeks, even before the German edition of 
Goldhagen’s book had appeared in the stores. 168  The defensive tone of many  
                                                
167Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men:  Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final So ution in Poland 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1992).  A study of another Police Battalion appeared in 1998.  Edward 
Westermann, “ ‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Ideological Soldiers’? Police Battalion 310 in Russia, 1942,” German 
Studies Review 21 (February 1998): 41-86. 
 
168Eventually, those contributions filled two volumes. Unwilling Germans? The Goldhagen 
Debate, ed. Robert  Shandley, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1998; 
Ein Volk von Mördern?  Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im 
Holocaust, ed. Julius Schoeps (Hamburg:  Hoffmann und Campe, 1996).   
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contributions, some of which even scolded the young scholar more than criticizing his 
work, is somewhat startling, but others were well-argued.  Methodological shortcomings, 
including reliance on overgeneralization, oversimplification, monocausal or reductionist 
explanations, and the lack of comparison, featured prominently in the reviews. Also, 
Goldhagen’s dismissiveness of structuralist explanations and his preference for 
voluntarist ones invited criticism since it went against the grain of Holocaust research. 169  
In such research, the consensus had privileged structuralist explanations, according to 
which most perpetrators were caught in a web of state terror and in forces of war that did 
not leave any room for personal choice. 
The historiographic faux pas of overgeneralization was indeed at the heart of 
Goldhagen’s argument:  he had extrapolated from the actions and motivations of the 
perpetrators in his case studies to ‘all Germans.’ Hitler’s Willing Executioners 
oversimplified in that it neglected to address the extermination of other ethnic groups and 
of the handicapped.  Neither did the author look at collaborators who had played 
significant roles in implementing the Holocaust in many of the conquered countries.170  
Some critics wondered why Goldhagen had not considered the complexity of the issues 
that the scholarship of the past decades had addressed.171  Eberhard Jäckel and Hans-
________________________ 
 
169For details about this branch of the debate, see A. D. Moses, “ Structure and Agency in the 
Holocaust:  Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics,”  History and Theory 37 (May 1998):  194-219, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505466 (accessed March 27, 2010). This is also the universalism (structuralist) 
vs. particularism (agency/voluntarist) debate. 
 
170Hans-Ulrich Wehler raised this point in his article, “Like a Thorn in the Flesh,” originally 
published in Die Zeit and reprinted in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 93-107, here 100. 
 
171Ibid., 101. 
 
80 
  
Ulrich Wehler, for example, took it as arrogance that Goldhagen had dismissed prior 
research summarily and then made claims of originality.172 
For Hans Mommsen, Goldhagen’s vivid depiction of violence “releases a certain 
voyeuristic moment that serious Holocaust research has deliberately avoided in ts 
restrained portrayal of the crimes.” 173  Furthermore, historians found Goldhagen’s 
assertion unconvincing and disingenuous that Germans had completely changed since 
1945.174  Finally, some historians accused Goldhagen of having committed a logical 
fallacy in his argumentation.  If German culture, over decades or centuries, had imbued 
Germans with a murderous anti-Semitism that was qualitatively different from anti-
Semitism in any other country, and Germans had appropriated this as part of their 
acculturation, then how could those same Germans be responsible for their deeds?  Was 
this not a structuralist argument after all? 175 
In his concluding verdict, Mommsen stated that “the corrosive sharpness with 
which Goldhagen charges the Germans with a will to ‘demonic anti-Semitism’ … is 
certainly ill suited to quiet resentments, and it is anything but helpful in gaining a sober 
confrontation with the past in the light of the present.” 176  One wonders if he referred to 
German historians’ resentment against their Jewish-American challenger?  Why should 
Goldhagen’s goal have been to quiet that resentment?  Perhaps he thought that German 
                                                
172Eberhard Jäckel, “Simply a Bad Book,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 88-89;  Wehler, 
“Like a Thorn in the Flesh,” in ibid., 102. 
 
173Hans Mommsen, “The Thin Patina of Civilization: Anti-Semitism Was a Necessary, But by No 
Means a Sufficient, Condition for the Holocaust,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 194. 
 
174Wehler, “Like a Thorn in the Flesh,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley,  98-99. 
 
175Moses, “Structure and Agency,” 217. 
 
176Mommsen, “The Thin Patina of Civilization,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 194-195. 
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historiography needed a bit of a jolt out of its structuralist complacency?  Also, what does 
the present demand that dealing with Goldhagen’s thesis would make impossible to 
attain—a self-assured national identity, perhaps?  To be fair, Mommsen and his eminent 
and experienced colleagues must have found the self-assuredness with which Goldhagen 
defended his thesis, and especially the accolades he received from the public, quite 
unsettling. As members of the Zeitzeugen generation, separating their professional 
judgment from their personal engagement in the issues may have posed a special 
challenge.  As historians, they felt dismissed and ‘emasculated;’ as older Germans, they 
probably felt unfairly accused. We have seen the interplay between generatio al identity 
and professional craft in the Fischer Controversy as well. Generational issues also played 
a role in the Historikerstreit, as they would in the controversy over the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung. 
Kurt Pätzold, in his role of quasi-outsider within the German guild, observed 
perceptively that among the reasons for the “lack of self-control” among the cri ics may 
have been, besides “injured vanity and rage over ignorance,” critics reacting “not as
specialists but as ‘Germans.’” 177  Perhaps he referred to the fact that some critics had not 
tired of pointing out Goldhagen’s youth and his cultural/ethnic identity, as if those had 
made him too biased for the scholarly pursuit of questions relating to the Holocaust.178  
                                                
177Kurt Pätzold, “On the Broad Trail of the German Perpet ators,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. 
Shandley, 163. 
 
178In “Simply a Bad Book,” Eberhard Jäckel referred to Goldhagen as a “capable young man,” 
who has “robbed himself of any scholarly prestige” with his “failure of a dissertation.”  Reprinted in 
Shandley, ed., Unwilling Germans?, 87, 90.  In “The Sociologist as Hanging Judge,” Rudolf Augstein 
made it a point to give Goldhagen’s age (35) and his status as “Junior Professor,” in ibid., 47. Andrei S. 
Markovits, in his contribution, “Discomposure in History’s Final Resting Place,” provided many examples 
where critics have made anti-Semitic remarks in addition to pointing out Goldhagen’s and his father’s 
Jewishness.  In ibid., 121-123.   
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Some critics had also demonstrated anti-American sentiments with barbs again t the 
‘educational system’ that had granted Goldhagen a Ph.D. for such ‘shabby work’ and 
with comments about the intellectual state of a society that warmly welcom d a book like 
Goldhagen’s.  These comments were also laced with anti-Semitism in that they ccused 
an allegedly Jewish-dominated press in the United States of an overly positive reaction to 
the book. 179  Clearly, the combination of youth, ethnic and national identity, and 
academic credentials had added an additional punch to Goldhagen’s theses in the eyes of 
many members of the historical establishment in Germany.  The guild must have indeed 
felt quite threatened about its continued ability to affect historical consciousness in 
German society. 
Goldhagen was not only the instigator of this controversy, but also played a 
central role as it unfolded.  Newspapers and magazines afforded him ample space to 
respond to his critics, he gave interviews, appeared at public discussions, and undertook a 
lecture/book promotion tour through major German cities.180  In his lengthy piece, “The 
Failure of the Critics,” originally published in Die Zeit just prior to the release of the 
                                                
179Hans-Ulrich Wehler, in “Like a Thorn in the Flesh,” wondered what had gone wrong at Harvard 
[in supervising the dissertation] and concluded that “It is not amusing to witness yet another failure of 
academe’s system of checks and balances.” In Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 102-103.  Frank 
Schirrmacher, in “Hitler’s Code:  Holocaust from Faustian Aspirations,” imputed that Goldhagen must 
have written for a U.S. audience because his book was so simplistic, concluding that Goldhagen’s book 
“leaves many questions open, including questions about the intellectual condition of a society that regards 
such theses as intellectual progress.” In ibid., 45. Hans Mommsen remarked that he (Mommsen) would not 
have signed off on Goldhagen’s degree. Mommsen, quoted in Michael Klundt, Geschichtspolitik:  Die 
Kontroverse um Goldhagen, die Wehrmachtsausstellung und das “Schwarzuch des Kommunismus,”  Köln:  
PapyRossa Verlag, 2000, 36. Ruth Bettina Birn agreed.  Norman Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn,  A 
Nation on Trial:  The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (New York:  Henry Holt and Company, 
1998), 144.  
 
180Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich; Dresden, Leipzig, or other cities in east Germany were not 
on the itinerary. 
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German translation of his book, Goldhagen took his historian critics to task.181  With 
surprising self-assuredness for a fledgling scholar with only a dissertation under his belt, 
albeit one that had become an international best-seller virtually over night, he expressed 
outrage over German scholars having discredited his book.  Their purpose in doing so 
had been, he alleged, to dissuade the German public from reading it or at least from 
taking it seriously.  Emphasizing the scholarly nature and originality of his work, as well 
as the fact that his critics had thoroughly misunderstood or maliciously misrepresented it, 
Goldhagen showed some of the arrogance that many historians had found so disturbing.  
He considered it entirely justifiable to dismiss the work of eminent Holocaust scholars, 
including Norbert Frei, Klaus Hildbrand, Eberhard Jäckel, Hans Mommsen, Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler, Robert Browning, and Raul Hilberg.  According to Goldhagen, they had failed to 
ask the right questions by not paying enough attention to the perpetrators, their motives 
and their numbers.   
Bemoaning the ad hominem attacks levied against him he argued that they were 
“sometimes spiced with anti-Semitic and anti-American allusions.” 182  Against the 
criticism of reductionism he held that “the call for complexity is often the refuge of those 
who find certain conclusions unpalatable.” 183 The accusation of monocausal 
argumentation was another instance of willful misinterpretation. Since several factors had 
to come together to make the Holocaust possible, it was not necessary to look at other 
                                                
181Goldhagen, “The Failure of the Critics,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley,  129-150.  He 
addressed his critics again in his article, “Modell Bundesrepublik:  National History, Democracy, and 
Inernationalization in Germany,” in ibid., 275-285 and in his response to those who had written to him,
published in Briefe an Goldhagen:  Eingeleitet und beantwortet von Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (Berlin:  
Siedler Verlag, 1997), 205-239. 
 
182Goldhagen, “The Failure of the Critics,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 131. 
 
183Ibid., 136. 
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European countries that clearly exhibited anti-Semitism.  Those countries did not have 
totalitarian regimes “bent on mass annihilation” and could therefore not have 
implemented a Holocaust of their own. 184 Goldhagen also vehemently denied having 
resurrected the notion of collective guilt, as many of his critics argued. Rather, he had 
done the opposite by emphasizing individual voluntarism and accountability.  
Furthermore, he took strong exception with those who had questioned his motives on 
account of his national and ethnic identity and family history. 
This particular angle of the debate must have really hit a sensitive nerve with 
Goldhagen, as his several paragraphs of refutation took on a notably agitated tone.185 The 
tone perhaps more than the substance of the arguments flying back and forth between 
Goldhagen and the German historians made painfully clear how difficult a civilized 
discourse about the Holocaust still was, across generational divides and more than fifty 
years after the event (Broszat and Friedländer come to mind who had been able to engage 
in civilized discourse during the Historikerstreit).  These two scholars had clearly been 
emotionally engaged, but their exchange did not come close to the virtual character 
assassination that Goldhagen and Mommsen inflicted upon one another. The dialog 
across generational boundaries was difficult even among Germans; apparently,  civil 
dialog was virtually impossible between a German of the Zeitzeugen generation and a 
Jew whose parent generation had been victims of the Holocaust. Instead of the deeply 
moving correspondence between Broszat and Friedländer, published in an academic 
journal, that had left the greatest legacy of the Historikerstreit, a disgraceful 
                                                
184Ibid., 142. 
 
185Ibid., 143-144. 
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confrontation between Mommsen and Goldhagen in front of a packed auditorium became 
the iconic event of the Goldhagen Affair. 186 This, in a nutshell, was the difference 
between these two waves of disputes about the Nazi past, so close chronologically yet so 
different in tone and substance from one another. 
There were also a few positive reviews from German historians, but the most 
affirmative echo came from non-historians, including the Jewish American Holocaust 
survivor and Peace Price recipient Elie Wiesel and German public intellectua  par 
excellence, Jürgen Habermas. 187  Their voices lent the issues Goldhagen had raised 
additional moral weight.  Habermas’s and Wiesel’s contributions are of interest h r  
because they framed the debate:  Wiesel’s commentary originally appeared in The 
Observer on March 31, 1996, before the book’s translation reached the German market, 
whereas Habermas’s assessment concluded the controversy in Germany eleve  months 
later.188  Both men were Zeitzeugen, Wiesel barely having survived the Holocaust and 
Habermas barely having been too young for military service.  Wiesel asserted, in contrast 
                                                
186Volker Ullrich gave a lively account of Goldhagen’s public appearances in Hamburg, Berlin, 
Frankfurt, and Munich, titled, “A Triumphal Procession:  Goldhagen and the Germans,” Unwilling 
Germans?, ed. Shandley,  197-201. Ullrich recounted Goldhagen’s provocative rh torical question of 
Mommsen, “Is there anyone here in this auditorium who agrees with Professor Mommsen that the people 
who were murdering Jews did not know what they were doing?” (199) Mommsen’s response came “with 
his face beet-red and his voice trembling in rage” ibid.  According to Mommsen, Goldhagen had 
misinterpreted his statement, but the damage had been done.  The audience was firmly on Goldhagen’s side
and the professor stood humiliated. 
 
187For example, Julius Schoeps published a tacitly positive review in Die Zeit.  Schoeps, “From 
Character Assassination to Mass Murder,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 79-86. Ulrich Herbert 
corrected Goldhagen on many issues, but attested him the merit of having asked ‘the right question.’ 
Herbert, “The Right Question,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 109-116.  British historian, Gordon 
Craig, agreed with Schoeps on commending Goldhagen for i itiating new discussions and new research 
into the role of the perpetrators.  Craig, “Ein Volk von Antisemiten?,” in ed. Schoeps, Ein Volk von 
Mördern? 171-175.  
 
188Elie Wiesel, “Little Hitlers,” in Ein Volk von Mördern?, ed. Schoeps,  44-47; Jürgen Habermas, 
“Goldhagen and the Public Use of History:  Why a Democracy Prize for Daniel Goldhagen?” in U willing 
Germans?, ed. Shandley, 263-273, originally published in Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, 
April 1997. 
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to many American historians, that Goldhagen’s book had indeed made a considerable 
contribution to the understanding and transmission of the Holocaust.  Predicting a heated 
Historikerstreit about the book in Germany, he recommended that every school class 
should read it. 189  “Harvard Professor” Goldhagen had undertaken thorough research and 
had uncovered surprising truths and “overpowering proof” with which many Germans 
still did not want to reckon. 190  For Wiesel, again disagreeing with many German 
historians and publicists, Goldhagen’s family background strengthened his authority to 
do research on the Holocaust.  After all, he himself shared this motivation with the young 
scholar and had dedicated his entire life to the same cause.  The more poignant was 
Rudolph Augstein’s disparaging remark that Wiesel’s support of Goldhagen was 
unsurprising since he himself [Wiesel] had done “research on nothing else” but the 
Holocaust, insinuating that this had disqualified Wiesel from being an unbiased 
reviewer.191 Wiesel attributed the insight to Goldhagen that the Holocaust was neither an 
accident of German history nor an aberration of the German mentality, but rather th t it 
was an integral component of both factors, as well as their logical consequence.  Wies l
wondered, though, if Goldhagen had lived up to his promise to explain how the 
Holocaust was possible. If one saw the Holocaust in the context of traditional German 
anti-Semitism, then his logic was convincing.  Wiesel’s concluding sentence could leave 
one with the impression that he would not insert himself further in the conversation, 
                                                
189Wiesel, “Little Hitlers,” in Ein Volk von Mördern?, ed. Schoeps, 44. 
 
190Ibid.  
 
191Rudolf Augstein, “The Sociologist as Hanging Judge,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 
49.  Norman Finkelstein, the son of Jewish Holocaust srvivors, would agree.  In his book criticizing the 
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simply because there was no more to say: “But I belong to the small minority for whom 
this in its breadth and heaviness incomparable tragedy will remain unexplained forever.  
And inexplicable.” 192   
Jürgen Habermas, who had played one of the leading roles in the Historikertreit, 
had remained silent in the Goldhagen Affair until its very end and effectively offered a 
kind of closure to the controversy.  While his role had been that of staunch critic of the 
revisionist historians in 1986, and while he had not shied away from serious indictments 
in harsh tones then, Habermas adopted a conciliatory stance ten years later.  He sought to 
reconcile those who had stood at opposite poles in the debate:  Goldhagen vs. the 
majority of German historians, the historians vs. the majority of the general public, and 
the generations of the Zeitzeugen vs. the Nachgeborenen [those who had been born after 
the Third Reich]. The occasion was the—not uncontroversial—decision on the part of the 
Board of Trustees of the Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik o award the 
Democracy Prize to Daniel Goldhagen in the spring of 1997, a prize that two leading civil 
rights activists of the former East Germany had last received in 1990.  In his laudatio, 
Habermas cited the justification for the award: “Through the ‘urgency, the forc fulness, 
and the moral strength of his presentation’ Daniel Goldhagen has ‘provided a powerful 
stimulus to the public conscience of the Federal Republic’; he has sharpened ‘our 
sensibility for what constitutes the background and the limit of a German 
‘normalization.’” 193  Normalization, of course, had also been at the center of the 
Historikerstreit, where it had appeared as the issue of historicization and comparability of 
                                                
192Wiesel, “Little Hitlers,’ in Scheops, ed., Ein Volk von Mördern? 47 [translation mine]. 
 
193Habermas, “Goldhagen and the Public use of History,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 
263.  
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Auschwitz.  Habermas made clear that the Board of Trustees had not intended to enter the 
discussion about the scholarly merits of the book among historians, but rather, that they 
meant to honor the book’s contribution to the discussion of normalization which had 
taken on added urgency in the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic.  In 
contrast to his stance during the Historikerstreit, Habermas was now careful to award 
credit to historians who had dedicated their lives to researching the Holocaust, 
specifically to Hans Mommsen, Eberhard Jäckel, Martin Broszat, Ulrich Herbert, and 
others. 194 The prize was not awarded for the scholarly merits of the book—and 
Habermas was careful to point out that he, as non-historian, did not feel authorized to 
offer such judgment—but rather for the public response it elicited, a justification that was 
quite controversial.  The power of the book was due to the fact that it “address[ed] 
precisely those questions that have polarized our public and private discussions for the 
past half century.” 195 The central issue had concerned the primary cause of Auschwitz 
and the Holocaust: Had it been the structures that a criminal regime had imposed on 
Germany or had it been the actions of individuals, including Hitler as well as ordinary 
Germans?  Goldhagen had also prompted a public discussion about the usefulness of 
assigning responsibility for national crimes retrospectively to individuals.  This question 
was linked to the broader issue of the public use of history.  Should the righteous 
condemnation of the older generation follow new revelations of their implications in past 
crimes?  Or, should such revelations call forth a sense of collective liability for the 
                                                
194These historians had taken Habermas’s side in the Historikerstreit. Still, his conciliatory tone 
here stood in contrast with his divisive stance ten y ars before. 
 
195Habermas.  “Goldhagen and the Public Use of History,” in Unwilling Germans?, ed. Shandley, 
264.  
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inherited past? 196 Only the latter approach would be a proper use of history in that it 
would help to “generate an ethical-political process of public self-understanding.” 197 
Here Habermas pointed to what he believed was the real merit of Goldhagen’s book, 
namely, the connection between political self-understanding and historical awareness.  
Only a proper awareness of one’s historical inheritance, including the burdens that such 
legacy brought with it, could provide citizens with the political-ethical compass th t was 
necessary to build a responsible nation.  This was, or should have been, at the heart of the 
debate at hand.  By pointing towards individual responsibility of the perpetrators and by
showing the connection between culturally determined values and actions, Goldhagen 
had offered Germans a view of human nature that included the possibility of 
transformation; a transformation that Habermas maintained had already happened in 
Germany through political and cultural enlightenment.  This, in conclusion, merited the 
Democracy Prize. 
Despite the various perspectives offered so far, one cannot fully appreciate the 
‘Goldhagen Phenomenon’ without taking a closer look at public reaction.  Without the 
high level of public interest and support for the young challenger from abroad, the media 
might not have kept the controversy going as long and German historians might not have 
reacted with such wounded pride.  First, however, it is important to establish that ‘the 
public’ by no means equaled ‘ordinary Germans.’  Traditionally, the readership of te
national press that carried the contributions came from the educated middle class.  Also, 
                                                
196Ibid., 267. Habermas was careful to distinguish ‘collective liability’ from the ‘collective guilt’ 
that had been a strong bone of contention among Germans for a long time and whose existence many 
accused Goldhagen of having revived in his book.  
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the majority of those crowding the lecture halls during Goldhagen’s book tour were 
students, that is, a generation born in the early 1970s.  Their grandparents might have 
witnessed the Third Reich first-hand, but even their parents would have been born after 
the war. 198  For them, it seemed, the National Socialist past had already been 
historicized.  Some observers claimed that Goldhagen had become a ‘pop star’ for many 
of them, or even a ‘redeemer’ of sorts.199  Norbert Frei explained this curious dynamic 
thus: “his followers understood Goldhagen as the messenger of a brand-new revelation of 
the seemingly deep and radical truth about the generation of their fathers and 
grandfathers.” 200  Omer Bartov found a good dose of rebellion against their professors in 
this, as well, whose lectures about the subject matter differed so sharply in methodology, 
style, and substance from the dynamic, American professor’s approach.201  While they 
most likely handled the issues with professional detachment, assuming their own  
impartiality, and offered mostly functionalist explanatory models, Goldhagen introduced 
moral issues into the mix, did not hide emotional involvement, and, best of all, offered a 
simple explanation for the Holocaust.  No academician had done that before with this 
assuredness and clarity.  By telling his young audiences that German anti-Semitism had 
all but disappeared from German society since 1945, Goldhagen indeed made it easy for
these young people to adopt what Frei described as ‘guilt pride’ [Schuldstolz].  This word 
combination does not exist in the German language, but it nevertheless conveys the 
                                                
198Bartov, “Reception and Perception,” in ‘The Goldhagen Effect,’ ed. Geoff Eley , 48. 
 
199Norbert Frei, “Goldhagen, die Deutschen und die Historiker.  Über die Representation des 
Holocaust im Zeitalter der Visualisierung,” in eds. Sabrow, Jessen, and Groβe Kracht, Zeitgeschichte als 
Streitgeschichte, 145. 
 
200Ibid., [translation mine]. 
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curious attitude of moral superiority on account of professing guilt for something one 
could not have done.  In this sense, Frei argued, their support of Goldhagen’s thesis 
constituted nothing less than ‘historical self-absolution.’202  For members of older 
generations, on the other hand, this would not work.  The only way we can catch a more 
direct glimpse at public reaction is through a subset of letters that Goldhagen received 
and authorized his German publisher to make available in book form.203  It goes without 
saying that one must approach these sources with due caution.  We do not know the 
criteria that the publisher used, and Goldhagen no doubt approved, to select seventy-
seven letters from the more than seven hundred he received over the course of sixteen 
months.204 The majority are favorable, but not all.  The letters’ mere existence attests to 
the impression Goldhagen must have made on those who read his book, saw him on 
television, or experienced him in person—enough of an impression to take the time to 
write him personally. No doubt, many expected a personal reply—otherwise they could 
have submitted letter to the editor of the national news media.  Goldhagen did reply, but 
summarily, at the end of the compilation. Thus he took yet another opportunity to defend 
himself publicly against his critics. 
A quantitative look at the collection shows that the majority of letters whose 
authors self-identified by age came from members of the Zeitzeugen generation (seventy 
years and older), a much smaller numbers from middle-aged persons (thirty to six years 
old), and none from persons under the age of thirty.  Among those from the older 
                                                
202Frei, “Goldhagen, die Deutschen und die Historiker,” in eds. Sabrow, Jessen, and Groβe Kracht, 
Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte, 145-146. 
 
203Goldhagen, Briefe an Goldhagen.  
 
204Ibid., 218. 
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generation, more writers identified themselves as male than as female (ten vs. seven). The 
same is true for the entire collection (forty-eight from male vs. twenty-three from female 
writers).  Five writers self-identified as Jewish Holocaust survivors.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given their public ‘performance’ and possible media bias against them, 
twelve letters specifically criticized German historians and praised Gol hagen by 
comparison.  One can group the many themes that writers addressed into four broad 
categories: generational issues, guilt and shame, counter-narratives and self-justifications, 
and public and academic representations.205  Many correspondents conveyed their or their 
family’s personal experiences during and after the war to Goldhagen, some wanting to 
explain or justify German actions and others affirming him in his assessments of ‘the 
Germans.’ Several apologized to Goldhagen for the treatment he had received from 
German historians or publicists.  The critical reception of the book and Goldhagen’s 
treatment at the hands of his critics seemed to have caused those writers more shame than 
the issues the book addressed.  Many thanked Goldhagen for his courage to ‘say the 
truth’ and to defend it in public.  The word that appeared over and over again is 
‘betroffen’ [deeply touched and troubled].  Goldhagen had touched a nerve indeed, but 
the public reacted differently in response than the guild had.  
Despite some common threads and broad trends, the letters show great variety.  
None is ‘typical’ or representative of the subset.  The letter from Freya von Moltke, 
widow of Helmuth James von Moltke, and former member of the German resistance 
movement against Hitler in her own right, stands out nevertheless.  The Moltkes, of 
                                                
205Under generational issues, writers addressed memory and their role as Zeitzeuge; under guilt 
and shame, confusion and sadness; under counter-narratives, Germans helping Jews, Eastern European 
anti-Semitism, life under dictatorship and war, ‘we did not know,’ and national pride; under public and 
academic representations, the role of German historians. 
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course, were by no means ‘ordinary Germans’ or representative of ‘the Germans’ during 
the war, but Ms. Moltke’s letter is nevertheless of interest because it addresse  not only 
the complexity of the issues, but also pointed out the tenuous position of the historian.206  
“Yes, you do describe in your book correctly the terrible truth.  Yet your attitude is 
characterized by prejudice,” she wrote, “and that is why some of your conclusions are 
wrong.” After assuring Goldhagen that she respected his prejudices and even understood 
them, she urged him to realize that his book was indeed written under their influence.  
“Historians cannot avoid letting subjectivity into their writing even when theyar  
convinced of their complete objectivity.  And you are no exception.” 207  In closing her 
letter she stated that she would do all that was in her power to see it published, for that 
was what she owed her friends.  Goldhagen may have thought he had found the answer to 
why the Holocaust had happened, but this letter showed, as many did, that there were no 
easy answers.  Monocausality and generalizations do not serve in historiographic quests 
for understanding.  The complexity of the past and the nagging issue of objectivity get in 
the way.  In Freya von Moltke’s assessment, and probably not only in hers, even for 
Goldhagen, the historian’s objectivity had remained nothing more than a ‘noble 
dream.’208 
Before we move on to the controversy over the W hrmachtsausstellung that was 
in full swing by the time Goldhagen received the Democracy Prize, we must ask wh t 
                                                
206The von Moltkes founded the Kreisauer Kreis in 1940.  Her husband was killed in January 1945 
in the wake of the assassination attempt on Hitler’s life.  Freya von Moltke lived in the United States until 
her death in early 2010.  She wrote her letter to Goldhagen on August 10, 1996.  Goldhagen, Briefe an 
Goldhagen, 109-110. 
 
207Freya von Moltke, in Goldhagen, Briefe an Goldhagen, 109-110 [translation mine]. 
 
208Peter Novick, The Noble Dream:  The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical 
Profession (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988).  Some critics, as we have seem, might have 
described Goldhagen’s quest as nothing more than a dream, but in their eyes it was not even a noble one.
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made the Goldhagen Affair the bridging event it was within the larger process of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
The Goldhagen Affair was a caesura in that it demonstrated the increasing 
internationalization of National Socialism and especially of the Holocaust.  The 
Historikerstreit had also received considerable foreign attention, but this controversy had 
already run its course in the United States before it came to Germany.  The Goldhagen 
Affair was an international phenomenon of which the German affair was merely one  
chapter.  German waves of controversy about the National Socialist past would move to 
the international stage, a development that the increasingly networked communication 
channels would accelerate. 209  
While the public had weighed in on the Historikerstreit, that controversy had still 
been a largely academic affair with members of the guild and prominent politicians 
sparring over the proper use of history in politics.  In this scenario, the public was the 
object of education—at issue was who would dominate the shaping of historical 
consciousness.  The Goldhagen Affair brought the public into play in an entirely new 
way.  Goldhagen’s book was addressed primarily towards the public, in complete contrast 
to Fischer’s tome so many years ago.  Likewise, the public decided who the ‘winner’ was 
in this controversy. It was definitely not the guild, nor was it Goldhagen; rather, it was 
the public itself.  We saw a similar pattern with the Walser-Bubis-Debate, even though 
‘the public’ applauded arguments then that were diametrically opposed to Goldhagen’s.  
Ever since the ‘Goldhagen Effect’ had inserted itself in the process of German 
                                                
209For example, H-Net, the Humanities & Social Sciences Online discussion forum offers ample 
opportunities to discuss virtually every historical subject among participants worldwide (http://www.h-
net.org). 
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Vergangenheitsbewältigung, ‘the public’ became the most important discussant.  This 
shift had consequences for historians. 
While it would go too far to expect academic historians to become ‘pop stars,’ 
many probably realized that it was high time to assume the role of public intellectua  in 
order to reach the public.  The guild was also well advised to recognize younger 
colleagues within their ranks who were promoting public history in various guises.  
History workshops, museum exhibits, advisor roles to movie productions, and seats on 
textbook editorial boards, as well as a role in teacher education would have to become the 
profession’s link with the public.  It was quite obvious that the Goldhagen Affair had 
introduced the show element into national discourse about the Nazi past.  There were also 
some innovations in terms of content. 
As mentioned earlier, Goldhagen’ argument gave entrance for moral issues into 
the discussion.  In fact, one could argue that he had used a ‘moral cudgel’ against 
possible German complacency about the Holocaust.  While the perpetrators had been ‘the 
others’ before, or rather, while they had been no one in particular, now they had become 
‘ordinary Germans.’ The controversy over the W hrmachtsausstellung took this a step 
farther by suggesting, that not only ‘ordinary Germans’ had implemented the Holocaust 
but rather potentially ‘all (male) Germans.’  The controversy over the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung also extended the shock effect of its revelation by using photo 
images. One could certainly interpret this as ‘moral cudgel,’ as many would.  Walser, 
finally, rejected the use of what he considered a ‘moral cudgel,’ and this time, many 
members of the public agreed.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WAR?  NOT WITH GERMAN SOLDIERS!  THE CONTROVERSY  
 
OVER THE WEHRMACHTSAUSSTELLUNG 210
 
 
 
Would it stretch our wave image too far to consider the controversy over the so-
called Wehrmachtsausstellung the tsunami of Vergangenheitsbewätigung?  Perhaps it 
would; instead, let’s settle for ‘the controversy of superlatives.’ What gripped the nation 
between March 1995 and October 1999 indeed dwarfed all previous records:  no prior 
controversy about the legacy of the Nazi past had lasted four years; never before had an 
historical exhibit in Germany—about National Socialism or any other time period—
attracted close to one million visitors; no previous controversy had occupied virtually all 
facets of society, from the federal government down to individual families; none before  
had prompted accusations of forgery and of treason, had led to litigation and job 
dismissals, and had included the defamation of the organizers; vandalism and near-riots 
in the streets had not accompanied historical controversies before.  The exhibit also 
prompted the biggest neo Nazi protest march in the history of post-war Germany.  As if 
that were not enough, this was the first public history event about National Socialism that 
had incited right-wing extremist protesters to the point of bombing display venues, as 
happened in 1999 in Saarbrücken.211  None had had the potential of pitting entire 
generations of Germans against one another to the extent that the Wehrmachtsausstellung 
                                                
210The correct title of the exhibit was Vernichtungskrieg:  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944 
[War of Annihilation:  Crimes of Hitler’s Army, 1941-1944], but it became popularly known as the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung [Armed Forces Exhibit].   
   
211Lena Knäpple, “Wehrmachtsausstellung,” in Lexikon der ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung,’ eds. 
Fischer and Lorenz, 289.   
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did.  There also had not been a need before to offer psychological and pastoral counseling 
to exhibit goers.  The impact of their public history project even surprised its creators. 
“We had expected to hit a nerve in society with this topic,” Walter Manoschek ventured, 
“but we had not expected to hit a nerve center.” 212 
While Fischer’s book had hit a nerve within the guild and eventually led to a 
paradigm shift within German historiography; while the Historikerstreit had arguably 
been the ‘perfect storm’ among controversies about the Nazi past; and while Goldhagen’s 
book would soon unleash a wave of emotional responses from the public, the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung had even more drastic effects.  It destroyed one of the last 
popular myths associated with National Socialism, the myth of the ‘clean Wehrmacht.’  
This, in turn, affected the historical consciousness among post-reunification Germans, 
strengthening the conviction of many that Germany could never again partake in war, not 
even as part of a military alliance or for peace keeping purposes.  Due to international  
expectations for the reconstituted nation that it shoulder new responsibilities on the world 
stage, and with crisis looming in the Balkans, this particular ‘memory war’ had indeed 
far-reaching political consequences.   The fall-out from this controversy shaped 
Germany’s national identity more thoroughly than previous controversies had.  Perhaps it 
was a tsunami, after all. 
Yet the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung was not only about national 
identity.  It was also about the personal honor and integrity of those who had served in 
Hitler’s army just as much as it was about the self-understanding of those who served in 
                                                
212Walter Manoschek, “ ‘Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944.’  
Innenansichten einer Ausstellung,”  Zeitgeschichte 29 no. 2 (2002):  67 [translation mine]. 
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the Bundeswehr, the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Ultimately, the 
controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung was about Germany’s future role in the 
world. 
The connection between the representation of the past and the perception of 
Germany’s role in the present (and future) had never been as clear as it was while the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung made its way through Germany and Austria in the mid-to-late 
1990s.  One would still not be able to appreciate the role of the controversy over the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung within the process of German reckoning with its National 
Socialist past sufficiently without looking at issues of personal and communal memory 
that it exposed to public view.  This aspect is indeed so important for our overall 
understanding of the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung that it warrants a separate 
chapter. While the political aspects of the controversy, which will be subject of this 
chapter, had a profound impact on national identity, the personal and social angles to be 
examined in Chapter Five can teach us something about the passing on of historical 
consciousness from generation to generation.   
To contextualize the controversy over the W hrmachtsausstellung, a few dates 
might be helpful.  Developed to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII 
in May 1995, the traveling exhibit opened in Hamburg on March 5, 1995.  Before 
returning to Hamburg in June and July 1999, it visited thirty-one cities.213  New York 
City was to be its first stop on foreign soil, but, due to massive criticism, the produces 
                                                
213On the exhibit’s itinerary were the following cities: Hamburg, Berlin, Potsdam, Stuttgart, Wien, 
Innsbruck, Freiburg, Mönchengladbach, Essen, Erfurt, Regensburg, Klagenfurt, Nürnberg, Linz, Karlsruhe, 
Munich, Frankfurt/Main, Bremen, Marburg, Konstanz, Graz, Dresden, Salzburg, Aachen, Kassel, Koblenz, 
Münster, Bonn, Hanover, Kiel, Saargrücken, Cologne, Hamburg, and Osnabrück.  Hamburg, where it 
originated, was the only city that hosted the exhibit twice, in two different venues. 
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pulled the exhibit and reconceptualized it completely.  Allowing the original exhibit to 
travel throughout the United States was thought to complicate the difficult negotiations 
over reparations to American Jews for forced labor under National Socialism that were 
going on at the time.214  A second Wehrmachtsausstellung, much less controversial than 
the first, reopened under a new title in Berlin in 2001. 215   
It is important to keep in mind that the controversy over the original exhibit 
overlapped not only with the negotiations over forced-labor compensation, but also with 
the Goldhagen Affair.  The Wehrmachtsausstellung hit the scene almost exactly a year 
before Goldhagen’s book was unveiled in the United States, which was also the point at 
which the German media began paying attention to it.  By the time the German 
translation arrived on the market in fall 1996, the exhibit had already toured several 
cities, but the controversy did not fully erupt until it arrived in Munich in early spring  
1997.  By that time, the Goldhagen Affair was virtually over but commanded some fresh 
attention when Goldhagen received the Democracy Prize.  Given that their messages 
were similar in that both pointed at the individual guilt of ‘ordinary’ German perpetrators, 
it is likely that the two controversies fed on one another and that many people engag d in  
both, but the literature yields little insight into possible cross-fertilization. 
                                                
214Hannes Heer, “Vom Verschwinden der Täter; Die Auseinandersetzung um die Ausstellung 
‘Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944.’ ” Zeitschrift főr Geschichtswissenschaft 50 
no. 10 (2002):  896.  
 
215Knäpple, “Wehrmachtsausstellung,” in Lexikon der ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung,’ eds. Fischer 
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with images.  Some have called it an exhibit of consensus.  Since this exhibit did not elicit a controve sy, it 
is not subject of this paper.  For more information, consult Heer,  “Vom Verschwinden der Täter,” 869-898. 
As of 2004, the successor exhibit has been dismantled and stored in the Deutsches Historisches Museum in 
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The controversy was similar to the Goldhagen Affair in a number of ways, but 
also introduced several new aspects to reckoning process.  Both Goldhagen and the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung took away the long-held popular myth of a minority having 
committed the crimes of the Third Reich while the majority of Germans were Hitler’s 
victims. The strict division between Nazis and Germans would no longer serve. Both the 
book and the exhibit broadened the circle of perpetrators to include virtually every 
German, either through direct participation in or active support of genocide.  
Furthermore, the book as well as the exhibit argued the case for voluntary action on the 
part of the perpetrators, emphasizing individual agency over structural explanations.  
Finally, Hitler’s Willing Executioners as well as the Wehrmachtsausstellung revealed that 
the Holocaust was not confined to the concentration and death camps, but rather took 
place to a large degree out in the open, mostly in the conquered Eastern territories.   
  The Wehrmachtsausstellung introduced new elements into Holocaust discourse 
and representation in that it did not use a book or lectures to disseminate its message but 
rather a public history venue.  The traveling exhibit consisted of about fifteen hundred 
previously unpublished, small format, and mostly amateur snapshots.  The power of the 
visual material overwhelmed the sparse textual material that accompanied the photos.   
Not a renowned museum or a prestigious university-affiliated research institute had 
conceived and sponsored the exhibit, but rather the independent and privately financed 
Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung [Hamburg Institute for Social Research].  The 
organizers were not members of the German guild, but rather a historian from Vienna, 
Walter Manoschek, the historian and movie producer, Hannes Heer, and Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma, the founder of the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, who also taught at 
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the University of Hamburg and was heir to a tobacco fortune. 216  Rather than utilizing 
museums, the exhibit was mounted in city halls and similarly politically exposed venues. 
Needless to say, the wrangling over venues became a political controversy in its ow  
right for many municipal and state governments.  Thus, while Goldhagen represented a 
threat to the guild’s self-understanding from outside of the country, the team of 
Manoschek, Heer, and Reemtsma seemed to question the guild’s hegemony from within 
the German context by using an unconventional yet powerful medium, non-traditional 
sources, and alternative venues. The controversy was also linked with the political 
process to an extent that only the Historikerstreit had approached, but, as will become 
apparent, for quite different reasons.  
The exhibit consisted of three parts. One dealt with the occupation of White  
Russia from 1941-1944; one with killings of the civilian population during the so-called 
partisan war in Serbia until 1941; and one with the annihilation practices of the Sixth 
Army as it advanced towards Stalingrad until 1942. The majority of the photos came 
from archives in Eastern Europe and Russia.  Many had originally been found in wallets 
of captured and killed Wehrmacht soldiers.  Others came from private photo albums and 
from letters that German soldiers had sent home during the war. The snapshots depicted 
scenes of humiliation of Jews, evictions, shootings, mass graves, public hangings of 
civilians, emaciated prisoners of war, and on-looking German troops, some posing with 
                                                
216It did not help their reputations with the guild tha  Heer had had connections to the extreme left 
in his youth and that Reemtsma had had some dealings with autonomous and radical squatter groups in 
Hamburg. Reemtsma’s abduction during the course of the exhibit added drama to the affair but was 
unrelated to the controversy surrounding the exhibit. The conservative politician from the CSU (Christian 
Social Union, the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democratic Union, CDU), Peter Gauweiler, 
sarcastically remarked that Reemtsma should have used hi  fortune for the victims of tobacco rather than 
for the remembrance of Jews, members of the Red Army, and hanged civilians.  Heer, “Vom Verschwinden 
der Täter,” 871. 
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corpses.  The victims were men, women, and children of all ages.  The images conveyed 
the utter contempt for human life and the sheer magnitude of the crimes against humaniy 
that characterized the war of annihilation against the Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies.217 
Not surprisingly, the emotional impact of the exhibit was powerful.  Some visitors 
used magnifying glasses, fearing to recognize a father, grandfather, or uncle in the 
photos, as did indeed happen. 218 The sheer force of the images shocked, horrified, 
devastated, shamed, or infuriated in a way that the spoken or written word could not.  The 
arrangement of the exhibition panels in the shape of an Iron Cross further exacbated the 
controversial nature of the exhibit and angered especially veterans, the Iron Cross having 
had a long tradition in the German armed forces to reward valor in combat.219  Many 
cities found it necessary to offer numerous avenues for visitors to receive support in 
dealing with their experience. For example, psychoanalytically moderate  discussion 
groups were offered and social workers and clergy stood by for individual conversations.  
Also, opportunities existed to write anonymous letters to the exhibitors, and extensive 
accompanying programs with historians, publicists, clergy, and politicians accompanied 
                                                
217Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 
1941-1944.  Ausstellungskatalog (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1996) [Exhibit Catalog]. 
 
218Ulrich, Bernd, Besucher einer Ausstellung:  Die Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen 
der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in Interview und Gespräch (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998), 12, note 9.  
A person who recognized himself as bystander in a shooting scene of civilians in Pančevo sued Hannes 
Heer for “besmirching his honor.”  Hamburger Institute für Sozialforschung, ed.  Eine Ausstellung und Ihre 
Folgen Zur Rezeption der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” 
(Hamburg:  Hamburger Edition, 1999), 186. 
 
219Even though the Bundeswehr no longer uses it as medal, a rendering of the Iron Cross is its 
official emblem. 
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the exhibit in many places.  Moreover, guest books offered visitors an opportunity to 
share their impressions and reactions. 220 
As mentioned earlier, the exhibit was designed to destroy the alleged popular 
myth of the ‘clean Wehrmacht.’  This view had persisted in parts of the German public 
even though historical research had long since established the numerous implications of 
the military in Nazi crimes.221  According to the myth, the SS and other special units had 
perpetrated the Holocaust, mainly in the concentration camps.  The military, on the other 
hand, had fought a ‘normal’ war on all fronts. ‘Normal’ here meant a war in which 
soldiers had acted honorably, in obedience to the oath of loyalty they had sworn to Hitler, 
and in accordance with internationally accepted standards of warfare.  Furthermore, the 
popular association of the Army in particular with the failed attempt on Hitler’s life in 
1944 had bolstered its reputation as a haven of civility and courage.  Many considered the 
Wehrmacht an organization distanced from the criminal regime, one in which inner 
emigration and resistance had been possible, at least to some extent. 222  
According to a related popular notion, the common soldier had been the true 
victim of Hitler’s war yet had managed to cling to traditional military values such as 
                                                
220The two books by the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, Eine Ausstellung und ihre 
Folgen and Besucher einer Ausstellung describe these programs in depth and offer analyses of the various 
discussions and interviews with visitors of all generations.  The entire collection of guest books is available 
in the archives of the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung. 
 
221Klundt, Geschichtspolitik:  Die Auseinandersetzung um Goldhagen und die 
Wehrmachtsausstellung, 45, 57; Rudolf n, “Zumutungen und Auseinandersetungen:  Reflexionen zur 
Ausstellung ‘Vernichtungskrieg; Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944’ in Linz,” Zeitgeschichte 24, no. 
11-12 (1997): 347; Omer Bartov, the American military historian, on the other hand, had bemoaned the fact 
that a connection between the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust had been lacking from historical esearch.  
Bartov, quoted in Manoschek,  “ ‘Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944,’ 65.  What  
research there might have been had apparently not made it into public consciousness. 
  
222Peter Steinbach, “Zur Mythologie der Nachkriegszeit:  Die NS-Wehrmacht als ‘Zelle des 
Widerstands’ und als Fluchtpunkt der ‘inneren Emigration,’ ”  in eds. Greven and von Wrochem, Der Krieg 
in der Nachkriegszeit, 39. 
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honor, comradeship, and sacrifice.  One indication of this myth’s persistence into the 
1990s is the fact that forty-one percent of respondents to an opinion survey said they 
thought about German soldiers in WWII “with admiration,” while only eighteen percent 
indicated negative connotations.223  The work of Andreas Hillgruber, one of the historians 
Habermas had criticized for his alleged revisionism during the Historikerstreit, had 
partially contributed to this myth with his book, Zweierlei Untergang.  Hillgruber had 
propagated the thesis that the military had been fighting valiantly and honorably on the 
Eastern Front to protect the Germans living in the occupied areas from the wra of the 
Red Army. The Wehrmachtsausstellung sought to shatter this image in the public 
imagination.  By doing so, it implicated the nineteen million German men who had 
served in the military during WWII.  While Goldhagen would argue that most ‘ordinary’ 
Germans would probably have acted like the members of Police Battalion 101—because 
they were representative of the population and because the eliminationist anti-Semitism 
was pervasive among Germans— the W hrmachtsausstellung suggested that virtually 
every male German probably had, in fact, been implicated in criminal acts, either as 
witness, bystander, or perpetrator. 224 This was, indeed, powerful and devastating news 
to the public at a time when there was much concern over forging a new, post-
reunification national consciousness.  Many would probably have welcomed a 
                                                
223Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993-1997, vol. 10, eds. Noelle-Neumann and Köhler, 
521.  Interestingly, more respondents from the old federal states (former West Germany) than from the new
states (former East Germany) associated admiration with the soldiers (forty-two vs. thirty-three percent); 
more respondents over sixty thought with admiration of WWII soldiers than those who were younger (fifty-
eight percent of sixty-year-olds vs. twenty-eight percent of sixteen-to-thirty-four-year-olds).  Eighty-seven 
percent of Russians thought of their soldiers with admiration. 
 
224Many families back at the home front were implicated as well in knowing what was happening 
at the Eastern Front since they received letters and photos from their soldiers, some of which became part 
of the exhibit. 
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Schlussstrich at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of National Socialism, 
especially since five years after reunification there was a sense that the time of ‘post-war’ 
Germany had also irrevocably come to an end.  We will further examine the impact of 
these attempts to shatter deep-seated myths in the popular imagination in Chapter Five.  
For now, let’s return to the political fall-out. 
The fall-out was considerable, with local, state, and the federal governments, as 
well as the military establishment entering the discussions.  The year 1995 was one in 
which domestic and foreign policy issues converged to create a situation ripe for 
controversy.  The culmination of the string of fiftieth anniversary commemorations 
coincided with the fortieth anniversary of the Bundeswehr and with five years of German 
post-war nationhood.  A volatile situation in the Balkans had brought the specter of 
genocide and war to Europe once again, after decades during which the Cold War 
between the superpowers had imposed relative peace.  The reunified Germany found 
itself in the crucible of these events.  No longer was it possible to occupy the sidelines of 
world politics, but the German population was not generally willing to enter the fay. 
The ‘vacations from world history,’ first imposed from the outside but subsequently 
adopted willingly and utilized to the country’s advantage, was irrevocably over by the 
mid-1990. 225  
As a result, Germany had to make difficult and unpopular foreign policy 
decisions.  Whereas the world had expected West Germany not to involve its armed 
                                                
225The then-editor of the national newspaper, Die Zeit, Theo Sommer, used the image of Germany 
taking a vacation from world history in an editorial in Die Zeit from August 14, 1992.  Gregor Schöllgen 
quoted Sommer as part of arguing for Germany to embrace the power that came with reunification and for 
the country no longer to be afraid to assert itself on the world stage.  Sommer, quoted in  Schöllgen, Angst 
vor der Macht, 137. 
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forces in missions other than the defense of its own territory during the post-war years, in 
the early 1990s pressures mounted for the united German nation to ‘do its share’ within 
NATO and the United Nations.  Jeffrey Olick summarized the changed foreign 
expectations towards Germany aptly: “[u]sually the world condemned and feare  any 
German military activity.  Now they demanded it.” 226  
Reunification and national sovereignty had indeed changed Germany’s 
geopolitical position within Europe and within its alliances.  It was therefore no longer 
possible to claim exemption from participation in military operations.  International 
crises, such as the first and second Gulf Wars, the break-up of Yugoslavia, and thewar in 
Kosovo, forced Germany to review its past policies on military engagement.  For 
example, the United States put considerable pressure on Germany to join the coalition 
against Saddam Hussein in 1991.  This situation was especially complicated since Iraq 
represented a potentially serious threat to Israel.  In response to the dilemma between 
historically conditioned realities and new foreign policy pressures, Germany had held an 
intense debate about out-of-area missions.  In July 1994, less than a year before the 
unveiling of the Wehrmachtsausstellung in Hamburg, the Federal Constitutional Court 
[Bundesverfassungsgericht] ad settled the matter, ruling that such missions were indeed 
constitutional, as long as they happened within a “multilateral framework” and the 
Federal Government authorized them. 227  Thus, Germany felt compelled to participate in 
the NATO IFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, beginning in December 1995, to 
enforce the Dayton Peace Accords.  This meant that the German military operated, for the 
                                                
226Olick, “What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past?” 560. 
 
227Thomas Berger, “The Power of Memory and Memories of Power:  The Cultural Parameters of 
German Foreign Policy-Making Since 1945,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe:  Studies in the 
Presence of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 93.  
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first time after WWII, in a country its predecessor army had brutally occupied fifty years 
before.228  It is not surprising that this mission was controversial in Germany, not only 
among the public, but also among opposing parties in the federal government.  Beginning 
in March 1999, Germany also participated in NATO bombing raids against the Serbs in 
Kosovo—without UN mandate.229  Tthe impact on popular sentiment of this escalation of 
military deployment is quite apparent when comparing exhibit guest book entries 
between 1995 and 1999.   
Given Germany’s long hiatus from engaging its military in combat beyond its 
borders, there was considerable domestic opposition against this war.  In 2001, only fifty-
four percent of respondents to an opinion survey acknowledged that this action 
represented a legitimate use of the Bundeswehr, while ninety-two percent believed that 
the Bundeswehr should be used only if Germany itself was attacked.230  Eventually, the 
government under Gerhard Schröder acted upon the popular opposition against out-of-
area deployment of German forces.  Schröder made himself unpopular with the U.S. 
President, George W. Bush, by refusing Germany’s participation in the invasion of Iraq
                                                
228For a detailed account of these developments, see Jeffr y Lantis, “Action and Engagement:  The 
Bosnian Crisis, 1994-1999,” in Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since 
Reunification (Santa Barbara:  Praeger, 2002), 107-140. ABC-CLIO eBook Collection, 
clio.com.library.acaweb.org/reader.aspx?isbn=9780313 12587&id=C7751-8 (accessed March 27, 2010). 
 
229Berger, “The Power of Memory and Memories of Power,” 95.  Thirty-one percent of the 
respondents to an opinion survey thought that NATO should not have used military means in Kosovo;  
forty-two percent believed that air strikes were sufficient (and ground forces too dangerous) and sixteen 
percent responded that NATO should have used ground forces from the beginning.  Allensbacher Jahrbuch 
für Demoskopie 1998-2002, vol. 11, eds. Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, 989.   
 
230Ibid., 978.   
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in 2003.231  Nevertheless, Germany did agree to play a non-combat role in Afghanistan, 
against considerable popular opposition.232  
Post-reunification Germany carefully and often painfully weighed its interna ional 
obligations as a sovereign nation and alliance partner against its deeply ingrained 
commitment not to use military power ever again to advance its national goals.  With 
hundreds of thousands of people visiting the exhibit these choices did not become any 
easier.  It would not have been difficult to accuse the organizers of deliberate ‘anti-war-
mongering’ for political purposes, as some doubtlessly did. 
The political controversy over the exhibit reached its climax in spring 1997 when 
the federal government rejected the request to mount it in the lobby of the Bund stag 
building in Bonn.  In response, parliamentarians felt compelled to debate the issues in the 
federal Bundestag [representative chamber of parliament].  Prior to the debate on March 
13, 1997, the governing coalition parties and the opposition parties drew up separate 
resolutions, all of which urged the political body to take an official stand vis-à-vis the 
message of the Wehrmachtsausstellung as well as towards mounting it in the lobby of the 
Bundestag.  As expected, the resolutions differed considerably by party.  After an 
unusually thoughtful and relatively non-partisan debate about the issues, however, the 
                                                
231Schröder and his liberal-leaning party, the SPD [German Social Democratic Party], made the 
war the central topic of their election campaign in 2002.  The SPD, together with the Greens, won, 
probably due in large part to their ‘not-with-us’ stance against President Bush’s call to join the ‘coaliti n of 
the willing’ against Saddam Hussein.  
   
232Fifty-one percent responded that they agreed with the deployment, while thirty-four percent 
disagreed.  Allensbacher Jahrbuch für Demoskopie1998-2002, vol. 11, eds. Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, 
990.   
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body rejected holding a vote as too divisive.233  Neither did the parties succeed in 
composing a joint resolution instead.  A second debate ensued on April 24, 1997, at 
which time representatives voted on the resolution that the governing coalition had 
submitted. The resolution narrowly carried 301 to 283.234  The value of the debate did not 
lie in the resolution that the chamber passed, a resolution that must have been a 
disappointment for the opposition parties, but rather in the openness, honesty, and 
personal Betroffenheit [being deeply touched and troubled] with which delegates of 
different generations and party affiliations voiced their standpoints on the issues.  
Freimut Duve (from the liberal opposition), Erika Steinbach, and Zeitzeugen 
Alfred Dregger and Otto Graf Lambsdorff  (all from the conservative govrning 
coalition) included personal experiences in their remarks, but the really outstanding 
contributions came from the Social Democrat Otto Schily and the Green Party 
parliamentarian Christa Nickels.  Both were members of the first successor generation, 
meaning that their fathers and male relatives had participated in the war.  Schily turned 
what began as a typically partisan and polemic debate around and introduced an entirely 
different tone.  He spoke of his uncle who had been devastated by the crimes of the Hitler 
regime and had committed suicide.  He spoke of his brother who had tried, 
unsuccessfully, to flee the country and then had volunteered for duty at the front lines.  
He spoke of his Jewish father in law, who had joined the partisans in fighting the 
                                                
233For the texts of the resolutions and a transcript of the debate in its entirety, see Die 
Wehrmachtsausstellung: Dokumente einer Kontroverse, d. Hans-Günther Thiele (Bremen: Edition 
Temmen, 1997), 170-223.  
 
234The resolution had a rather conservative tone, but was clearly a result of political compromise.  
It condemned right-wing as well as left-wing extremist attacks on the exhibit.  It pointed out that WWII had 
been a tragedy that also had led to millions of German victims.  The resolution sought to save the honor f 
the individual soldier and place the main responsibility for the war with the regime.  It gave the exhibit the 
right to a voice in the debate but affirmed that it was only one voice among many and should not be 
installed in the Bundestag.  The complete text is available in Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. Thiele, 222. 
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Wehrmacht.  Only this partisan, Schily maintained, who had lost his entire family in the 
gas chambers, had put his life on the line for an honorable cause.  Acknowledging this, he 
continued, one could not close one’s eyes from the horrible photos in the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung, which gave an invaluable contribution to the difficult work of 
reckoning that still lay ahead. 235  
Nickel’s statement was no less impressive for her willingness to share very 
personal thoughts in a highly political and  public environment.  She spoke of her father 
who had been present when Kohl and Reagan shook hands at Bitburg.  As difficult as it 
might be to imagine, it seemed that her father had worn his SS uniform to the occasion 
(what he wore was black and had skulls on the lapels).  Nickel, already serving as 
representative for the Green Party in parliament at the time, had not dared to confront him 
about it.  She had been devastated on the realization of what had happened at the Eastern 
Front, but also about what apparently had been done to men like her father.  Those men 
had loved life, but they had burdened themselves with unfathomable guilt during that 
war, a guilt that would have an abiding impact on them, their wives, and their children.  
She, the daughter of such a man, had loved her father dearly.  The one best thing to 
promote healing would be if parents and children could sit down together and have an 
honest conversation about what had happened during the war and how it had come to 
pass.  The silence had to be broken.  The Wehrmachtsausstellung had helped just such 
conversations along, as difficult as that process was. 236  
                                                
235Schily, in Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. Thiele, 181-183 [Paraphrase and translation mine]. 
 
236This translated paraphrase cannot adequately capture the eloquence and powerful simplicity of 
this contribution [translation mine].  For the original, see Nickels, in Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. 
Thiele, 191-193.  Chapter Five will deal with the impact of the Wehrmachtsausstellung on families. 
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Unfortunately, the resolution that barely passed after this debate was non-
committal and did not come close to reflecting the moral depth with which many of the 
representatives had addressed the issues.  Nevertheless, one can probably consider the 
fact that the exhibit was able to move to Frankfurt, the Paulskirche, no less, a positive 
result of the Bundestag discussion.  Incidentally, Ignatz Bubis and Jan Philipp Reemtsma 
opened the exhibit at the very place that would see Bubis on the defensive in a few years’ 
time. 237  An American reporter grasped the symbolic significance of the placement in the 
Paulskirche when he surmised that “[i]f the Americans were willing to deal with a 
comparable controversy about the use of their atomic bombs, they would have to choose 
the Independence Hall in Philadelphia as the place to do this.” 238 
Political fallout of the Wehrmachtsausstellung also affected the self-
understanding and image of the Bundeswehr.  As conscript army, the Bundeswehr is an 
entity that links the state and its foreign policy directly with the people, in their rol s as 
citizen soldiers.  Given the volatile foreign policy situation in which Germany found 
itself in the mid-1990s, and the popular reaction to the exhibit, it is not surprising that the 
Bundeswehr became a player in this controversy.  By contrast, the German military had 
not inserted itself in any of the previous controversies about the legacy of the Nazi past.   
None of them had dealt with the Wehrmacht as a potentially criminal organization and 
therefore had not affected the Bundeswehr. 
 Not surprisingly, many visitors drew connections between the role of the 
Wehrmacht in WWII and the role that the Bundeswehr was to assume in the newly 
                                                
237As already mentioned in Chapter One, the first German parliament had met in the Paulskirche 
after the Revolution of 1848, making the location  the birthplace of German democracy.   
 
238Quoted by Bernd Greiner in Eine Ausstellung und ihre Folgen., ed. Hamburger Institut für 
Sozialforschung, 41.   
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reunified nation.  In Germany, where pacifist and anti-war sentiments had been not only 
state policy since 1945, but had also found strong support among large parts of the 
population, an exhibit that openly showed atrocities perpetrated by the military during
war operations would strengthen pacifist and anti-military sentiments.  Questions about 
the continuity between Hitler’s Army and the Bundeswehr had been lingering since the 
controversial rearmament of West Germany in 1955, although the government had 
repeatedly confirmed that the Bundeswehr did not build on the traditions of the 
Wehrmacht, at least not as an organization. This so called Traditionserlass [official 
pronunciation about the Bundeswehr not continuing the traditions of the Wehrmacht] had 
been suspect with parts of the population, however, since former Weh macht personnel 
had helped build the Bundeswehr in its early years.  
Not surprisingly, the Bundeswehr did take the defensive vis-à-vis the exhibit, 
feeling vilified and dishonored by its message, and probably also weakened in terms of 
its new international role.239  It is indeed likely that the exhibit further strengthened the 
resolve of the population to resist any attempt by the United States to draw Gemany into 
the war against Saddam Hussein.  Depictions of crimes that ‘ordinary’ soldiers had 
allegedly committed during operations in WWII did not lend themselves to preparing the 
German population for supporting their armed forces in a military operation against Ir q, 
especially since many Germans considered the second Iraq war as an illegal war of 
aggression.  The tenor of the guest book entries was just that:  a categorical no to war, 
under any circumstances, especially not one that used German soldiers or that emanated 
from German soil.  
                                                
239Bundeswehr soldiers were allowed to visit the exhibit only as private persons and not in 
uniform. 
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What, then, were the military establishment’s arguments against the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung?  In spring 1997, officials in Bremen attached to their permission 
to mount the exhibit in the city hall the stipulation to assemble a conference of experts 
prior to opening day.  Bremen sought to avoid what had happened in Munich, where 
violent clashes on the central square [Marienplatz] between right-extremists and exhibit 
supporters had accompanied the exhibit in city hall.  Instead, Bremen wanted to facilitate 
a respectful dialog about the issues at hand.  Using Bremen city hall, a place where many 
a dispute had been discussed throughout its almost 600-year history, the city invited 
representatives of politics, the academy, the military, and the public to a sympo iu  in 
February 1997.240  Hannes Heer, Jan-Philipp Reemtsma, and Walter Manoschek were 
present, as well as one of their most ardent critics, Günther Gillessen. 241  Wolfgang 
Altenburg, Bernhard Gertz, Gottfried Greiner, Ernst Rebentisch, Günter Roth, and 
Werner von Scheven represented diverse military perspectives. 242  A summary of this 
group’s main arguments shall provide some insight into the military reception of the 
exhibit.  As an interesting sidelight, the editors of the textbook, Geschichte und 
                                                
240See Thiele’s introductory remarks and Major Dr. Hennig Scherf’s welcome to the participants 
for an explanation of the circumstances of the symposium.  Thiele, “Einleitung” and Henning Scherf, 
“Begrüβung,” in Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. Thiele, 7-14 and 15-16.  In January 1999, the stat  
government of Schleswig-Holstein provided a similar opportunity for dialog between opposing parties in 
connection with the showing of the exhibit in Kiel.  Hans Adolf Jacobsen and Wolfram Wette, Eine 
Ausstellung im Streit:  die Auseinandersetzung um die Ausstellung des Hamburger Instituts für 
Sozialforschung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen derWehrmacht 1941-1944,” 15. Landtagsforum  (Kiel: 
Landtag Schleswig-Holstein, 1999).    
 
241Gillessen was retired professor from the University of Mainz.  In 1997 he worked as journalist 
for foreign policy for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
 
242Altenburg was a former General and past General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, in addition to 
past chairman of the NATO military commission in Brussels; Gertz was chairman of the Berman 
Bundeswehr Association in Bonn; Greiner was a former Major General; Rebentisch was a retired senior 
military physician; Dr. Roth was a retired Brigadier General and former director of the Military Research 
Institute of the Bundeswehr; and von Scheven was a retired Lieutenant General. 
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Geschehen, published in 2005, chose to represent the controversy over the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung using as primary sources excerpts from three contributions to the 
symposium in Bremen.  Students are challenged to assess, based on these sources and on 
a variety of contemporary materials (posters, letters, military commands, statistics) to 
what degree one should label the W hrmacht, as well as the SS, as criminal 
organizations.243    
None of the discussants denied that the Wehrmacht had indeed let itself be used as 
the instrument of Hitler’s war of annihilation.  None denied that atrocities had taken
place.  All, however, took serious issue with the exhibit.  For one, it lacked scientifi 
merit and failed to adhere to scientific norms.  It did not aim to discern the truth and was 
politically motivated. 244   The exhibit also levied summary judgments, assigned 
collective guilt to all soldiers, provoked and shocked, and demonized an entire 
generation. 245  Rather than facilitating dialog between the generations, the organizers 
provoked defensiveness in Zeitzeugen who felt summarily vilified.  The moral arrogance 
and polemic stance of the exhibit’s creators, all members of the successor generations, 
further exacerbated this situation in the minds of the discussants.  Instead, the organizers 
neglected their duty to approach their ‘tragic war inheritance’ with the utmost delicacy 
and diligence.  Instead of judging hastily, their aim should have been to find historical 
                                                
243Geschichte und Geschehen—Neuzeit, eds. Bender et al., 219-223. 
 
244Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. Thiele, 35, 68, 106.  One of the participants, former Major 
General Dr. Gottfried Greiner, even invoked Leopold von Ranke’s dictum of finding how ‘it really was’ 
and asserted that the exhibit had failed to do this (ib d., 35).  
 
245Ibid., 35, 67, 70, 104, 106, 119. 
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truth. 246  The exhibit also failed to depict the entire situation in which the Wehrmacht 
and its individual soldiers found themselves.  It did not contextualize; it offered no 
explanations for the depicted situations; it did not provide background for the mentalities 
of the times, and, most seriously, it did not mention the resistance movement at all. 247 
All critics bemoaned the effect of the photos.  According to them, they were 
overpowering, without proper explanations and contextualization, shocking, and “left the 
visitor alone with the emotional effect of the images.” 248 This was especially detrimental 
for the Zeitzeugen and for younger visitors who would be tempted to come to the 
conclusion that “soldiers are murderers.” 249 The exhibit did not adequately address the 
moral predicaments of the soldiers.  Soldiers were torn between doing their duty for the 
Fatherland, honoring their oath of obedience to Hitler, defending home and hearth, 
averting the wrath of the Red Army, and participating in actions that they may not have 
deemed moral.  Several commentators called this dilemma tragic.250  Von Scheven put it 
most powerfully when he stated that “as a German, one could call Word War II the 
                                                
246Ibid., 38, 72, 106, 121.  According to Roth, “the exhibit contributes only in a limited way to the 
understanding of our history and to an objective judgment about it.  Rather it sows suspicion and 
irreconcilability among the generations.” Ibid., 72 [translation mine].  Von Scheven emphasized the tragic 
nature of the war generation and cautioned successor generations to approach the issues with a caring rather 
than a judging attitude.  Ibid., 121 and 135.  
 
247Ibid., 68-69, 104 - 106, 119-120. 
 
248Ibid., 119, [loose translation mine].  
   
249Ibid., 39.  This statement by Greiner alludes to the exhibit, Soldaten sind Mörder [Soldiers are 
Murderers] that ran in 1996/97 in Berlin and other cities.  It addressed German atrocities against the USSR 
and Yugoslavia during the war, as well as the contemporary German involvement in the war in Yugoslavia.  
Greiner called the two exhibits companion exhibits, although they emanated from different organizations 
and had different goals.   
 
250Note how Hillgruber’s perspective, so criticized during the Historikerstreit, was still visible in 
these arguments.  Hillgruber may not have been that far off, at least not in terms of prevailing opinio s 
within the military establishment. 
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tragedy of our sense of duty.” 251  A related criticism of the exhibit was that it neither 
took into account that the soldiers lived in a totalitarian system and might have feared for 
their lives, nor that the general mentality of the times understood the war against the 
Soviet Union as a war of world ideologies, from which only one party could emerge 
victoriously. 252 
Finally, the exhibit failed to address the connection between the Wehrmacht and 
the Bundeswehr, which was a multifaceted one, given the fact that former members of the 
Wehrmacht were instrumental in building up the Bundeswehr during its first decades of 
existence. This neglect led to the mostly negative reaction of the Bundeswehr to the 
exhibit.  There had been calls for boycotts.  In the eyes of visitors, the failure to address 
the connections probably led to a summary judgment about both organizations, 
associating the Bundeswehr with crimes committed in the Wehrmacht and ultimately 
seeing all soldiers as murderers. 253 The symposium ended with a plenary discussion in 
which the opponents did not come to any consensus about the exhibit, but nevertheless 
accomplished what had not happened in Munich, namely a civilized discourse about 
contentious issues.  The organizers had intended to start a conversation about the role of 
the Wehrmacht in Germany’s war of annihilation.  Such conversation had indeed 
happened, in parliament, in Bremen, and eventually also among historians. 
At this point one may have wondered if the guild had taken any position during 
this controversy.  For quite some time, university historians apparently did not pay much 
                                                
251Die Wehrmachtsausstellung, ed. Thiele, 127. The German original reads, “Man k n als 
Deutscher den Zweiten Weltkrieg eine Tragödie unseres Pflichtbewusstseins nennen” [emphasis in 
original; translation mine]. 
 
252Ibid., 120-121. 
 
253Ibid., 39, 102-106, 125-135. 
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attention to the exhibit.  Lena Knäpple, in her retrospective about the controversy, 
explained this with the guild not recognizing Heer and Reemtsma as competent 
historians.254  Another reason for the guild’s initial lack of interest might have been that 
the exhibit’s message did not break new historical ground.  Even though there was much 
research yet to be done about the W hrmacht and especially about the individual soldier, 
a historiographic consensus did exist about the military’s implication in war crimes, 
especially on the Eastern Front. The American military historian, Omer Bartov, for 
example had just a few years before published his acclaimed Hitl r’s Army:  Soldiers, 
Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, in which he had established that Hitler had indeed 
made the Wehrmacht he instrument of his policies of annihilation and genocide. Bartov 
had also been able to show the gradual brutalization of many a soldier serving at the 
front, which would explain many soldiers’ willingness to commit atrocities. 255  By the 
time the Wehrmachtsausstellung came on the scene to destroy the ‘myth of the clean 
Wehrmacht,’ there had not been any such myth among historians for quite a while. 
Furthermore, the one-sidedness, the lack of contextualization, the emphasis on emotion, 
the extensive use of photos, and perhaps the very fact that this was public history must 
have contributed to a general disinterest among academic historians. 
By 1999, however, the controversy had attracted some historians’ attention.  
Interestingly, the historian-initiated campaign against the exhibit first came from abroad, 
with two influential German military historians jumping on the bandwagon.256  The 
                                                
254Knäpple, “Wehrmachtsausstellung,” in Lexikon der ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung,’  288. 
 
255Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army:  Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). 
  
256These were Rolf-Dieter Müller from the Militärgeschic tliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam and 
Horst Möller from the Munich-based Institut für Zeitgeschichte.  Together, these historians represented the 
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criticism concerned the authenticity of the photos.  Polish historian Bogdan Musial and 
Hungarian historian Krisztián Ungváry alleged that a large percentage w s mislabeled 
and did not depict crimes committed by the W hrmacht at all but rather atrocities of the 
Red Army or partisans.  According to them, the exhibitors had willfully forged other 
photos.257  The international commission of historians who spent a year examining the 
photos concluded in November 2000 that less than twenty photos did not, in fact, belong 
in the exhibit. 258 But the damage had already been done.  The intense media attention 
given the accusers had undermined the credibility of the entire exhibit in the eyes of the 
public and the organizers pulled it even before the verdict of the commission had come 
out.  According to Manoschek, there had not ever before been a historical exhibit 
working with photos that had been as thoroughly scrutinized as to the provenance and 
authenticity of this material as had the Wehrmachtsausstellung. 259  As a result of the 
controversy over the photos, the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, much to the 
chagrin of the original organizers, subsequently developed a ‘sanitized’ version of the 
exhibit that eliminated the most scandalous aspects of the original and opened it on 
November 27, 2001 in Berlin. 260  
________________________ 
arguably most prestigious German institutions dedicated to research of National Socialism, the Holocaust, 
and military history. 
 
257The media jumped on this controversy, a development that eventually prompted a moratorium 
of the exhibit and a thorough examination of the authenticity of the photos.  Manoschek,  
 “ ‘Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 194 -1944,’ ” 69; Heer, “Vom Verschwinden der 
Täter;” 872-874. 
 
258Heer, “Vom Verschwinden der Täter;” 874.  Omer Bartov was a member of the commission.  
 
259Manoschek, “ ‘Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944,’ ” 69. 
 
260Heer, “Vom Verschwinden der Täter;” 874-875, 892.  For example, the new exhibit lacked all 
photos that ordinary soldiers had taken.  One could no longer see those scandalous photos depicting 
grinning soldiers posing with their victims, both before and after the victims’ execution. 
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German historians, albeit for the most part not members of the guild, took the 
more sober atmosphere surrounding the successor exhibit as a welcome opportunity for a 
scientific colloquium about the state of research on the Wehrmacht.  Significantly, the  
Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-
Berlin co-hosted the colloquium, with Jan Philipp Reemtsma and Horst Müller jointly 
welcoming their colleagues.  Once again, the exhibit—albeit the second one this time—
had brought erstwhile opponents together.  The meeting resulted in a book that provided 
an overview of the state of research on the Wehrmacht as of 2005.261  
Apparently, the original Wehrmachtsausstellung had opened up new lines of 
inquiry for military and social historians.  For example, several contributions dealt with 
the mentalities among common soldiers, something that military historians had 
previously neglected.  Also, the historians seemed more willing to use new types of 
source material, as, for example, field-post letters.262 Regardless of what many historians 
might have thought about the scientific merit of the first exhibit, it did prompt them to 
pay more attention not only to the individual and his agency, but also to the common 
soldier in general.  The guest books that the organizers had made available to visitors al o 
allow us some insight into individual reaction to the messages of the exhibit.  Although 
still relatively little researched, they are gradually becoming historicized in their own 
                                                
261Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jurit, eds., Verbrechen der Wehrmacht:  
Bilanz einer Debatte (München:  Verlag C.H.Beck, 2005).  Incidentally, the majority of the contributing 
historians did not hold professorships at universitie  but rather held academic lectureships or worked for the 
two historical institutes.  Most also did not belong to the generation of Zeitzeugen but were born in the 
1960s.  These two facts alone distinguished this group from the historians that had been involved in the 
other controversies. 
 
262Ulrike Jureit, “Motive—Mentalitäten—Handlungsspielräume:  Theoretische Anmerkungen zu 
Handlungsoptionen von Soldaten,” in Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, eds. Hartmann, Hürter, and Jureit, 163-
170; Klaus Latzel, “Feldpostbriefe:  Überlegungen zur Aussagekraft einer Quelle,” in ibid., 171-181. 
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right. As important primary documents, they are indeed, or should be, part of the 
historiography not only of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, but rather of the overall process 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany. 263 
The books from the two showings in Hamburg lend themselves to comparison.  
Do the entries differ?  Presumably, visitors saw the exhibit in 1995 with relatively littl  
preparation; four years later one would assume that they knew what to expect.  We do not 
know how many people went back to see the exhibit for a second time.  What we do 
know is that the percentage of visitors who availed themselves of the guest books was 
quite low (one volume exists for the 1995 and two volumes for the 1999 exhibits).  First, 
the entries will be examined for connections that visitors made between the historical 
events they saw depicted and Germany’s current military engagement in the Balkans.  
Chapter Five will look at the same guest books through the lens of memory. 
A comparison of the guest books from the showings in Hamburg in March and 
April 1995 with those from June and July 1999 shows how contemporary political events  
colored visitors’ experience of the exhibit.  While only two of thirty-three entri s in 1995 
made connections between the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union in WWII and  
German military policy in the 1990s, in 1999 eleven of the forty-seven entries used the 
occasion to condemn the deployment of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions.  For the 
visitors in 1999 more so than for those four years earlier, ‘learning from the past’ had 
taken on a concrete meaning vis-à-vis the present.  
                                                
263When I worked with them the first time in summer 2007, according to the archivist, very few 
people had looked at the guest books.  In 2009, he said that ‘every so often someone took a look.’ One of 
those persons must have been the author of the encyclopedia article about the Wehrmachtsausstellung, 
Lena Knäpple, since she included a couple of general statements about them in her article (L xikon der 
“Vergangenheitsbewältigung, eds. Fischer and Lorenz, 288).  Yet to my knowledge, the collection of well 
over one hundred guest books has not been systematically studied. 
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In 1995, connections visitors drew between WWII and the post-reunification use 
of the German military were still quite general.  According to one visitor, “There is no 
excuse for any of this!  The Germans started the war.  All cruelties happened because of 
that.  One should absolutely be against war [emphases in original].” 264  For this visitor, 
the atrocities the German military had committed in WWII provided a sufficient reason 
for radical pacifism in the present.  This visitor did not need to know about atrocities that 
the other side might have committed, as several other visitors did; s/he did not ask for 
differentiation or contextualization; rather, for him/her, war was war and as such 
detestable.265 The second writer was more specific, even in 1995.  S/he asked, “And 
today?!  Billions of German Marks for the Bundeswehr.  Old drill in new uniforms.  And 
nobody objects when ‘our boys’ ‘suddenly’ ‘appear again’ in Turkey, Cambodia, 
Somalia.”266  Those out-of-NATO-area deployments were peace missions under the 
auspices of the United Nations, but they were nevertheless new for Germany and shocked 
many.267  This writer found even peace missions unacceptable for German soldiers, given 
the message s/he took from the exhibit. Whether Germany might deduce a special 
                                                
264Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg,  March 5 to April 14, 1995, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
265I will use the somewhat awkward dual-gender pronoun t  refer to all entry writers, even though 
the handwriting often gives clues as to the gender of the writer.  Before I was allowed to photocopy entries, 
contributors’ names were blacked out to assure privacy.   
  
266Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, March 5 to April 14, 1995, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
267I do not know what the writer referred to with Turkey, but in Cambodia, the first German 
soldier was killed as part of a peacekeeping mission in the fall of 1993. For Somalia, s/he probably refe red 
to UNOSOM II, the UN peacekeeping mission in 1992 to 1994.  Germany deployed Bundeswehr troops to 
participate in the mission in 1993, a step that wasquite controversial.  The mission ended in failure.  For 
more information, see Jeffrey Lantis, “Peacekeeping a d Humanitarian Relief Operations in Somalia,” in 
Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Reunification (Santa Barbara:  
Praeger, 2002), 55-78. ABC-CLIO eBook Collection, 
clio.com.library.acaweb.org/reader.aspx?isbn=9780313 12587&id=C7751-8 (accessed March 27, 2010). 
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responsibility to protect populations around the globe from civil war or genocide and use 
its military to do so precisely because of its Nazi past either had not occurred to this 
writer or s/he had rejected it.   
By 1999, the tone of the entries had changed considerably.  For one visitor, the 
lesson to be taken from the exhibit was simple. “After this exhibit,” s/he wrote, “the only 
appropriate position is to be for the abolishment and dissolution of the Bundeswehr.” 268 
For this visitor, the exhibit had erased any difference between the We rmacht and the 
Bundeswehr, if such difference had ever existed in his/her mind.  Military equaled 
military, and war was war.  Another visitor was not quite as radical, but demanded that 
“militarism finally has to be squelched so that something like this can no longer happen; 
and that it happens in every war through every regular army is only logical.  For peace in 
the entire world [emphasis in original].” 269 Another commentator disagreed and 
remarked  sarcastically that the exhibit was “part of the German ‘tradition’ of a 
permanent tearing apart of oneself [Selbstzerfleischung]!”  What the exhibit lacked for 
this person was information about past maritime powers (s/he named the Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch and British) who had eliminated entire cultures and peoples over 
centuries.  S/he did not understand why nobody talked about those atrocities any more. 270 
This person, as some other visitors, would have preferred historical comparisons, not 
with other atrocities in the twentieth century, but with events further back in history.  One 
suspects that s/he was aware that those comparisons would relativize German atrocities 
                                                
268Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
269Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume One, June 1 to June 30, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.]. 
 
270Ibid. 
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during WWII, just as Habermas had accused Nolte of doing in the 1980s.  Apparently, 
the conditions that had prompted the Historikerstreit were still alive and well in 1999.  
Incidentally, Martin Walser did not use the term Selbstzerfleischung in his speech nine 
months earlier in the Paulskirche, but he insinuated a German predilection for doing just 
that, and, as we have seen, he was tired of it. This visitor might have well agreed with 
Walser.   
The visitors who made direct connections between the past and the present did so 
criticizing the military policies of the Schröder government.  One specifically referred to 
the ‘Kosovo crisis,’ asking what lessons those living in the present could take from the 
photos in the exhibit. S/he conceded that everyone would need to form his or own 
opinion about that but that apparently peoples did not learn from history.  Using a 
somewhat incoherent line of argumentation, this visitor wondered whether it was still 
necessary to instill a bad conscience in “us Germans.” 271  Possibly s/he meant to say that 
since peoples did not learn form history anyway—see the Kosovo crisis—making 
contemporary Germans feel bad about WWII served no real purpose.  Perhaps prompted 
by this entry, a cluster of commentaries making direct mention of the crisis in the Balkans 
followed.  One writer wondered what might happen when this exhibit was shown in 
Belgrade “in a few years.”  What would “the peace loving people living there say about 
March 24, 1999, and the war that was begun on that day, with the help of Germans?”  
How would they judge the Germans then, this being the second time?  S/he continued, 
“Will not the second illegal war in the Balkans and the chain of diplomatic mistakes since 
                                                
271Ibid.  
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1989 justify an accusation once again?” 272  The connection between the two military 
deployments could not have been any closer than in the mind of this visitor.  Apparently, 
the exhibit had prompted this perspective, or at least reinforced a similar prior notion. 
Another visitor was even more direct when s/he wrote, “Now NATO murders 
again in Yugoslavia.  Will we have to wait for an exhibit for 50 [sic] years.” 273  The next 
writer seemed to have built on this comment when s/he stated how good it was that so 
many young people saw the exhibit.  S/he could not understand that one of the 
organizers, “notwithstanding this documentation of the crimes of the Wehrmacht, 
supports the war of aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia.” 274 Apparently, one of the 
organizers did not oppose the NATO deployment.  In the mind of this visitor, such a 
stance was entirely incomprehensible in light of the exhibit, meaning that for him/her the 
war of annihilation against the Soviet Union from 1941-1944 was virtually the same as 
NATO actions in Kosovo in 1999.  Another person pushed even further, concluding, 
“That was cruel:  but even crueler is that this is repeated after 58 [sic] years!!  Serbia is 
being bombed again.  Hitler had bombed hardly any hospitals, did not kill babies in 
Kindergartens and clinics, but today NATO does this.  NATO kills children, youth, old 
people, and the sick (without casualties of its own).”  After recounting an interview with 
two German bomber pilots s/he had seen on television in spring 1999 in which one pilot 
had said that he had ‘only done his job—like a master baker baking rolls’ and the other 
had said that his first bombing raid had felt better than when he had been with a woman 
                                                
272Ibid.  The writer must have referred to NATO air strikes on Belgrade towards the end of May, 
1999.  This would have just happened a few days before the person saw the exhibit at the beginning of 
June. 
 
273Ibid. 
 
274Ibid. 
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for the first time, the writer continued, “The NATO criminals from today took an exit 
from morals and ethics.  Bill Clinton favors merciless bombardment; morally [illegible], 
without conscience can be displaced.  Libido and rockets, bombs, explosions (instead of 
orgasms).  Are NATO human beings with their new world order!?” 275 What is striking 
about this entry is not so much the writer’s comparison between Hitler and NATO and 
Hitler and U.S. President Clinton, but the fact that NATO and Bill Clinton are mad out 
to be worse than Hitler and the Nazis.  The writer may have forgotten, or had suppressed 
his/her knowledge of the hundreds of handicapped, the millions of Jewish children, and 
the uncounted civilian victims in the occupied areas in the East that the Nazi regimehad 
killed for reasons of ‘racial hygiene.’  One wonders whether this visitor felt compelled to 
transfer the feelings of guilt that the exhibit might have prompted from his/her own group 
to another.  Given the current political situation, the Americans and NATO were 
convenient targets for blame, especially since NATO had indeed bombed civilians, albeit 
by mistake. With his/her recounting of the interview of two German bomber pilots s/he 
did raise one important point, however.  Under conditions of war, or given exceptional 
power, humans can indeed get ‘a rush’ from committing violent acts.  They do not 
necessarily have to be imbued with ‘eliminationist antisemitism’ to kill wil ingly.  
Perhaps Goldhagen’s thesis had not been as sound as he had made it out to be, after all.  
The reasons for this visitor’s need to blame the Americans can of course only be 
speculation, but it nevertheless is instructive to see what powerful, if perhaps unintended, 
                                                
275Ibid. The original German of the last sentence is grammatically and orthographically not quite 
correct.  It reads, “Sind NATO Menschen mit ihrer Neue Weltordnung !?” The writer must have referred to 
the accidental bombing of a maternity hospital in Belgrade just days before, so the television images of that 
carnage must have been fresh in his/her mind.  Theywere closer to his/her reality than images from a war 
that happened over fifty years ago.  For more information about the Kosovo crisis, see Kathleen Young, 
“Kosovo,” in Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, ed. Dinah Shelton (Detroit:  
Thomson Gale, 2005), 622-626. 
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reactions an exhibit aiming for emotional impact can elicit.  No wonder, perhaps, that 
some conservative politicians were so vehemently opposed to the original 
Wehrmachtsausstellung. 
More nuanced and constructive was another visitor’s comment, “…an important 
exhibit.  Especially the examples from the Balkans the German KFOR [Kosovo Force] 
soldier should see before his deployment, so that he knows which memories Serbs, 
Albanians, and other Yugoslavian peoples connect with German troops.  Our KFOR 
soldiers now have the great chance, through exemplary conduct during the process of 
bringing peace to the country, to make amends for part of the historical guilt of their 
fathers and grandfathers!”276  This writer identified him/herself as sixty-eight years of 
age.  This means that s/he was born in 1931 and could have well belonged to the 
generation that was utilized in the war effort in their early teens.  A twenty-five year old 
visitor expressed a similar notion when s/he said that “for us younger ones” the exhibit 
was about “knowing what happened and getting or acquiring a different attitude/insight!  
And to learn [emphasis in original] from it!  To see contemporary happenings 
(Yugoslavia, etc.) differently, more differentiated.  To acquire lessons frm it.” 277 
The last person submitting an entry in the 1999 Hamburg guest book relating 
contemporary and historical military actions was more interested in simlarities than in 
differentiations.  S/he wrote, “How similar to one another the photos are:  Yugoslavia in 
1941 and 1999.  Who brings to justice the war criminals Hitler and Göring?  Who brings 
to justice the war criminals Schröder [German Federal Chancellor in 1999] and Fischer 
                                                
276Ibid. 
 
277Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.]. 
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[German Foreign Minister in 1999]?  Wehrmacht or Bundeswehr. The terror is the same.”  
In a different handwriting, just below this entry, someone else posed the question, “Who 
brings to justice Milosevic??” 278 
These entries reveal, even though one can certainly not claim that they are in any 
way representative of what ‘the’ visitors thought about the exhibit, that those who chose 
to comment via the guest books applied the message about the past to present political 
circumstances. In some cases, it may have worked the other way around, with the 
televised images from the bombings in Kosovo coloring the perception of the photos in 
the exhibit.  Whether the producers had intended for visitors to come to the conclusions 
that our writers expressed must remain an open question.  That the emotional power of 
the photos challenged visitors to take a stand, whether in writing or just for themselv s, 
certainly underscores the responsibility that comes with ‘doing’ public history. 
Yet by far a larger number of visitors directed their comments towards issues of 
memory, their very own memories of the war and its aftermath or memories passd down 
from grandparents and parents to children and grandchildren.  An examination of these 
voices will further enhance our understanding of the controversy over the so-called 
Wehrmachtsausstellung.  It will also help to fully elucidate the exhibit’s multifaceted 
contributions to the process of reckoning with the National Socialist past in Germany. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
“GRANDPA WAS NO NAZI”279: 
 
  THE  WEHRMACHTSAUSTELLUNG,  
 
 MEMORY, AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
 
Soldiers not murderers?  My father told me shortly before his death, ‘we all went 
to war enthusiastically.’  Thank you, now I know why.280 
 
I have waited for this moment for 40 years.  Now I see what it meant when my 
father ‘proudly’ talked about his ‘war experiences’ and there was talk about 
‘destroying partisan hideouts’ or ‘smoking them out.’  As a ten-year-old, at family 
celebrations, I regularly got sick to my stomach when hearing this, now I cannot 
even eat as much as I want to throw up, […] 281  
 
I am also German, but I was born in Poland.  My grandpa was a soldier in the 
German military.  I simply cannot believe that he would have participated in such 
atrocities.282 
 
[…] My grandma was raped and made a refugee when she was seventeen—as old 
as I am now.  That should also be shown, in my opinion. […] 283  
 
 
These are just a few of many guest book entries whose authors self-identifie as 
children or grandchildren of the German war generation. Variations of the same 
                                                
279This is the title from Harald Welzer’s work on the roles National Socialism and the Holocaust 
play in family memory.  Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, “Opa war kein Nazi”:  
Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main:  Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 2002).  
 
280Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg,  March 5 to April 14, 1995, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  All translations 
mine.  The translations are as close to the originals as possible, including irregular sentence structure. 
 
281Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944 ” in 
Hamburg, Volume One, June 1 to June 30, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.]. 
 
282Ibid. 
 
283Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
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narratives appear repeatedly.  Themes such as the impact of war on family relationships, 
innocence and guilt, victor and victim status, and the evils of war dominate the entries.  
Confusion, empathy, and sorrow speak from the texts, but anger and cynicism also come 
through at times, directly or thinly disguised.  Despite the broad range of detail,
sophistication, and perspective one finds among the comments, it is nevertheless apparent 
that each writer brought to the exhibit prior notions about WWII and about the role that 
his or her family had played before and during the war.  It seems that even those visitors 
who were born after the Third Reich had ‘memories’ of the times.  For some members of 
the first successor generation, those memories remained associated well into adulthood 
with feelings they remembered from childhood.  For grandchildren it seemed especially 
difficult to reconcile memories of their grandparents with the soldiers they saw in the 
exhibit, even though they knew that their grandfathers had served in the military during 
the war. 284 
Not only the powerful photos and their controversial arrangement, but also the 
very experience of being in the images’ presence together with other, emotionally 
engaged persons must have compelled many visitors to reflect upon the notions and 
memories they had brought with them.  Some apparently saw their worst fears and 
                                                
284When referring to the first successor or children geration, I mean persons whose parents  
participated in the war but who themselves did not play any active role in the support of war efforts, either 
because they were too young at the time or because they had not been born yet.  This generation includes 
those born between 1935 and 1965.  The second successor or grandchildren generation includes those who 
associated the war primarily with their grandparents; this generation was born after 1970.  This scheme 
places the children generation between young adulthood and advanced middle age at the time of the exhibit 
and the grandchildren generation at high school age and younger.  Many visitors would have had both 
parents and grandparents in the war, but generally those who used the guest books mentioned either parnts 
or grandparents not both.  Those who were teenagers during the war are counted to the Z itzeugen, even 
though they may have participated in the war yet also had parents who were active participants.  The guest 
books I examined did not include commentaries that self-identified as Zeitzeuge and as a child of the war 
generation, although there must have been quite a few visitors who fell into that category.  Members of this 
generation would have been born in the 1920s and would have been in their seventies in the 1990s. 
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suspicions about their family members justified, while others reacted defensiv ly and 
must have felt compelled to salvage their loved-ones’ honor.   
Reading the comments one wonders if there were generational delineations 
among the various entries.  Did middle-aged ‘children’ and teen-aged ‘grandchildren’ 
who engaged with and reflected upon the message of the We rmachtsausstellung react in 
more or less predictable ways, based on membership in their respective generational 
cohorts?  May it even be possible to discern patterns of how families pass on narratives 
and memories about the war and about the Holocaust from generation to generation?  A 
theoretical framework within which to analyze the guest book entries will facilitate the 
process of exploring these difficult yet important issues.285 
Theoretical approaches to the study of memory lend themselves to the task.  Even 
though recent Zeitgeschichte about National Socialism and the Holocaust is replete with 
memory studies, seminal works from the broader field of the social sciences mak  
significant contributions.286  The names reappearing over and over in studies that look at 
National Socialism and the Holocaust through the lens of memory are Maurice 
Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, and James Young, but also, especially in the German literature, 
Aleida Assmann, Jan Assmann, and Jörn Rüsen.287  More recently, Harald Welzer has 
                                                
285For a narrative of the impact of the various post-WWII generations on the reckoning with the 
National Socialist past in Germany, see Aleida Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis, especially Chapter 
Two, “Verkörperte Geschichte—Zur Dynamik der Generationen,” 31-69. 
 
286For a listing of selected works on history and memory, see page 9, note 6. 
 
287For more information about these authors’ seminal contributions to the roles of memory in 
historical consciousness, see Pierre Nora, “Between M mory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” 
Representations no. 26, Special issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989): 7-24, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928520 (accessed March 27, 2010); James E. Young,  “Between History and 
Memory:  The Uncanny Voices of Historian and Survivor,” History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (October 1, 
1997):  47, http://0-www.proquest.com.library.acaweb.org/; Document ID: 593640241(accessed March 27, 
2010); Aleida Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis:  Von der individuellen Erfah ung zur öffentlichen 
Inszenierung (München:  C.H. Beck, 2007);  Jan Assmann,  “Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle 
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expanded on the work of these influential scholars and proposed a ‘theory of memory,’ 
based on empirical research about National Socialism and the Holocaust in family 
memory. 288  Welzer’s work is especially fruitful for our inquiry since it involved a good-
sized sample of multi-generational families and should therefore provide clues about the 
impact of generational cohort on memory.  Before examining Welzer’s study and his 
conclusions, a brief exploration is in order of the foundations that the French sociologist, 
Maurice Halbwachs, laid with his seminal work on collective memory. 289   
Halbwachs’s revolutionary contribution to the understanding of the social 
dynamics of memory was his delineation among a variety of memory types. As part of
his work on the sociology of knowledge, Halbwachs distinguished autobiographical 
memory from collective memory, both of which were in turn distinct from what he called 
historical memory.  Fundamental to his theory is the notion that memory was inextricably 
linked with human interaction. Within his scheme, autobiographical memory gives 
individuals a sense of self, an identity rooted in an individual past.  As individuals share 
autobiographical memories with members of the groups to which they belong, they 
develop a common sense of identity complete with a shared way of looking at the past 
________________________ 
Identität,” in Kultur und Gedächtnis, eds. Jan Assmann and Tonio Hölscher (Frankfurt am Main:  
Suhrkamp, 1988), 9-19; Jörn Rüsen, "Trauer als historische Kategorie,” in Erlebnis— Gedächtnis—Sinn:  
Authentische und konstruierte Erinnerung, eds. Hanno Loewy and Bernhard Moltmann  (Frankfurt:  
Campus Verlag, 1996), 57-99. 
  
288Welzer, born in 1958, is a social psychologist and professor at the Kulturwissenschaftliches 
Institut Essen at the University of Witten/Herdecke.  His research emphases are memory and tradition 
research, as well as political psychology. 
 
289Maurice Halbwachs was born in France in 1877.  During WWII, German occupation forces 
committed him to a concentration camp because he had inquired about the murder of his elderly, Jewish 
parents-in-law.  He died in the camp in 1945. One can find more information about his life and his various 
scholarly contributions in Lewis A. Coser’s introduction to Halbwachs’s book, On Collective Memory.  
Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, edited, translated, and with an Introduction by Lewis A. Coser 
(Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1-40.  
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that is unique to the group.  This Halbwachs called collective memory.  For him, 
collective memory did not exist in isolation from individuals as some abstract or 
biologically determined entity. Rather, he explained, “[w]hile the collectiv  memory 
endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as 
group members who remember.” 290 Historical memory, finally, evolved from collective 
memory as larger groups created rituals and places of commemoration of their communal 
past.  Grand national narratives, as expressed in national holidays, national monuments, 
and in the passing on of traditions would all constitute historical memory within 
Halbwachs’s scheme.  Historians have also referred to the phenomenon of historical 
memory as historical consciousness, historical culture, or historical identity.  National 
identity would be broader yet than historical memory in that it is more present and future 
orientated; however, historical memory represents one aspect of national identity.   
For Halbwachs, memory in its three manifestations was a sociological category.  
Memory only existed within relationships among individuals or among groups of 
individuals. All three manifestations relied on discourse.  Since individuals and groups 
constructed their memories, as many collective memories existed in society as there were 
groups.  Likewise, individuals could partake of a number of different collective memories 
simultaneously, depending on the various groups with which they associated.  Ultimately 
this meant that there were multiple ‘pasts’ co-existing within larger society, pasts that 
could easily, and often did, compete with one another.291 
                                                
290Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, quoted in Coser, “Introduction,” 22. 
 
291For example, the National Socialist past as remembered in Germany differs from that 
remembered by groups of former victims or their successor generations.  Israelis and Poles, by and large, 
would remember the Third Reich, the war, and the Holocaust differently than most Germans would. 
Similarly, history as written by victorious powers generally reads differently than history as presented by 
those who lost wars.  Here, we only consider competing pasts within German society. 
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Applied to the theme of successive waves of controversies over the National 
Socialist past,  Halbwachs’s theory illuminates why ‘the past’ can be so contentious and 
why ‘memory wars’ have taken place over the proper understanding and representation of 
that past.  It is also clearer now why discourse played such a prominent role in the 
controversies, a fact that was especially obvious in the Historikerstreit and in the Walser-
Bubis-Debate.   
Halbwachs also argued that memories were fluid, meaning that all three types of 
memory were subject to continuous change.  To him, memory, like the past, was not  
static or an entity in itself; rather, individuals and groups constantly reconstructed their 
memories in order to make sense of the past in light of the present.  According to 
Halbwachs, memory in its various iterations served identity, on the individual as well as 
the group levels.  Another important aspect of Halbwachs’s scheme is the notion that the 
individual constructed his or her autobiographical memory within the framework of the
group to which he or she belonged.  Thus autobiographical memory was always 
embedded within collective memory.  Halbwachs further argued that families, being th  
quintessential social group, constructed their own collective memories and passethem 
on from generation to generation.292  
With his emphasis on individuals and groups constructing their past via memory, 
Halbwachs undermined the notion of the independent existence of ‘the’ past. For the 
historian of National Socialism and the Holocaust, as for any historian studying the very 
recent past, this means that work with Zeitzeugen [those who have first-hand experience 
________________________ 
 
292More information about these concepts of memory is available in Coser’s introduction and in 
Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 41-189.  Pages 54-83 deal with collective memory and the family. 
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of the time period under investigation] would not reveal how events had really happened 
and what the past had really looked like, but rather how various individuals and groups 
used their conception of the past to make sense of their individual biographies and of 
their group identities.293  Consequently, in historical research one could speak of a double 
filter that separated the present from the past, even if Zeitzeugen existed: one filter being 
the perceptions that the historian brings to his or her work and the other being the ways in
which memory operates within the individuals he or she queries about the past.294 
Postmodern notions of history have led to similar insights about what historical research 
can and cannot accomplish. 
While Halbwachs’s theory about memory was visionary at the time, by today’s 
standards it seems rather crude.  Even though social scientists, including historians, still 
appear to consider Halbwachs’s work foundational, they have fine-tuned his theory, 
utilizing new insights from the neurological sciences.  Harald Welzer has done this, 
making his work helpful as we are trying to understand what the guest book entries 
dealing with memory and family might tell us about the impact of the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung on biographical, collective, and historical memory. 
                                                
293Those engaged in oral history would deal with these is ues at a matter of course.  Incidentally, 
Halbwachs can also help us understand how the exhibit itself represented a particular construction of the
past, based on the perspective of its organizers.  This was, as we have seen in Chapter Four, part of the 
criticism leveled against the exhibit.   
 
294Numerous reflections about this phenomenon exist.  Two examples focusing on German 
research of the recent past [Zeitgeschichtsforschung] are Jarausch, “Zeitgeschichte und Erinnerung.  
Deutungskonkurrenz oder Interdependenz?” in Verletztes Gedächtnis, eds. Jarausch and Sabrow, 9-37 and 
Harald Welzer, Verweilen beim Grauen:  Essays zum wissenschaftlichen Umgang mit dem Holocaust 
(Tübingen:  edition discord (sic), 1997), especially the essay, “Der Mythos von der unbewältigten 
Vergangenheit.  Über ein Interpretament der Zeitzeugenforschung zum Nationalsozialismus,” 49-68.  
Heinz Bude offered reflections about the narrative int rview as research instrument in “Der Ort des 
Interviews,” in Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., Besucher einer Ausstellung, 13-12. 
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In his book, Opa war kein Nazi, Welzer and his co-authors reported on the 
multigenerational research project, Tradierung von Geschichtsbewusstsein [the process of 
passing historical consciousness on from generation to generation].  The research rs 
asked  what ‘normal Germans’ remembered from the National Socialist past, how they 
talked to family members about their memories, and how the resulting narratives mad  
their way from generation to generation via communicative processes within families.  
To answer those questions, research team members participated in forty family 
conversations and 142 follow-up interviews. These conversations and interviews yielded 
a total of 2,535 stories. 295 Although it is tempting to recount some of the interviews in 
detail, a summary of the research team’s initial expectations and of their conclusions 
must suffice. 
Based on previous research in a variety of social sciences, the team hypothesized 
that historical consciousness included a cognitive as well as an emotional dimension.  
This seemed plausible since the neurological sciences and cognitive psychology had 
established that human memory used different systems for cognitive and emotional 
memory.296  The team found the two dimensions manifested in many conversations 
                                                
295Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi, 11. Curiously, the authors did not include 
in their report the dates of the conversations, but from a conference presentation by Olaf Jensen about his 
Diplomarbeit [Master’s Thesis], in which he offered a quantitative analysis of the family conversations, 
one can conclude that the majority of the interviews had taken place by March 1999, coinciding with the 
final year in which the original Wehrmachtsausstellung toured Germany.  Olaf Jensen, I duktive 
Kategorienbildung – skalierende Strukturierung – Klassifizierung.  Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse mit WinMAX 
am Beispiel von Mehrgenerationeninterviews zum Nation lsozialismus. Presentation at the Conference 
Computerunterstützte Analyse Qualitativer Daten, (Marburg: October 7-8, 1999), 4, 
www.maxqda.de/download/maxlit-4.pdf (accessed March 30, 2010).  The Volkswagen Foundation 
sponsored the research project. 
 
296Welzer explained the neurological foundations of memory more fully in his book, Das 
kommunikative Gedächtnis:  Eine Theorie der Erinneru g (München:  Verlag C.H. Beck, 2002).  See 
especially Chapter Two, “Das Gedächtnis ist erfinderisch.  Befunde aus der Neurowissenschaft und der 
kognitiven Psychologie,” 19-45.  
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during which older family members recounted memories of a “glorious” time in the 
Hitler Youth, “with shining eyes,” even though those same persons took a critical stance 
towards National Socialism at the time of the conversation.  Without hesitation, many 
members of the Zeitzeugen generation remembered “the good times” during the Third 
Reich, indicating that a distinction existed in their minds, albeit an unconscious one, 
among the feelings they associated with the past and what they knew cognitively about 
that same past.297  Welzer and his colleagues surmised that this dissonance would play a 
role in how elders passed down their memories to children and grandchildren, with the 
emotional aspects of memory trumping the cognitive ones. Consequently, they expected 
the stories dominating family discourse would differ significantly from what c ildren and 
grandchildren learned about the National Socialist past through family-external 
channels.298 
Generally, the researchers observed, the more a member of a successor generation 
knew about the criminal nature of the Third Reich and about the widespread participation 
of ‘ordinary’ Germans in perpetrating the Holocaust, the stronger was the desir to 
distance their own family members from personal implication.299  Grandchildren 
demonstrated an especially strong tendency to cast their grandparents in a positive light.  
In some cases this meant that in the mind of a grandchild, the grandparent had ‘saved 
Jews’ or had been a ‘resistance fighter,’ even though the elder had previously recounted a 
story placing him or her clearly within the camp of bystander or perpetrator.  The 
                                                
297Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi, 10-11. 
 
298Ibid. 
 
299Ibid., 77-78. 
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Zeitzeuge had left just enough room for interpretation to allow this mutation.  Welzer and 
his team coined the term cumulative hero-ization for this process.300  The process could 
also work as cumulative victimization, morphing the family member from bystander or 
perpetrator into the role of victim.  The more often family members retold a particul  
event or story, the more obvious the recasting became.  The Nazis, by contrast, assumed 
the role of ‘the other’ in the process.  Emotional attachment to family members as well s 
family loyalty also seemed to color how one generation ‘heard’ the stories of their elders 
and how they chose to fill the blank spaces those stories left.  In addition, members of 
successor generations demonstrated a tendency not to hear certain elements of a story that 
had clearly been part of the elder’s narrative.  Those ‘unheard’ or ‘forgotten’ incidents 
were invariably elements that would have put the elder in a negative light.301  
Apparently, the process of cumulative hero-ization or victimization was much 
more evident with the second than the first successor generation.  The greater 
chronological distance to the past and the generally less conflict-prone emotional 
relationships between grandchildren and grandparents may have accounted for this 
difference.  Welzer and his team also attributed the dynamic to the extraordinary amount 
of cognitive knowledge about National Socialism and the Holocaust that existed among 
the younger German generations, due to repeated exposure in school and to the 
overabundance of mediated information about the time period.  The more factual 
knowledge they had about the criminal nature of the past, the researchers theorized, the 
                                                
300Ibid., 64.  The German reads, kumulative Heroisierung, which means that successive iterations 
of a particular event in the past turn a person a bit more into a hero with each retelling of the story.  By this 
process, a bystander can morph into a rescuer of Jews or a resistance fighter. 
 
301Ibid., 207. 
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stronger their desire to disassociate their families, and by implication themselves, from 
that past.302  
Welzer and his colleagues deduced a theory from their findings according to 
which the historical consciousness of successor generations was an amalgam of multiple 
sources and influences.  They used the terms Lexicon and family album to clarify the 
difference between the two main types of influences.  The ‘lexicon’ stood for factual 
information and cognitive knowledge passed on through a variety of family-external 
channels.  Those included school curricula, the media, and, using Jan Assmann’s 
terminology, the various manifestations of cultural memory. 303  Yet the ‘lexicon,’ 
according to Welzer, was by no means dominant within the individual’s historical 
consciousness.  More important were the stories the individual shared with family 
members.  Those narratives, through continuous repetition and reconstruction, comprised 
family memory.  Notions of emotional attachment and family loyalty imbued family 
memory.  For the process that made family memory possible, Welzer coined the trm 
communicative memory.  While the ‘lexicon’ was an expression of cultural memory, the 
‘family album’ was the product of communicative memory.304  Like a picture album in 
which family photographs tell the family’s story in chronological as well as in emotional 
                                                
302Ibid., 156. 
 
303Ibid., 52-53, 164, 12-13.   Assmann tweaked Halbwachs’s definition of historical memory to 
arrive at what he called cultural memory.  Both terms denote the images, rites, and places that each culture 
and each epoch uses to define itself as distinct from other cultures or from other epochs.  Historical 
memory as well as cultural memory represents a public manifestation of large-group identity.  The grand 
national or master narrative would be a major manifestation of both, historical memory and cultural 
memory.  See J. Assmann, “Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität,” in Kultur und Gedächtnis, 
eds. J. Assmann and Hölscher, 12-16. 
  
304Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi, 9-10, 164. 
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terms, Welzer’s ‘family album’ metaphor denoted unique family memories, condensed 
into stories that provided identity and meaning.  
Welzer and his team concluded from what they heard in the family interviews that  
the ‘family album’ trumped the ‘lexicon’ in terms of influencing an individual’s historical 
consciousness. “Family memory is the primary source of historical consciousness,” th y 
stated, continuing, that the cognitive knowledge [Wissen] one acquired via history 
curricula, public history, documentaries and movies was something entirely diff rent than 
the unquestioned assurance [Gewissheit] one soaked up as a member of a memory 
community about that community’s past. 305  Perhaps not surprisingly, Welzer and his 
team found that the Holocaust did not appear in the ‘family album’ at all.  While the 
Holocaust dominated cultural memory in post-reunification Germany, meaning that it 
occupied much space in the ‘lexicon,’ there were only blank spaces in the ‘family album’
where the Holocaust should have been.306  Victim and hero narratives dominated those 
spaces instead. 
Do Welzer’s conclusions provide us with a road map to better understanding the 
guest book entries dealing with memory and family?  If one looked at the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung as experimental design, with the visit itself being the 
intervention, it would immediately become apparent how different this set up was from 
Welzer’s design.  The only evidence of the visit’s impact are the entries themselves.  
                                                
305Ibid., 210.  The common root between the German Wissen and Gewissheit makes clear how 
closely related the two concepts are.  The first is cognitive knowledge while the second denotes emotional 
knowledge.  
 
306This finding might also help explain Martin Walser’s defensive reaction against those aspects of 
contemporary German cultural memory that he considered ‘moral cudgels’ (see Chapter One).  Walser 
might have experienced great dissonance between his autobiographical and family memory and the cultura 
memory that surrounded him, a phenomenon that was probably true as well for many visitors of the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung. 
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Missing is what individual visitors thought about the issues presented in the exhibit 
before entering the exhibit hall, although in some cases visitors alluded to this in their 
commentaries.  Also, the guest book entries represent one-way communications; ne ther 
family members nor researchers were present to ask follow-up questions.  Lastly, as 
mentioned before, the entries do not allow broad conclusions.  Their authors represent but 
a minute fraction of those who visited the exhibit.  Nevertheless, approaching the entries 
with all due caution and keeping Halbwachs’s theory and Welzer’s conclusions in mind 
does shed additional light on the impact of the W hrmachtsausstellung on family memory 
and on historical consciousness. 
The entries chosen to open this chapter demonstrate quite clearly how differently 
members of the two successor generations reacted to what they saw in the exhibit. 
Almost stereotypically, the first two writers reacted with cynicism and moral judgment 
vis-à-vis their parents, while the last two clearly represented the scheme Wlz r had 
observed among grandchildren in his family studies.  All four writers, in one way or 
another, cast themselves or their loved ones as victims:  victims of deception, victims of 
traumatic memories and victims of war itself.  Some presented themselves as d fenders 
of those whose victim roles the exhibit did not honor adequately.  The entanglement of 
cognitive knowledge and emotional assurance also comes through clearly in all four
entries.  For the second person, emotional associations with war stories even manifsted 
themselves in physical reactions.  The writer remembered becoming sick to the s mach 
during childhood upon hearing about the war; as an adult, this writer once again felt like 
vomiting after having seen the exhibit.  The third writer could not reconcile the emotional 
memory of the grandparent with the knowledge gained from the exhibit. 
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Another entry exemplifies even more clearly the multi-generational and family 
aspects of dealing with the National Socialist past.  Obviously under the emotional 
impact of what he had just experienced, this person wrote, 
Oh father, why could we never talk about this.  For you comradeship, oath, and 
your ‘sprayers’ (=cannons, ic) were the most important.  You never saw, heard, 
or became aware of anything.  I do not only mourn the victims of the madness!  I 
also mourn a non-existent father/son relationship!  You would be 85 now, I am 53 
½ and father of three sons and one daughter.  May God protect us all. 307 
 
Presumably, the writer had visited the exhibit alone, but emotionally his parents 
and his children were with him nevertheless.  He clearly went as an individual who was 
inextricably embedded in family relationships.  For him, the legacy of the Holocaust was 
indeed a family matter.  Apparently, though, that very subject had been missing from his 
‘family album,’ even though conversations about the war must have taken place betwen 
him and his father.  The exhibit might have confirmed to this writer how very inadequate 
those conversations had been for what he needed to know in order to make sense of his 
family’s place in the past. The fact that he closed his entry with introducing his children 
to his presumably deceased father allows us to venture that this writer left thexhibit 
resolved to amend or change the narrative that he would pass on to his own children.  His 
reason for doing so would not seem to be primarily to educate them about the Holocaust 
but rather to develop a closer emotional bond with them than he had been allowed to 
forge with his own father.  If nothing else, the emotionally powerful nature of family 
memory is apparent in this entry.   
                                                
307Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944 ” in 
Hamburg, Volume One, June 1 to June 30, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.]. 
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Another member of the children generation clearly expressed the dissonance s/he 
perceived between ‘lexicon’ and ‘family album,’ trying visibly to maintain a non-
judgmental attitude vis-à-vis his/her “loved ones:”     
I would give much for knowing what my father did.  I just want to know, not 
judge.  But it is difficult.  Really it is unfathomable:  He is a loving father and the 
same person was a pilot of a bomber.  That much I know.  Thank you for the 
effort and hard work of researching the exhibit.  Without remembrance and 
acceptance of the past there is no humane future.308  
 
Another visitor simply wrote, “I cannot, and do not want to believe that my father 
knew of all this.” 309  A similar entry assumed more readily that the father might have 
indeed been implicated, “As the daughter of a possible perpetrator, my heart racd while 
the pictures and texts had their effects on me.  Relief about not having discovered him—
but immeasurable shame, shame, shame.” 310  Yet another writer seemed to have no 
doubt about the implication of his/her father.  This person wrote that s/he had traveled all 
the way from Bonn to see the exhibit in Hamburg because s/he was no longer able to 
abide the father’s denial and “settling of accounts [Aufrechnen].”  The writer went on to 
explain that his/her father had been born in 1927 and had served as soldier at the Eastern 
Front.311  Yet another son or daughter entrusted to the guest book his/her feelings, 
I am crying for what happened…Also in my father’s name…he was a committed 
one.  I am still ashamed but one can only soften it a little with the truth, b  one 
                                                
308Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg,  March 5 to April 14, 1995, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
309Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
310Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg,  March 5 to April 14, 1995, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
311Ibid.  
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cannot erase it. I was afraid with each photo to recognize my father…but I still 
looked.  Never again war.  Never again averting one’s eyes.” 312   
 
None of these members of the first successor generation attempted to distance 
their elder from the perpetrators; on the contrary, it is surprising to what extent the 
children accepted the historical ‘truth’ of the exhibit’s message and were prepared, albeit 
with sadness, incredulity, shame, or anger to place their parents into the scenes they saw.  
Welzer did not observe this dynamic at play within the family conversations he and his 
team witnessed.  The physical presence of the elder generation in those conversati s and 
the emotional aspects inherent in family gatherings might have accounted for the 
difference between what the researchers observed and what comes through in the guest 
book entries. 
The similarities between members of the second successor generation in Welzer’s 
study and in the guest books are more apparent.  All follow the general scheme of the two
entries opening this chapter.  Not all writers identifying themselves as belonging to the 
grandchildren generation mentioned their grandparents, but those who did disassociated 
them from the events they saw in the exhibit.  One entry is of special interest.  Th  writer 
did not go as far as turning his/her two grandfathers into heroes, but s/he nevertheless 
allowed the perpetrator among the two to morph into a victim during the course of the 
entry.   
Both my grandfathers were in Russia.  One as motorcycle dispatch rider and the 
other in a notorious police regiment whose job it was to fight partisans.  The first 
‘got around’ as dispatch rider and, if he did not lie to me, saw much that was 
worse than on these photos.  And he was shocked!  The second was in a function 
in which he was responsible for such photos. (As perpetrator).  Before and after 
the war he was a loving father and husband.  Why is this exhibit called ‘crimes of 
                                                
312Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944 ”  in 
Hamburg, Volume One, June 1 to June 30, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.]. 
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the military’ and not ‘crimes of the war’ because the war made my grandfather 
what he became during the war. 313  
 
All phenomena that Welzer observed appear in this entry.  The comment seems to 
come straight from the writer’s ‘family album.’  S/he must have heard the stori s of 
his/her grandfathers’ pursuits during the war many times.  The grandfathers must have 
been quite open with their grandchild about what they had seen and done during the war.  
None of this had made them bad persons in the eyes of the grandchild since one 
grandfather ‘was shocked’ at what he had seen and the other had been made a victim of 
the circumstances.  The first successor generation, the writer’s parents, must also have  
contributed to the ‘family album,’ attesting to the fact that their father had been a ‘loving 
father.’ The loving father and husband had crowded out the perpetrator in the 
grandchild’s imagination.  The victim motif made this possible; the exhibit had not been 
able to destroy the image. 
Another writer provided comments, thinly concealing a good dose of smugness, 
 Blessed with the mercy of the late birth (construction year 1958), I had the good 
luck of having had a grandfather who was one of the few that actively opposed the Nazis.  
Moreover, my parents brought me up in a liberal, anti-fascist spirit, which hopefully has 
left political evidence [in my life].  Consequently, the story about the crimes of the 
Wehrmacht is nothing new for me. […] 314   
  
We cannot say whether the grandfather’s alleged opposition to Hitler was a result of 
cumulative hero-ization in Welzer’s sense or whether it had a historical basis.  The writer 
left unclear whether the information about the grandfather was first-hand or part f the 
family narrative that the parents had passed on.  However that may be, it is clear that the 
                                                
313Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
 
314Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hanover, Volume One, November 1998, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  
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writer had no problems reconciling family memory with the message of the exhibit.  On 
the contrary, the exhibit seemed to have reinforced the conviction that the own family 
had been ‘on the right side’ of history all along.  Some of the language in this comment 
allows one to wonder whether the writer’s socialization might have taken place in the 
former East Germany.  Antifascism was generally not part of West German discourse 
about National Socialism, while it dominated that discourse in the German Democratic 
Republic.  Where the writer grew up does indeed not matter much for our purposes, 
except to demonstrate that the cultural framework in which family memory functions 
affects the images and terminology used in constructing the past.315  
Comments by members of the Z itzeugen generation are curiously absent from 
the guest books.  The relatively few writers who self-identified as members of the war 
generation either attempted to correct the exhibit’s message by relating in considerable 
detail ‘how it really was,’ or they tried to explain why the circumstances had compelled 
soldiers, perhaps themselves included, to act the way they had.  Those writers used 
familiar discourses of honor, comradeship, fear for one’s life, and the harshness of 
partisan war to make their points.  As one Zeitzeuge maintained, “The following must be 
said:  These were the deeds of the communication zone (back area services!) and not 
those of the real Wehrmachts oldier—the front soldier!  Those had to fight and hour by 
hour fear for their lives!” Almost as a post script, the writer added below his entry and in 
                                                
315Welzer referred to this process as cultural framing.  According to this theory, those who 
constructed narratives about their pasts used cultural frames to communicate their stories.  These frames 
might come from popular movies, cultural stereotypes, or from cultural references that all members of a
group share and understand.  Welzer observed, for example, that some narrators conveyed their war 
memories using themes taken directly from movies that were familiar to their audiences. For example, plots 
or scenes from the movies, Die Brücke, Das Boot, and Im Westen nichts Neues were cultural frames that 
Zeitzeugen in Welzer’s study had used to convey their war experiences.  Welzer, Das kommunikative 
Gedächtnis, 171-192. 
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parenthesis, “[I] was at the front for several years and am 100% war disabled.”316  Others 
criticized the organizers for defaming an entire generation of German men, including 
their own fallen comrades. The few commentators that mentioned children or 
grandchildren did so only to express relief that successor generations had been spar d the 
horrors of war.  The relatively low representation of Zeitzeugen in the guest books 
examined here could be a reflection of the war generation’s waning numbers by the mid-
1990s; yet the Zeitzeugen generation did not stand entirely on the sidelines during the 
controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung. 317 For example, many expressed their 
opinions about the survey in letters to newspaper editors.  This generation was also well 
represented in research projects that included interviews and surveys of visitors in va ious 
venues.318 
                                                
316Gästebuch der Ausstellung “Vernichtungskrieg.  Verbr chen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944” in 
Hamburg, Volume Two, July 1 to July 15, 1999, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, [n.p.].  The 
German term translated as communications zone is Etappe. 
 
317According to Lena Knäpple’s retrospective, some warparticipants “admitted guilt” in their 
guest book entries, but I did not encounter those in the books I examined.  Knäpple, 
“Wehrmachtsausstellung,” in Lexikon der ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung,’ eds. Fischer and Lorenz, 288.  
Hannes Heer, in a retrospective newspaper article ten years after the dismantling of the original exhibit, 
also cited several admissions of guilt from the guest books, albeit without indicating their exact locations.  
Hannes Heer, “Die letzte Schlacht der alten Soldaten:  Wie die Ausstellung über den ‘Vernichtungskrieg’ 
der Wehrmacht das Land spaltete,” Die Zeit, Politik  (Article Series:  “Mein Deutschland,” 15. Teil), June 
25, 2009. 
 
318While systematic research on the guest books does nt seem to exist, other forms of reactions to 
the exhibit (survey responses, interviews, and letters to the editor) have been subject to research on which 
documentation exists in the literature. Two such studies are, Ilka Qyindeau, “Erinnerung und Abwehr:  
Widersprüchliche Befunde zur Rezeption der Ausstellung ‘Vernichtungskrieg,’ ” in Der Krieg in der 
Nachkriegszeit, eds. Greven and von Wrochem, 291-306 and Johannes Klotz, “Die Rezeption der 
Ausstellung ‘Vernichtungskrieg’ in Leserbriefen,” in Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit, eds. Greven and von 
Wrochem, 307-323. In 1996, Ruth Beckermann produced a film of the interviews she performed with 
former Wehrmacht soldiers.  Ruth Beckermann and Peter Roehsler, Jenseits des Krieges=East of War 
(New York: First Run/Icarus Films, 1996).  A book followed two years later.  Beckermann, Jenseits des 
Krieges:  Ehemalige Wehrmachtssoldaten erinnern sich (Wien:  Döcker Verlag, 1998).  The book, 
Besucher einer Ausstellung, also shed light on visitors’ reaction to the exhibit, with ample representation of 
Zeitzeugen. 
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The exhibit designers intended to facilitate conversation among generations, but 
commentators disagreed to what extent that happened.319  Even when it did happen, it 
was not always conducive to healing, but at times rather confrontational.  The ‘wall of 
silence’—perceived or real—the constructed memories of brotherhood among soldiers, 
the sense of obligation toward the memory of fallen comrades, and the notion of loved 
ones at home who ‘knew nothing’ apparently were powerful and difficult to overcome.320  
Cross-generational dialog about as contentious and emotional a topic as National 
Socialism and the Holocaust seemed to be more difficult among strangers than among 
family members.  The bonds of love and loyalty that Welzer and his colleagues had 
observed at work in the families of their sample must have played a decisive role in the 
process of forging a collective memory of the past.  That bond must have been less 
obvious when family members confronted their memories alone, as they generally did in 
the Wehrmachtsausstellung, or when they faced members of other generations who were 
also strangers.321 
                                                
319Michael Klundt asserted that this dialog did happen.  At the same time he criticized that some of 
it showed tendencies of ‘harmonizing reconciliation’ which was only possible because alleged perpetrators 
among the discussants were allowed to cast themselves as Hitler’s victims, while the real victims and their 
descendents were not part of these intergenerational dialogs.  Klundt, Geschichtspolitik:  Die 
Auseinandersetzung um Goldhagen und die Wehrmachtsausstellung, 46.  Bernd Greiner, historian at the 
Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung and at the University of Hamburg, disagreed.  Greiner, in Ei e 
Ausstellung und ihre Folgen, ed. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, 39–40. There seem to have been 
numerous opportunities for dialog, but apparently such dialog was often divisive rather than congenial.   
 
320For more detail, see Bernd Ulrich, Besucher einer Ausstellung.  The book offered analyses of a 
subset of 131 oral histories that were conducted with visitors in Berlin, Stuttgart, and Potsdam. In his 
introduction, Bernd Ulrich emphasized that the interviews were not representative of the estimated 21,000 
visitors who saw the exhibit in those three venues (ibid., 9).  At times, the interviewers’ own biases against 
the war generation showed through. All interviewers were members of the second successor generation, a 
generation that by and large had harbored anger against its elders, especially during the upheavals of the 
late 1960s.  We have seen some evidence of this anger in a number of guest book entries from the first
successor generation as well. 
 
321Whether communication among strangers might be more ‘h nest’ because unencumbered by 
emotional family entanglements is interesting to ponder, but not at issue here.  Social psychologists might 
be better qualified to pursue this type of question han historians are. 
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As argued in Chapters Four and Five, the controversy over the so-called 
Wehrmachtsausstellung has shaped the reckoning with the legacy of National Socialism 
in Germany on multiple levels.  This was perhaps nowhere more evident than in the 
debate the Bundestag conducted about the exhibit in March and April, 1997.322  As 
politicians, representatives clearly referred to what Welzer called the ‘lexicon’ of 
National Socialism.  As we have seen from the excerpts presented in Chapter Four, 
however, the ‘family album’ had a powerful presence as well, which is quite remarkable 
for a political event such as a parliamentary debate.323 Even though the deputies had 
assembled to make a political decision, in full view of the public eye, they nevertheless 
brought personal and family memories with them which they were not afraid to share 
freely.  In this they were not unlike the exhibit visitors whose comments we have 
analyzed.  Thus, among the controversies we have examined, the one about the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung demonstrates most clearly the resilience yet malleability of ‘the 
past.’  It also illuminates the multiple forces bearing on historical consciu ness.  Wissen 
and Gewissheit act together, often in competition with one another. Finally, the 
controversy showed that the insights and attitudes resulting from the complex 
relationships between the various influences upon historical consciousness often serve as
normative guides to action.  This was most likely the case for those visitors wh  
expressed opposition to the use of the Bundeswehr in the Balkans or in Iraq.324    
                                                
322See also the discussion of the Bundestagsdebatte in Chapter Four, pages 108-111. 
 
323I would argue that historical consciousness, in all its complexity, colors all political action, but 
politicians seldom acknowledge this fact as directly and openly as the deputies did in March and April of 
1997. 
 
324Others could have drawn the opposite conclusion, namely, that Germany had an obligation to 
send the Bundeswehr to areas of crisis in order to prevent civil war from escalating into genocide, precisely 
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  The controversy over the so-called Wehrmachtsausstellung demonstrated once 
more that the past does not just ‘pass away,’ as Ernst Nolte had wished it would during 
the Historikerstreit.  The past also does not necessarily undergo the normalization 
process that Chancellor Kohl and others had hoped it would, even though, as we have 
seen, the memories of the past have undergone changes in conjunction with broader 
political, social, and generational shifts.325 As the last Zeitzeugen leave the scene, 
historical consciousness is likely to continue to change; a process for which Martin
Broszat coined the term historicization [Historisierung] during the Historikerstreit and 
which historians have debated controversially ever since.326  Pulling together the various 
insights from our examination of multiple waves of controversies in a final analysis 
should also shed some additional light on this process that is ever ongoing, yet so difficult
to define or explain. 
________________________ 
because of the nation’s National Socialist past.  Such arguments may exist in the guest books, but I did not 
encounter them in the books I examined. 
 
325To what extent this means that the past itself has c nged is a discussion between 
postmodernists and modernists.  Talking about normalization immediately raises the question whether  
anything is ‘normal’ in history, but, again, this is a discussion for another day.  
  
326See the discussion of histocization in Chapter Two, pages 62-66. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study has explored the complex relationships between history, memory, 
historical consciousness, and national identity.  James E. Young posed the fundamental 
issues as questions. “How does a state incorporate its crimes against others into its 
national memorial landscape?” he asked, and “Under what memorial aegis, whose rules, 
does a nation remember its own barbarity?” 327  
It is noteworthy that instead of using the term grand national narrative, Young 
spoke of ‘memorial landscapes.’ He had primarily physical places of commemoration in 
mind, but his landscape metaphor also works for historical consciousness in general.328 
As the case studies examined here have demonstrated, discourse about the past shapes 
historical consciousness. Consequently, the narratives and images with which 
communities speak about their past are not unlike public commemorations, memorials, 
and museums in their roles of shaping and communicating historical identity.  Just as 
physical landscapes consist of diverse geological formations, ‘memorial landscapes’ 
imply not only a variety of places of commemoration, but also diverse narratives about 
the past.  In this sense, the survey of four decades of reckoning with the legacy of 
National Socialism has allowed a glimpse not at an emerging grand national narrative, 
but rather at the unfolding of a national memorial landscape. 
                                                
327James Young, quoted in Welzer, Verweilen beim Grauen, 20.  Quoted from James E. Young, 
The Structure of Memory:  Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 
1993), 22. 
 
328Pierre Nora’s concept of  ‘places of memory’ also seemed to be broader than physical places of 
commemoration.  Those places would include everything that a national community deemed worthy of 
remembering.  For a summary of Nora’s Les Lieux de Mémoires see Kattago, Ambiguous Memory, 16-18. 
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The study has also shed light on the various actors that vie if not for hegemony in 
the process then at least for a place at the table.  For example, from time to ti the state 
seeks a prominent role in forging a national memorial landscape by interpreting the past 
and by giving the past meaning for the present. While this may be unavoidable yet 
potentially controversial in respect to state-sponsored commemorations and publicly-
financed memorials and museums, it was contested in the memory wars on which this 
study has focused.  The Historikerstreit demonstrated the state’s ambition most clearly in 
that ‘Bitburg’ and Chancellor Kohl’s Wende provided the controversy’s political impetus.  
The government’s decision to deploy German armed forces in out-of-area missions 
during the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung served a similar function. Yet, as 
we have seen, the state is by no means the only player competing for a role in the process 
of forging a national memorial landscape. 
As the Fischer Controversy has demonstrated, professional historians were the 
ones who initiated a process that led to a profound reassessment of the National Socialist
past.  As subsequent memory wars increasingly played out in the public limelight, 
however, the guild slowly faded into the background, only to reemerge during the 
controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung.  At that point, historians brought to the 
table what historians do best:  they designed public history events that shared insights 
from academic scholarship with public audiences; they served as experts in the evaluation 
of primary source material; they conducted oral history research projects, and they used 
questions raised in the course of the ongoing debate to push the historiographic research 
agenda forward. 
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This study has also shown that with each new controversy the work of 
contemporary historians [Zeitgeschichtler] became more difficult and contentious. This 
was primarily due to the ever more visible and powerful role the media claimed for itself 
in the process of forging Germany’s memorial landscape.  While the media’s power over 
the public arena fully came into its own in the Goldhagen Affair, the (print) media had 
already begun its march towards dominating public discourse with the Fischer 
Controversy.  The controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung and its sustained 
intensity over the course of almost five years are quite unthinkable without the media.  
Yet one should be careful not to evaluate this development in entirely negative terms.  
Television and press coverage also made available new channels for historians to each 
out to wider audiences.  The lines between academic and popular history may have 
blurred, but new opportunities for two-way communication opened up at the same time.  
As public discourse rapidly moves to virtual platforms, professional historians may find 
new challenges and additional opportunities for being part of the conversation.   
The public emerged as perhaps the strongest force throughout the five memory 
contests at issue in this study.  While the Fischer Controversy had been primarily about 
the state and about the role of the historian vis-à-vis the state, with each subsequent 
memory contest the focus on the individual increased; a development that came to a head 
with the Walser-Bubis-Debate.  While the first memory war concerned actors and 
structures on the international and national levels, subsequent ones increasingly focused 
on individuals.  The controversies peeled away, layer by layer, what separated the 
individual, ‘ordinary’ person from the crimes of the past.  In the end, nothing remained 
between that past and the individual conscience. To say it differently, the memory 
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contests moved from the outside in, starting with the state and ending with one of the 
most personal possessions an individual has, his or her conscience.  As German society 
worked its way from the Fischer Controversy to the Walser-Bubis-Debate, ‘Hitler-free’ 
spaces became smaller and smaller until they disappeared almost entirely. Each memory 
contest managed to dismantle a taboo that the previous one had left intact. By the time 
the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Walser-Bubis-Debate gripped 
the land, potentially everyone was challenged to take a stand—which many did.  Some 
chose defensiveness and anger; others looked for deeper reflection; yet others to k 
political stands vis-à-vis current government policies. Thus, the controversies contributed 
to the building of a national memorial landscape by dismantling, piece by piece, taboos 
about National Socialism and about those who had been part of it—virtually all who had 
belonged to the Volksgemeindschaft during the Third Reich.329  Whereas victims (mostly 
German victims at first but later also Jews and other victim groups) had crowded the 
landscape since the early days of post-war Germany, perpetrators and bystanders claimed 
more space as the waves of controversies swept over the land.  Perhaps ironically, the 
memory wars also followed an opposite trajectory at the same time:  from relatively 
contained discussions among a small circle of historians they morphed into what one can 
only call public spectacles, beamed via television into virtually every household. 
                                                
329Volksgemeindschaft, literally translated as the community of the peopl , had been the term 
Hitler and the Nazis used for all Germans who were de med to be fit to be part of that community.  This 
excluded German Jews and many other groups.   The statement in the text is not meant to assign collectiv  
guilt to all Germans alive during the Third Reich; it just says that the controversies revealed, bit by bit, that 
virtually everyone who was not victim of Nazi persecution was implicated in the criminal aspects of the 
Third Reich in some way, perhaps merely as bystander.  Expressed differently, it became increasingly 
difficult to maintain that the Nazis had been “the others.” 
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It could be tempting to portray this multi-faceted trajectory as progress towards a 
‘model,’ ‘correct,’ or ‘enlightened’ approach to reckoning with a difficult past.330 It was 
not.  Presenting the five controversies as bracketing and bridging events migh  also have 
suggested that developments unfolded more or less inevitably and according to plan.  The 
process traced here does not demonstrate progress nor was it inevitable in the way t at it 
developed. As we have seen, the public reacted to each controversy in quite unpredictable 
ways, depending on the contexts in which the debates occurred.  Evidently, the various 
players did not learn from or matured on account of the memory contests in any 
systematic way.  For example, public reaction to Goldhagen’s thesis was entirely 
different than the response to Walser’s speech.  Indeed, comparing the two leaves one 
puzzled about the fickleness of public opinion. 
Apparently, as taboos disintegrated, as demographics shifted, as historiography 
advanced, and as the impact of the media changed the rules of the public sphere, the 
parameters within which memory wars occurred became entirely different ones.  This 
process is likely to continue with unknown implications for controversies yet to come. 
Even though in 1995 a majority of Germans expressed the opinion that the country had 
dealt sufficiently with its National Socialist past, and despite the evidence that many 
seemed to have reached the burn-out stage on Vergangenheitsbewältigung at the time of 
the Walser-Bubis-Debate, new memory contests have erupted since then and Germans 
                                                
330One does find such assessment in the literature, alb it in respect to the process in general rather 
than specifically targeted at the controversies we have examined.  Interestingly but not surprisingly, these 
perspectives come primarily from outside observers rather than from within German circles (unless they are 
made in connection with Schlussstrich argumentation or come from the extreme right wing).  Daniel 
Goldhagen, for example, attested Germany model chara ter in terms of reckoning with a criminal past.  
Klundt, Geschichtspolitik, 28. Olick offered a more nuanced assessment, but still referred to the German 
case as “powerful substantive and theoretical exemplar” that has “provided much of our contemporary 
vocabulary for thinking about these issues” as other nations have “confronted the legacies of difficult 
pasts.” Olick, “What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past?” 566-567.  
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have weighed in. 331  Closure is not in sight.  How the process has occurred so far neither 
represents progress nor followed logical rules, and it is impossible to predict how i  will 
continue. 
It is easy to overlook one of the more indirect results of reckoning with the legacy 
of National Socialism, namely the ‘culture of discord’ [Streitkultur] that has evolved in 
the process.  Many Germans look upon this with considerable pride, but it has also posed 
challenges to political leaders and public policy makers.  This dynamic was especially 
obvious while the Wehrmachtsausstellung made its way from city to city.  The 
controversy demonstrated that it was possible to instrumentalize National Socilism for 
present purposes.  One could use the past as ‘moral compass’ or, to use Habermas’s 
terminology, as ‘normative filter’ for deciding contentious issues in almost any area of 
foreign and domestic policy.332  In Germany, this has happened with respect to foreign 
relations with Israel (and with Israel’s enemies), nuclear armament, the use of German 
armed forces, the handling of asylum cases, policies towards the mentally ill, s well as 
issues of life and death (capital punishment, abortion, end-of-life practices).  The list 
could go on and would also include issues of how to deal with political dissidents, right-
wing extremist groups, and neo-Nazi movements.  We have seen this dynamic at play 
primarily in the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung, during which both sides 
used the past to argue their case. Walser exposed the flipside of the same process by 
                                                
331Sixty-three percent answered in the affirmatively when asked whether Germany had dealt 
sufficiently [ausreichend] with its recent past during the last fifty years.  Only thirty percent said no, and 
seven percent were unsure.  Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1993-1997, vol. 10, eds. Noelle-
Neumann and Köcher, 529.  As for new controversies, one only needs to follow the daily German press to 
see that topics related to National Socialism, the war, and the Holocaust remain very much alive, as well as 
controversial, in national discourse. 
 
332Klaus Naumann, “Zwischen Tabu und Skanda.:  Zur Aufarbeitung der NS-Vergangeneheit in 
der Bundesrepublik,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 41 no. 9 (1996), 1137. 
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attacking unnamed groups and individuals for instrumentalizing ‘Auschwitz’ for their 
purposes.  They did not use the Holocaust as ‘moral compass,’ he alleged, but rather as 
‘cudgel’ to advance their own economic gain.333  In either case, National Socialism has 
provided the historical backdrop for political action in the present. Discussing the legacy
of National Socialism in the public sphere for making political arguments that affec the 
present has become a regular feature of German political culture.  
Does this mean that National Socialism and the Holocaust have been historicized? 
Long gone are the days when Martin Broszat and Jürgen Habermas argued for subjecting 
National Socialism, WWII, and the Holocaust to the same scholarly scrutiny as one 
would apply to the study of any historical subject.334  Even Ernst Nolte’s plea for 
contextualizing the Third Reich seems rather anachronistic from today’s perspective.335  
Historiography has come a long way since the days when historicization and 
contextualization were issues of acrimonious debate.  New methodologies have becom
more widely accepted and new questions have arisen partially as a consequence of 
working through the controversies.  Furthermore, historians no longer need to work as 
hard as Fischer and his colleagues did to dismantle taboos in the popular imagination 
                                                
333Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” in Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 13, 
12. 
 
334Broszat clarified once more in 1988 what he had meant in his plea for the historicization of 
National Socialism that he had originally published in 1986.  Martin Broszat, “Was heisst Historisierung 
des Nationalsozialismus?” Historische Zeitschrift 247, no. 1 (1988): 1-14. 
  
335Critical reaction against Nolte’s revisionism was ju tified in the 1980s, but it seems that the 
need for comparative historiography of National Socialism has become once more acceptable since then.  
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about the recent past; much of that work has been accomplished in the course of 
conducting the five memory wars that were at issue in this study.336 
One must wonder, however, if Broszat and others had imagined the kind of 
historicization that seems to be at work in a young student’s reflection on learning bout 
National Socialism in school.  In the course of their family interviews, Harald Welzer and 
his colleagues had asked a twelve-year-old what she thought about her current course of 
study.  “Yes, I find that totally interesting,” she responded, 
because we have also learned about the Stone Age and the middle ages.  First, we 
learned about the Stone Age, then the middle ages, then it always progressed a 
few generations, must have some sort of system.  So now we have this topic.  Yes, 
it is fun.337 
 
The student continued to share her considerable factual if spotty knowledge about 
National Socialism, also mentioning her inability to imagine her grandfather having been 
alive during the war.  For this student, National Socialism, WWII, and the Holocaust 
were topics just as the Stone Age and the middle ages. Learning about them was fun.  
This is historicization in all its inevitability.  Broszat and those who were concerned 
about the dangers of relativization associated with historicization might find reassurance 
in that the history curriculum for German schools addresses the ethical dimensions of 
                                                
336Some myths about the past seem to persist among the public, not unlike the one about the ‘clean 
Wehrmacht,’ despite the evidence historians uncover to the contrary.  Just recently, the German newspaper 
Welt Online reported on a historical commission having researched the long-standing notion of low-flying 
British airplanes hunting defenseless civilians after the bombing of Dresden in WWII.  The historians did 
not find evidence to verify those accounts.  Nevertheless, all of the comments accompanying the article 
expressed disbelief in the historians’ report.  After all, the writers had heard about these instances and 
believed them to be true.  Once again, the ‘family album’ trumped the ‘lexicon.’ Sven Felix Kellerhoff, 
“Dresden 1945:  Bis zu 25,000 Tote, aber keine Tieffliegerangriffe,” Welt Online, March 17, 2010 
(http://www.welt.de/kultur/article6817372/Bis-zu-25-000-Tote-aber-keine-Tieffliegerangriffe.html). 
  
337Welzer, ‘Opa war kein Nazi,’ 7.  I do not mean to imply that ‘fun’ is bad, even though from an 
adult perspective, the term seems somewhat jolting in connection with studying about National Socialism 
and the Holocaust.  Here it probably just indicated that the teacher had succeeded in awakening this young 
student’s curiosity about the past, which is to be commended. 
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National Socialism, WWII, and the Holocaust in addition to providing factual 
information even in the lower grades.338  As the coverage of our controversies in current 
textbooks for High School students has shown, history curricula challenge older students 
to engage in higher level critical thinking about the issues involved.  The assignments 
also ask students to integrate what they have learned through multiple venues about the 
time period (using primary sources, movies, and family stories).  In other words, National 
Socialism and the Holocaust are historicized in school curricula, but their treatment 
makes an effort to convey the time period’s moral and ethical dimensions; something that 
Saul Friedländer (and others) had been concerned about during the Historikerstreit. 339 
Despite the inevitable historicization that comes with increasing chronologica  
distance from the past, National Socialism and the Holocaust have not become history 
like any other.340  One could attribute this primarily to the presence of Zeitzeugen, but as 
Chapter Five has demonstrated, the reality is more complicated.  If the presence of 
                                                
338A textbook geared towards the middle grades dedicated n entire unit to the very issues 
addressed in Young’s question, namely how does a country incorporate its darkest history in its historical 
consciousness; is there a proper way to commemorate the victims; how does one discern similar threats in 
today’s society? Assignments challenged middle school students to discuss why people might want to 
repress the National Socialist past; they were to discuss the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, and they were to 
conduct internet searches about groups working against right-wing extremist movements in Germany.  
They were also to research traces of Jewish life and culture in their home towns.  Sven Christoffer, Eckard 
Hanke, Helmunt Heimbach, Arno Höfer, Uli Jungbluth, Klaus Leinen, Peter Offergeld, and Antonius 
Wollschläger, Zeitreise 3 (Stuttgart:  Ernst Klett Verlag, 2008) 82-89. 
 
339For a cogent summary and analysis of Broszat’s and Friedländer’s positions on historicization, 
see Jörn Rüsen, “The Logic of Historicization:  Metahistorical Reflections on the Debate between 
Friedländer and Broszat,” History and Memory 9, no. 1/2 (Fall 1997): 113 [no ending page number 
provided], http://0-www.proquest.com.library.acaweb.org/; Document ID: 593643081(accessed March 27, 
2010).  
 
340As some historians have pointed out, historicization of National Socialism has received a boost 
from the end of communism in Europe which eventually ended German division into two states.  After 
1990, the Third Reich had become an epoch separated f om the present by another distinct epoch, namely 
that of the two German successor states.  Consequently, it has become ‘easier’ to study National Socialism 
since reunification.  Saul Frieländer,“Martin Broszat und die Historisierung des Nationalszialismus,” in  
Mit dem Pathos der Nüchternheit:  Martin Broszat, das Institut für Zeitgeschichte und die Erforschung des
Nationalsozialismus, eds. Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Claudio Natoli, 155-171 (Frankfurt/Main:  Campus 
Verlag, 1991), here 160. 
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Zeitzeugen were the defining factor in rendering history contentious, then it would be 
only a matter of time until memory wars were no longer necessary.  The elusive 
Schlussstrich would follow about eighty years after a controversial event—in the case of 
Germany, this would be by 2025 at the latest—and successive generations would wonder 
what all the fuss had been about. 341 Yet this is not how it works.  As many guest book 
entries have demonstrated, ‘memory’ of the past persists in individuals and groups long 
after those who have witnessed the past are no longer around.  In the process of moving 
from one generation to the next, stories about the past generally change, but evidently 
without losing their power in the process. We saw evidence for this dynamic at work in 
many guest book entries, but one can also detect it in the numerous associations of 
expellees that still exist in Germany, even though most members of the generatio  that 
actually experienced expulsion from the lost German territories have died.  Some gr ups 
within those organizations, by now surely under the leadership of members from 
successor generations, still agitate for return of the lost territories.  For these descendents, 
as for children and grandchildren of other victims of war, the ‘family album’ reains a 
powerful antithesis to the ‘lexicon.’ Given these insights, memory contests ar unlikely to 
cease once the last Zeitzeuge has passed on.  Just because National Socialism has been 
thoroughly historicized and just because some young students have ‘fun’ learning about it
in school does not mean that it will no longer represent contested history.  Neither does it 
mean that historicization is necessarily identical with relativization; a fear that had still 
                                                
341I am referring specifically to Germany, but my statements have broader applicability.  
Traumatic events in the history of a group or nation would have similar effects.  The Holocaust would be a 
prime example for this in the case of Israel; slavery, the Civil War, and the legacy of racial discrimination  
have cast shadows in U.S. society that were longer than the life span of contemporaries; the examples could 
go on and on. 
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been very real during the Historikerstreit.342 What is probably does mean, at least for the 
second and subsequent successor generations, is that learning about, talking about, and 
most likely  disagreeing about the legacy of the National Socialist past has become a 
normal and regular aspect of political life. 
When pondering the effects of generational succession on reckoning with the 
National Socialist past, one might overlook the fact that historians figure in this dynamic 
as well.343  Norbert Frei’s work sheds light on this important aspect of the historicization 
process. He has shown how the waning of the Zeitzeugen generation among professional 
historians has affected, and is likely to continue to affect, contemporary history 
[Zeitgeschichte] as an academic sub-discipline in Germany. 344 The fact that until recently 
the study and interpretation of National Socialism has been largely in the hands of 
members of the Zeitzeugen generation is often overlooked.  Indeed, several of the 
controversies at issue here resulted in significant ways from fissures among or between 
generational cohorts.  The Fischer Controversy pitted two generations of historians 
against each other.  The Historikerstreit was a fight over competing pasts among 
members of the same generation.  The Wehrmachtsausstellung became to some extent the 
                                                
342The danger of relativization may be just as strong today, if not stronger, than it appeared in the 
1980s; today it comes largely from outside of respectable historical circles.  One can see extreme right-
wing parties and movements fuelling calls for relativization and playing into popular xenophobia and other 
fears that accompany economic uncertainty. 
 
343Ralph Jessen offered an analysis of the various confli ts (between historical science, politics, 
and the public) that resulted from many historians of Zeitgeschichte also having been contemporaries of 
National Socialism.  Ralph Jessen, “Zeithistoriker im Konfliktfeld der Vergangenheitspolitik” in Verletztes 
Gedächtnis, eds. Jarausch and Sabrow (Frankfurt:  Campus Verlag, 2002), 153-175. 
 
344Norbert Frei, “Farewell to the Era of Contemporaries:  National Socialism and Its Historical 
Examination en route into History,” in History and Memory 9 no. 1/2 (Fall 1997): 59 [no ending page 
number provided], http://0-www.proquest.com.library. caweb.org/; Document ID: 593643091 (accessed 
March 27, 2010). The emphasis here is on Germany, but similar processes would probably play out 
elsewhere. 
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controversy it was on account of intergeneration strife among historians.  Finally, i  the 
Goldhagen Affair generational animosities played out on a transnational level.345  
According to Frei, the departure of historians who had also experienced National 
Socialism first-hand bears both dangers and opportunities for the field of Zeitgeschichte.  
One might fear, he argued, that the absence of “moral restraints enforced by th  
contemporaries” might open doors for “random [and] gratuitous speculation,” which 
could replace “serious inquiry and authentic research.” 346  A popular market that seems 
to be ever more interested in scandalous revelations might further accelerate this trend. 
Frei saw early signs of such developments in the Goldhagen Affair.347  On the other hand, 
with the absence of Zeitzeugen among historians and the general public, research would 
no longer have to take “the reputations and interests of former perpetrators, collaborators, 
and profiteers” into consideration.  Concentration camp research and a social history of 
‘Aryanization’ were just two areas Frei saw as potentially benefiting. Researchers were 
also likely to taker closer looks at continuities between the Third Reich and post-war 
Germany than had been the case so far. 348 As the last contemporaries of National 
Socialism left the scene, Frei reminded us, this period in contemporary history “[was] on 
the verge of becoming ‘plain’ history, …” Yet since National Socialism as Zeitgeschichte  
“was never an exclusively German prerogative, so it will remain an international research 
                                                
345Looking back on the Historikerstreit from the perspective of 1997, Frei wrote, “It now seems 
that the Historikerstreit could be described as the protracted political farewell—abruptly ended by German 
reunification—of a generation of researchers and indiv duals who had a specific autobiographical agenda 
and were facing retirement at the start of the 1990s.”  Frei, “Farewell to the Era of Contemporaries,” [n.p.], 
Section II, paragraph 12.   
 
346Ibid., Section III, paragraph 1. 
 
347Ibid. 
 
348Ibid., paragraphs 4-6.  
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topic once it has entered the realm of history.”  His article ended with a categorical ‘no’ 
to a past that might finally pass away. On the contrary, since “[T]he paradigm tic 
significance of this past has not vanished, whoever hopes that it will do so in the future is 
hoping in vain.” 349  Clearly, historicization is as inevitable as it is welcomed, yet neither 
relativization nor a Schlussstrich are part of the equation. 
This is also the point at which to ask if any of the periodization schemes offered 
in the literature describe adequately the process of reckoning with the past, as viewed 
through the lens of waves of controversies.  Siobhan Kattago’s five-stage scheme as well 
as Norbert Frei’s four-phase approach seems inadequate in that both treat the entire time 
span from 1980 to the present as a single stage.  For Kattago, the 1980s inaugurated what 
she called the stage of normalization and national identity.350  Frei referred to those years 
as Vergangenheitsbewahrung [commemoration of the past]. For him, the stage of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung [reckoning with the past] preceded the last stage and had 
presumably come to an end by the 1980s. 351 
Having looked at four waves of controversies falling between the mid-1980s and 
the late 1990s allows the fine-tuning of existing periodization schemes.  The quest for 
national identity has certainly been part of each controversy, as has the wrangling over 
normalization.  We have argued earlier that the past itself cannot and should not be 
‘normalized;’ first, because there is no such thing as ‘normal’ history and second, 
because those who have argued for normalization in connection with National Socialism 
and the Holocaust have generally done so in order to relativize the criminal nature of the 
                                                
349Ibid., last two paragraphs. 
 
350Kattago, Ambiguous Memory:  The Nazi Past, 38-48. 
 
351Frei, 1945 und Wir, 41. 
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Third Reich.  We have conceded, however, that the processes of learning about, talking 
about, and arguing about National Socialism have become normal aspects of German
political culture.  Frei’s commemoration phase has become ingrained in German culture
as well, at least in the forms of public discourse and public ritual.  Commemoration h s 
become part of the country’s memory landscape.  Treating the twenty years spanning the 
time before the Historikerstreit until the end of controversy over the 
Wehrmachtausstellung as one single phase, however, does not work.  It does not do 
justice to the social, geo-political, and demographic shifts that have so profoundly 
affected the course of reckoning with the past during those years.  Instead, it may be ore 
appropriate to subdivide the last stage into two separate ones.  The 1980s with the 
Historikerstreit would be the era of discourse debates, while the 1990s with the 
Goldhagen Affair, the controversy over the Wehrmachtsausstellung, and the Walser-
Bubis-Debate would be the era of memory and conscience debates.  Together, the two 
eras would converge into the larger stage of historicization. 
James E. Young’s taxing question is still waiting for an answer.  It will have to 
remain open since a finite answer does not exist.  A nation cannot declare at a certain 
point in its history that all has been accomplished, just as it cannot claim at any one time 
that its national identity has been established and will remain unchanged.  Indeed, 
Young’s question is not one that requires a finite answer. Rather, the answer lies in the 
process itself.352  Individuals, groups, and nations continuously address the issues he 
                                                
352After having arrived at this conclusion on my own, I came across a quote by Young that makes 
me think he would answer his own question as I do.  “[T]he best German memorial to the fascist era and its 
victims may not be a single memorial at all—but simply the never-to-be-resolved debate over which kind 
of memory to preserve, how to do it, in whose name, and to what end.”  James E. Young, quoted in 
Kattago, Ambiguous Memory, 171.  Quoted from Young, The Texture of Memory:  Holocaust Memorials 
and Meaning (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1991), 21. 
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raised as they go through the unending processes of remembering their past, learning
about it, debating the past’s meaning for their lives, act upon their understanding, and 
pass on their knowledge and understanding to the next generation. Once a community has 
accepted the fact that its past includes uplifting as well as traumatic aspe ts, each 
generation will ‘reckon’ differently from the one that came before.  In the process, 
aspects of the past will reveal themselves that no one had been able or dared to see 
earlier.  Historians and the public will ask questions that have not occurred to anyone 
before. Finally, issues in the present will prompt communities to query the past in new
ways. New sources will present themselves.  Historians, most likely in collaboration with 
members of other academic disciplines, will apply new methodologies.  The results might 
change virtually everything, as happened in the Fischer Controversy.  The past, 
regardless of how riddled with traumatic or criminal events, will remain important as 
individuals, groups, and nations discover and rediscover their historical roots and 
negotiate who they are in the world.  This study’s focus was on post-war Germany, and 
we have argued that Germany’s case was not exemplary.  Yet the issues conn cted with 
forging memorial landscape that incorporate proud as well as burdening aspects of a 
national past are applicable beyond the German context. 
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